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Lithium-ion Battery Safety - Assessment by Abuse Testing, 
Fluoride Gas Emissions and Fire Propagation 
FREDRIK LARSSON 
Department of Physics, Chalmers University of Technology 
ABSTRACT 
Lithium-ion batteries offer high energy and power densities as well as long life time but have 
a more narrow stability window compared to other battery types and contain reactive and 
flammable materials. In case of overheating the battery cell can release gas (vent) and, at 
temperatures of about 150-200 °C, a so called thermal runaway can occur, that is a rapid self-
heated temperature increase which is typically accompanied with a large release of smoke and 
gas, fire and a potential cell case explosion or gas explosion. In this work Li-ion battery safety 
has been studied by abuse tests; external fire, external heating (oven), external short circuit 
and overcharge. In total fifteen types of commercial Li-ion battery cells with various 
chemistries and cell capacity sizes ranging from 1.4 Ah to 45 Ah were studied. 
Cell abuse may have a number of consequences. Emissions of toxic and flammable gases 
have been studied under external heating and fire tests. During such tests cells can vent long 
time before/without thermal runaway. In external heating abuse tests, three different vents 
were identified, two of them occurred before the thermal runaway. In case of a delayed 
ignition of the vented gases mixed with air in a confined/semiconfined space, a gas explosion 
can occur. The consequences of a gas explosion might be significantly more severe than those 
of a cell case explosion (explosion due to extreme cell pressure). In external heating tests, 5 of 
11 cells underwent a gas explosion, for all levels of cycle ageing studied (0-300 deep C/2 
cycles). Released fluoride gas emissions have been studied by FTIR spectroscopy and gas-
washing bottles, a parallel independent method, that verified the total emission amounts. In 
fire tests, toxic hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas was released with 20-200 mg/Wh of nominal 
electrical energy capacity, according to data from seven types of commercial Li-ion cells at a 
state of charge (SOC) in the range of 0-100 %. The HF production rate in limited fire tests 
was temporarily increased when water mist was applied as a fire fighting medium, however, 
the total HF emission values were similar with or without water mist. Emission of POF3 was 
also detected in the fire test, but only for one cell type at 0 % SOC. In external heating tests 
on the same cell type at 100 % SOC, emissions of HF and POF3 were also detected. The 
measured amounts indicate that HF might pose a severe and acute toxic threat. 
Heat spreading from a single Li-ion cell failure to adjacent cells, the cell-to-cell propagation, 
has been studied both experimentally and by numerical simulations. The use of fire walls 
between modules can significantly influence the propagation. A general risk assessment for 
Li-ion is presented and it is concluded that there is a lack of data on failure mechanisms, 
probability and consequences today. 
The shut-down principle for future metal-air batteries, has also been studied as an additional 
safety aspect, utilizing primary (non-rechargeable) commercial Zn-Air cells. Besides offering 
an additional shut-down technique, it also offers possibilities to reduce electrical hazard 
voltages, by temporarily bringing the voltage down to zero volt. 
Keywords: Lithium-ion, safety, abuse testing, thermal runaway, fire, cell case explosion, gas 
explosion, propagation, gas emission, hydrogen fluoride 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Batteries of different types, sizes and applications are widely used today. There are many 
requirements on the battery depending on the use such as low weight, small volume, low cost, 
long life time as well as being safe. Batteries can be divided into two main categories, primary 
batteries, i.e. non-rechargeable and secondary batteries that are rechargeable and can be used 
multiple times. There are different battery technologies for each main category. A battery can 
consist of one or several cells. Common primary batteries are small consumer batteries type 
AA or AAA consisting of one cell of e.g. alkaline type.  Type AA and AAA cells are also 
available as secondary rechargeable batteries. 
The lead-acid battery is a rechargeable battery widely used as vehicle start battery and 
backup-battery. The lead-acid battery technology is mature, it has been used for more than 
150 years, it provides however relatively low energy density, low cycle life time and long 
charging time. The nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) technology is another type of secondary 
battery that offers a higher energy density and a longer cycle life time. NiMH has been widely 
used, however its market has decreased in favor of the lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries. The Li-
ion batteries are rechargeable and offer a long life time combined with high energy and power 
densities, resulting in compact and low weight high-performance batteries, but have 
drawbacks in terms of safety. The first commercial Li-ion battery was introduced by Sony in 
1991, for a review of the development of lithium-ion batteries see Blomgren [1]. 
Lithium is a very light element and offers a high cell voltage when used in batteries. The term 
lithium battery is sometimes used for both rechargeable Li-ion and non-rechargeable Li-metal 
batteries, which have very different properties. Today’s primary lithium batteries, named 
lithium-metal (Li-metal), are typically found in coin cells (e.g. CR2026 type). Even though 
secondary Li-ion batteries do not use lithium in metallic form today, it might be used in the 
future also for rechargeable batteries, increasing the confusion even more regarding the 
vocabulary. In some situations, e.g. in case of fire-fighting with water, it is essential not to 
mix up Li-ion and Li-metal battery types as water and lithium-metal produces hydrogen. 
INCIDENTS AND FIELD FAILURES 
There are billions of Li-ion battery cells in use world-wide and every year a number of 
incidents happen. Relatively few incidents are widely reported by media, some are only 
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locally reported, while some are not reported at all. There are thus limited statistics about Li-
ion battery incidents and there is no organization that specifically handles battery accidents. 
For consumer Li-ion cells, a cell failure rate of less than 1 ppm (<1 cell failure in 1 million 
cells) are reported in a few scientific papers [2,3,4] however just as a number without further 
information, discussion or references how they were obtained. Thus, the knowledge of cell 
failure rates is limited or not publicly available. The known incidents are typically referred to 
as field failures, that is, failures in the field. There are a number of possible causes for battery 
failures and at least a part of the field failures are often considered as spontaneous internal cell 
short circuits. They start at a micrometer scale inside a cell with a short circuit rapidly 
increasing the local temperature. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect these 
types of failures before they happen. Internal cell short circuits are just one of possible causes 
for fires or explosions, external factors are also very important. 
Nowadays Li-ion batteries are used in different environmental conditions, with a more 
complex ageing profile and power usage, e.g. with large current (high C-rate
*
 values), in 
larger packs, with larger cell sizes, with newly developed electrode materials, electrolyte 
mixtures, etc. For example, “automotive cells”, i.e. cells with high quality manufacturing (e.g. 
more pure raw materials) and larger size than that of typical consumer products, are exposed 
to road vibrations, humidity and temperature variations, high charge and discharge pulses, 
thus the environmental conditions are quite different compared to those for small consumer 
cells of e.g. the 18650 type. However, 18650 cells are sometimes used also in larger battery 
systems e.g. the electric car manufacturer Tesla Motors have used 18650 cells but have now 
announced a change to a somewhat larger cylindrical cell of type 2170, i.e. 21 mm in diameter 
and 70 mm long [5]. 
When a new technology is introduced the knowledge on associated risks is often limited. 
When risks become better known steps are taken (counter actions) to handle these risks.  For 
example, the use of gasoline is a natural part of the handling of vehicles today, however 
gasoline is a rather extreme, dangerous substance in terms of risks for fire and explosions. 
Anyhow, today the society has learnt how to handle gasoline so that the safety level is 
relatively high. For electric vehicles as well as for other applications using Li-ion batteries the 
learning curve is still on the rise. 
                                                             
*
 The C-rate relates the size of the current to the capacity size of the cell, where 1 C means a current equal 
to 1 hour discharge of the battery cell. For example a 10 Ah cell have a 1 C-rate of 10 A, while the 10 C-rate is 
100 A and C/10 is 1 A. 
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Over the years there have been repeated incidents involving Li-ion batteries in cell phones, 
laptops and other portable electronic devices but with the growing use of larger battery 
systems incidents can have more serious consequences, for example in case of a fire in a grid 
power storage plant using Li-ion batteries. Laptop computer batteries have been, and still are, 
involved in battery incidents, due to e.g. cell manufacturing problems, that have led to major 
recalls, costly for the manufacturer, e.g. Sony [6]. As another example, many cell phones of 
type Samsung Galaxy Note 7 did catch fire in 2016. That lead to a massive recall by Samsung 
[7]. Fire incidents with smaller-sized consumer products, including e.g. batteries for electric 
bicycles and hover boards, having a Li-ion battery are reported relatively often, however 
taking into account the billions of battery cells used, the failure rate is low. Additionally, the 
consequences from a single cell or small Li-ion battery failure are typically not so severe.  
There are however examples of fatal consequences from small Li-ion battery failures. In 2009 
in Staffanstorp, Sweden, a family of five people were killed in their sleep during a house fire, 
and the fire investigation identified an overheated laptop computer as the probable origin of 
the fire [8,9]. 
Some incidents involving electrified vehicles have attracted considerable media attention. In 
2011 there was an incident involving the electrified vehicle Chevrolet Volt [10]. The vehicle 
had been crash tested according to common test procedures without problems. However, three 
weeks later a battery fire accompanied with an explosion occurred as reported in the 
investigation of the event by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).  
The cause was found to be short circuit by leaking coolant from the mechanical crash damage. 
After the incident the failure modes were repeated and the delayed fire could also be 
reproduced. Another incident reported by media occurred in 2012 when hurricane Sandy 
flooded the harbor in Newark, New Jersey, USA. Thousands of vehicles parked in the harbor 
were immersed in about 1.5-2.5 meters of sea (salt) water and there were reports of burned 
HEVs and PHEVs, from Toyota Prius and Fisker Karma. Sea water is a good electrical 
conductor that can cause an electrical short circuit, e.g. in the Li-ion battery but also in the 
vehicle´s 12 V lead-acid battery and system. This was an extreme situation, cars are not 
designed to be submerged in sea water. In order to avoid consequences of such an incident, 
cars need to be designed with a tightness level of IP68 or equal, something that is not easily 
accomplished in a Li-ion battery and particularly not for the 12 V system. 
At the end of 2013 the media attention was high since three electric vehicles, Tesla Model S, 
went into fire within a time period of six weeks.  The first incident was caused by the driver 
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hitting road debris at highway speed which mechanically abused the battery pack from 
underneath by penetration. The second incident involved severe mechanical deformation 
when the driver hit a concrete wall and thereafter a tree. The third incident was also caused by 
mechanical abuse when the car was hit by road debris. Thus, the three electric vehicles were 
exposed to large mechanical forces and one could argue what level of damage a vehicle 
should be designed to handle. NHTSA conducted an investigation but did not find any defect 
trends [11]. After these incidents Tesla Motors reinforced the construction to better protect the 
battery from mechanical abuse [12]. There have been a few more fires in the same type of 
vehicle, e.g. one in Norway and another in Sweden [13], both when the vehicle was being 
charged. Vehicle fires in the USA comprise about 1 fire in 1400 vehicles [14]. The statistics 
for electric vehicles is still very limited, but this far the EVs are significantly less prone to fire 
as discussed in Paper II.  EVs offer in principle several safety advantages [15], anyhow real-
world potential safety disadvantages are yet not known to the full extent, for example, the 
EVs on the streets today are still relatively new thus potential ageing effects on safety are not 
yet accounted for. 
The risks for fire and explosion are of special concern in cases where there are limited 
possibilities to escape the consequences of a battery incident. In 2013-2014 there were a series 
of fire incidents involving the then new airplane Boeing 787 Dreamliner [16,17]. Given the 
occurrence of fires and the number of installed batteries, the cell failure probability rate in 
2014 was extremely high, magnitudes above the typical failure rate values found of about 1 
ppm. The Dreamliner was the first commercial airliner to use Li-ion batteries but after a 
reconstruction of the battery system no further incidents have been reported. Battery fires 
have occurred in airplanes earlier but then involving Li-ion batteries in the cargo hold of the 
airplane. In 2010 and 2011 two fires occurred in Boeing 747 cargo planes resulting in airplane 
crashes where the crew was killed. The fires were blamed on the transported Li-ion batteries 
[18]. The airline industry has since then imposed strict regulations for transporting Li-ion 
batteries as cargo, but restrictions have also been imposed for batteries transported as hand 
luggage on airplanes [19]. Another example of a battery fire that may have consequences for 
the application is the RoboSimian fire in 2016, where the Li-ion batteries of the robot did 
undergo thermal runaway and a subsequent fire in Nasa’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory [20]. 
All this incidents and accidents show the importance of safety of batteries. The increased use 
of Li-ion batteries emphasizes the need even more. 
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LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES 
 
THE LITHIUM-ION BATTERY CELL 
The term Li-ion battery is used as a family name of a type of batteries using intercalation 
electrodes and lithium ion conducting electrolytes of different chemical compositions. The 
batteries are typically characterized by a high cell voltage of about 4 V, high energy and 
power densities, short charging times, low self-discharge, high efficiency and long life time 
[21]. Compared to many other battery technologies Li-ion batteries have some drawbacks in 
terms of safety, e.g. the electrolyte is flammable, and the cell has a limited stable operational 
window in terms of voltage and temperature ranges. In case of overheating, the cell in itself 
internally provides all three elements (in the fire triangle) necessary for fire; heat/igniter, 
combustible material and oxygen. 
Li-ion battery cells are sealed during normal use and can be found in different shapes, the 
most common are cylindrical, hard prismatic and pouch prismatic, see examples in Figure 1. 
A common cylindrical size is the so called 18650, which is 18 mm in diameter and 65 mm 
long. It was originally used in battery packs for laptop computers. Li-ion cells are today 
commercially available in a large range of different capacities, the most common ones are in 
the range of about 2-20 Ah per cell. 
 
Figure 1. Photo showing commercial Li-ion cells of three types; cylindrical, hard 
prismatic and pouch prismatic. 
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Li-ion batteries are produced in very large numbers and are used in many different 
applications; e.g. in consumer products such as cell phones, laptop computers, digital 
cameras,  handheld power tools, electrified vehicles, ships and for stationary energy storage 
used in the electrical grid. The small powerful Li-ion batteries have revolutionized the 
consumer market enabling for example the smart phones. The attractive properties of the Li-
ion technology, especially the energy and power densities (corresponding to low weight and 
volume) and long life time, have resulted in an increasing use of Li-ion batteries for 
electrified vehicles, i.e. hybrid electric vehicles (HEV), plug-in HEV (PHEV) and electric 
vehicles (EV), all with different degree of electrification and battery sizes. The diverse 
applications meet different demands and environmental conditions. For example, in vehicles 
there are road vibrations, potential crash forces/deformation and vast temperature and 
humidity variations, while desired battery properties are low cost, long electrical driving 
range (high energy density), high acceleration and top speed (high power density), fast 
charging (high charge power density) and long life time. From a physical science perspective, 
there is always a trade-off between the desired properties, e.g. it is simply not possible to have 
the highest energy density at the same time as having the highest power density. The battery 
optimization is, within reasonable ranges, a matter of constructional design. For vehicle 
applications this means for example, that having a fast charging capability limits the driving 
range but also lowers the battery life time, since high currents (both charge and discharge) 
typically wear out the battery faster. 
In Li-ion battery cells, the lithium ion, Li
+
, is transferred between the cathode (positive 
electrode) and the anode (negative electrode), during charging and discharging, this is 
sometimes referred to as a “rocking chair”. Figure 2 shows a schematic illustration of the Li-
ion cell. During electrical discharge the current goes through the electrical load from plus pole 
to minus pole and the circuit is closed by the lithium ion transport in the electrolyte. The 
porous separator is soaked with electrolyte and prevents cathode-anode contact while the 
holes in the separator allow electrolyte penetration, thus can Li
+
 pass through. The electrical 
current is conducted via current collectors, using thin metal foils of aluminum at the cathode 
and copper at the anode. 
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Figure 2. Schematic illustration over the Li-ion battery cell, the directions of the arrows 
are valid during discharging (opposite direction during charging). 
 
There are a large number of possible electrode materials and many of them have been studied 
in research laboratories, while just a few have been commercialized. For the anode, different 
types of carbon/graphite are the most used commercially. Another commercial anode material 
is lithium titanium oxide (LTO), Li4Ti5O12 or other titanium compounds, e.g. LATP,  
LiAlTiPO4. For the cathode a wider range of materials are commercially available. The first 
cathode material used by Sony was lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), LiCoO2 and it is still in use. 
Other metal oxides are also used e.g. based on nickel, manganese and aluminum in various 
combinations. Lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC), LiNixMnyCozO2 is a common 
cathode materials in different combinations where x+y+z=1. (NMC is sometimes also referred 
to as NCM.) Lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA), LiNixCoyAlzO2, and lithium 
manganese oxide (LMO), LiMn2O4, with manganese spinel are other common cathode 
materials. Another group of cathode materials are based on phosphates, and a few of them are 
commercialized, the most common one is lithium iron-phosphate (LFP), LiFePO4. The 
different electrode materials offer various pros and cons. 
There are also different types of commercial separators. The most common separator material 
is a polymer made from e.g. polyethylene (PE) or polypropylene (PP). The melting 
temperature of PE is about 130 °C while PP melts at about 160 °C. Sometimes a combination 
of PE and PP is used as a two layer PE-PP or a trilayer PP-PE-PP separators. These are called 
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shutdown separators and offer some safety advantages. The polymer separator can also be 
reinforced by ceramics to allow physical rigidity at higher temperatures, usually 200 °C or 
somewhat higher. 
The electrolyte is typically a mixture of a Li-salt, organic solvents and a number of additives. 
The exact electrolyte composition used in commercial Li-ion batteries is seldom or never 
revealed and considered key knowhow and treated with large secrecy. Water based 
electrolytes have an electrochemical stability window of about 1.2 V and cannot be used in 
Li-ion due to the higher cell voltage [22]. The Li-salt is needed to enable the Li
+
 conductivity 
and the currently outmost used commercial Li-salt is lithium hexafluorophosphate, LiPF6. The 
fluorine in the LiPF6 may give rise to toxic gas emissions but it has so far been a difficult and 
complex task to replace the LiPF6 in the electrolyte. The organic solvents are typically a 
mixture of linear and cyclic carbonates in order to achieve optimal properties in terms of e.g. 
viscosity, dielectric constant, melting and boiling temperature. Common linear carbonates 
include dimethyl carbonate (DMC), diethyl carbonate (DEC) and ethyl methyl carbonate 
(EMC) while common cyclic carbonates are ethylene carbonate (EC) and propylene carbonate 
(PC). Other common solvents are, e.g. ethyl acetate (EA). A number of additives, typically in 
small concentrations, are often used since they are important for various purposes, e.g. 
performance, life time and safety. 
The cell layers of cathode, separator and anode are soaked with electrolyte and then the layers 
are either rolled forming a so called jelly-roll or cut in rectangular shapes and stacked on top 
of each other with electrical parallel connectors between each layer. The jelly-roll is typically 
used in cylindrical or hard prismatic cans, while the stacked layers are more common in 
prismatic pouch cells. Figure 3 shows X-ray photos of an 18650 cell where the layers in the 
jelly-roll are clearly seen. 
Several safety mechanisms can be integrated into the Li-ion cell. All Li-ion cells today need 
to be fully sealed since the electrolyte would otherwise evaporate and react with humid air. In 
a situation when the battery cell undergoes excessive temperatures, the cell pressure will 
increase and in order to prevent build-up of extreme cell pressure and the consequence of a 
cell case explosion, a safety vent is integrated into cylindrical and hard prismatic cells, while a 
pouch cell typically has no safety vent since it cannot build similar high pressures before 
naturally bursting. A pouch cell can still have a predesigned spot or spots with less strength in 
order to predetermine the location of the pouch cell opening. The interior of the cell can also 
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have a (partly) reversible integrated current limiter such as a positive temperature coefficient 
(PTC) or a non-reversible current breaker such as a current interrupt device (CID). 
 
Figure 3. X-ray photos of a 18650 cylindrical cell of type Sanyo UR18650F where A-E 
is not of the same scale, (A) showing a cross-section of the jelly-roll, (B) 
showing a 3D of the top of the jelly-roll, (C) showing the jelly-roll from the 
side, (D) showing a cross-section of the top of the cell and (E) showing a 
cross-section of the full cell-length. 
Thus the Li-ion battery cannot be described as one single type, but rather as a wide range of 
different types of batteries. New materials in terms of cathode, anode, separator and 
electrolyte for Li-ion batteries are constantly developed. Li-ion batteries are often considered 
positive for the environment and climate change, however the full picture is complex. There 
are environmental challenges for Li-ion batteries during e.g. material processing and battery 
manufacturing. The amount of easily accessible lithium sources in the world are concentrated 
to a few sources and countries [23], even more than for oil, causing potential future political 
10 
 
and market problems. There are huge amounts of highly diluted lithium in sea water, but it is 
technically and commercially challenging to extract it. Material recycling of Li-ion batteries 
today focuses on the expensive metals in the battery but might need to focus also on recycling 
lithium in the future in order obtain enough lithium for the wide use of Li-ion batteries. 
Development of future sodium-ion batteries [24] may decrease the need for lithium, but 
lithium ion batteries are and will still be dominant for an extended period of time. 
 
THE LITHIUM-ION BATTERY SYSTEM 
A commercial Li-ion battery today consists of one or multiple cells but also includes 
electronics for monitoring and control of the cell/cells, cables/connector, all placed inside a 
battery box (e.g. plastic/metal). Li-ion batteries for cell phones typically consist of just one 
battery cell, while a Li-ion battery for a power tool can consist of e.g. 6 cells. Larger batteries 
for electrified vehicles and stationary grid applications can consist of hundreds or thousands 
of cells or even higher numbers of cells. The application determines the need for power and 
energy capacity of the battery and thereby the requirements on the cell. By electrically 
connecting battery cells in series the total voltage is increased, and by parallel electrical 
connection the capacity is increased. For large batteries cells can be connected both in series 
and parallel, and they can be arranged in different ways, forming one or several so called cell 
strings. 
Today typically about 10-20 cells are placed together into a battery module with a voltage of 
about 50 V, and then a number of modules are connected together to form the battery pack 
with a voltage of about 300-1000 V. For very large systems, a multiple of battery 
subpacks/packs are connected together to form a battery system. If just one battery pack is 
used that will be the battery system. 
The outer battery case or box is needed to protect the battery from the environmental 
conditions which vary for different applications. Is should protect from; dust, moisture from 
rain or air humidity, low and high temperatures, mechanical abuse e.g. drop or deformation by 
crash, vibrations from e.g. road applications, as well as from accidental short-circuits. 
A thermal management system that controls the heating and/or cooling of the battery system, 
is needed for larger batteries, and can be passive or active using air or a liquid as cooling 
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agent. It is important to keep the battery within a certain temperature range for reasons of 
safety, life time and performance. 
The battery management system (BMS) is the brain of the battery system and has a number of 
sensors to monitor and control the battery. The BMS is needed for Li-ion batteries in order to 
maintain a safe operation. For small batteries only one BMS is used, such a BMS is 
sometimes called protection circuit module (PCM). Larger battery system can have a master 
BMS and a multiple of slave BMS, typically one slave BMS per battery module. 
The BMS must measure the voltage of each battery cell in order to prohibit overvoltage and 
undervoltage. Cells connected in parallel can be treated as one cell in terms of cell potential, 
however in case of separated battery strings, the cells are not connected in parallel and in such 
a case all the battery cells need to be monitored. In addition to the individual cell voltage 
sensors, the battery module and pack voltages are typically also measured, and are important 
in order to validate potential errors in the voltage sensors. The current in the battery system is 
also measured at one or several locations. 
The temperature is typically measured at a numbers of places in the battery system. In large 
systems, it was earlier relatively common to have one temperature sensor per cell or per two 
cells. Nowadays it is more common to have fewer temperature sensors, e.g. 1-2 sensors per 
battery module (e.g. 10-20 cells) in the automotive industry, in order to lower the cost of the 
battery. The temperature sensors are important in order to establish the overall battery 
temperature for operational purposes, e.g. power output and for control of the thermal 
management system. 
The battery system also consists of electrical components such as current cables, connectors 
and circuit breakers. Typically one or several fuses are used for short circuit protection of the 
battery pack, and there are usually electrical circuit breakers in form of contactors at each 
battery pole, a negative contactor and a positive contactor. Figure 4 shows a simplified 
schematic illustration of a battery system focusing on the current path and battery voltage 
connections. When powering up the battery system the voltage goes from 0 to the system 
voltage of typically hundreds of volt, and in order to lower the transient current peaks, a pre-
charge circuit is often used, typically consisting of a contactor and a resistance (not shown in 
Figure 4). 
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The battery voltage has so called floating ground, meaning that there is no electrical 
connection between either of the battery poles and the outer reference ground potential (e.g. 
chassis ground in vehicles). The floating ground increases the general electrical hazard safety 
since two isolation faults are needed in order to create a circuit. The isolation between the 
battery poles and the ground is typically monitored by an isolation monitor circuit in the 
BMS. 
 
 
Figure 4. Simplified schematic illustration of a battery system. 
 
During usage the cells will show somewhat different behavior due to small variations in the 
cell from the manufacturing, from temperature variations within the battery pack and from 
various electrical connections (resistances) of the cells. Therefore the cells need to be 
balanced, in order to achieve similar conditions for the cells by adjusting their cell potential. 
The BMS controls the cell balancing which can be achieved with different passive (resistive 
burning of the cell(s) with the highest voltage) or active (shifting energy from high to low 
voltage cells) techniques. 
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The BMS typically also determines the state of charge (SOC), i.e. the remaining capacity, of 
the battery pack and also the state of health (SOH), i.e. the ageing (wear) of the battery. The 
BMS or the battery application establishes the maximum discharge and charge currents 
(power) given the status of the system, e.g. cell temperature, SOC and SOH. The BMS, 
especially in larger battery systems, communicates with the application, via e.g. CAN 
communication protocol. State of safety (SOS) is a novel term which yet not has an 
established definition and seldom reported [25]. 
In a situation where the battery cells can be damaged, the BMS can shut down the battery 
pack via request to the application or simply via opening of the contactors. This can occur in 
case of isolation faults, overcurrent, overvoltage or undervoltage (for a single cell), too low or 
too high cell temperatures. 
 
SAFETY OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES 
Lithium-ion batteries contain a flammable and volatile electrolyte [26]. The Li-ion cell, even 
without contact with the outside environment, in itself contains all three parts of the fire 
triangle in case of overheating; heat, combustible material and released oxygen. In case the 
temperature of a Li-ion battery cell increases the electrolyte starts to evaporate increasing the 
internal cell pressure, which can lead to a swollen cell, see an example in Figure 5. If the 
temperature continues to increase the cell pressure will increase further and to avoid extreme 
internal cell pressure, cells are designed to vent and thereby release the gases. If the internal 
cell temperatures increase too much exothermic reactions will increase the temperature even 
further which can lead to a so called thermal runaway (TR), that is a rapid self-heated cell 
temperature increase typically accompanied by one or several of the following events; strong 
venting (smoke and gas release), cell case rupture/explosion, gas explosion and fire. Figure 6 
shows a photo of a Li-ion cell at the moment the thermal runaway start, showing the cell 
squirting out ignited material, less than a second later the cell is engulfed in fire. The released 
gases can be ignited at once but in case of a delayed ignition there may be a risk of a gas 
explosion, with more severe consequences, particularly in confined or semi-confined 
environments. Different Li-ion electrode materials have different thermal runaway 
characteristics [Paper I-III,27,28,29,30]. The emitted gases consist of the organic electrolyte 
solvents, such as DMC, DEC, EC, or decomposition products such as CO, H2 and CH4. 
Besides being flammable the vented gases are also toxic and corrosive. Toxic gases include 
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various fluoride gases, e.g. hydrogen fluoride (HF) and phosphoryl fluoride (POF3). The 
released gases consist also of CO (an asphyxiant gas) and CO2 (induces anoxia). 
 
 
Figure 5. A commercial Li-ion pouch cell which is swollen due to overcharge abuse. 
 
 
Figure 6. A commercial Li-ion cell of type 18650 undergoing thermal runaway in 
external heating abuse test. 
 
The cell temperature increase can originate from many sources, Figure 7 shows different 
types of abuse, potentially leading to TR in a single cell which could propagate to adjacent 
cells and eventually to the complete battery system. The critical temperature depends on cell 
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type and ambient conditions, and it is a matter of heat generation vs cooling. The exothermic 
reactions can start already at about 30 °C [31], but typically higher temperatures are required, 
starting from about 120 °C with the breakdown of the solid electrolyte interface (SEI) layer 
[30]. After the SEI breakdown and if the temperature increases further, the next step is 
exothermic reactions between the electrodes and the electrolyte, typically the anode-
electrolyte reaction starts first followed by a larger exothermic cathode-electrolyte reaction. 
The point of no return for the thermal runaway is typically about 150-200 °C [Paper I-
III,27,28,29,30], different for different time scales, cells, battery pack layouts, abuse type and 
method. 
 
 
Figure 7. Thermal runaway in a single cell and its potential propagation to complete 
battery system level. 
 
In abuse testing the battery is exposed to different types of violence in order to study the 
battery response to the abuse. The level of violence ranges from mild to severe, in different 
abuse test types and within the same abuse test type. Some of the abuse tests are close to 
possible events in real-world situations, e.g. external fire, while other failure types that may 
happen are difficult or impossible to mimic in an abuse test in a controlled laboratory, e.g. 
spontaneous internal cell short circuits. Batteries are often designed to be safe in some abuse 
situations, for example having a fuse to offer protection for external short circuit, however, 
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protection from all types of abuse is impossible. There are several international abuse test 
standards, such as the commonly referred to FreedomCAR [32], the SAE J2464 [33] and 
UL1642 [34]. For transportation requirements of batteries, United Nations (UN) have a test 
standard, UN 38.3 [35] assessing the batteries when they are not in use, i.e. during 
transportation. Cells/batteries that are to be transported needs to pass this standard otherwise 
they may not be transported and thus are very difficult to sell and distribute. 
Abuse testing is a valuable tool to assess safety, however passing an abuse test does not 
necessarily mean that the battery is safe. The nail penetration abuse test is a relatively 
common test, where a metallic nail is forced through a Li-ion cell. Those tests are 
unfortunately not well understood and typically considered having poor reproducibility [36] 
and being non-reliable by Li-ion battery safety experts. By varying e.g. the size and shape of 
the nail and its speed and impact angle, the cell response can vary greatly [37]. 
There are no intrinsically safe Li-ion cells, which mean that fires and other thermal incidents 
will occur. The consequences of a single cell failure may be insignificant while the same 
failure affecting all the cells in a battery pack may be serious. For high safety in battery 
systems it is therefore essential to handle the consequences from cell failure and minimize 
cell-to-cell, module-to-module and pack-to-pack propagation. It is a complex task and it can 
be difficult to completely stop the propagation, however, to delay it might be important as 
well, achieving valuable time for warning/detection, evacuation of personal, fire fighters to 
arrive, etc. 
From a general physical principle perspective: the higher amount of energy per unit, the 
higher potential for safety risks, i.e. an increased energy density results in an increased safety 
challenge. Additionally, the higher the cell voltage the higher the safety challenge, since the 
voltage stress on the electrolyte increases and there is an increased pressure on undesired side-
reactions. The development towards higher cell voltage in Li-ion batteries is therefore 
challenging. 
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EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
Experimental work has been carried out in paper I-VIII in order to evaluate the safety of Li-
ion and zinc-air batteries. An overview and summary of the experimental methods is 
presented here. More detailed experimental descriptions can be found in the respective papers. 
TESTED BATTERY CELLS 
Fifteen commercial Li-ion battery cells types and two commercial primary Zn-air cell types 
were tested, see Table 1. The most common battery chemistries for Li-ion batteries were thus 
investigated as well as different size and packaging of the cells. Li-ion cells for consumer 
products as well as “automotive” cells were included. Automotive classed cells are typically 
characterized as high quality cells made from more pure raw materials and with high quality 
manufacturing process and having long life, capable of higher currents, robustness for e.g. 
vibrations, humidity and temperature variations occurring on road conditions. 
Table 1. List of tested commercial battery cells, sorted by nominal capacity size. 
Commercial battery cells Nominal 
capacity 
(Ah) 
Nominal 
voltage 
(V) 
Anode/cathode 
material 
Cell 
packaging 
Secondary cells (rechargeable): Lithium-ion 
K2 Energy LFP18650E 1.4 3.2 carbon/LFP cylindrical 
Sanyo UR18650F 2.2 3.7 carbon/cobalt based cylindrical 
Samsung ICR18650–24F 2.4 3.6 carbon/cobalt based cylindrical 
Lenovo laptop battery pack (Sanyo cells) 2.8 3.7 unknown cylindrical* 
K2 Energy LFP26650EV 3.2 3.2 carbon/LFP cylindrical 
Saft MP176065 6.8 3.75 graphite/LCO hard prismatic 
EiG ePLB-F007A 7 3.2 carbon/LFP pouch 
EiG ePLB-F007H, ”older design” 7 3.2 carbon/LFP pouch 
Lifetech X-1P 8Ah 38123 8 3.3 carbon/LFP cylindrical 
EVE F7568270 10 3.2 carbon/LFP pouch 
Altairnano LTO 13 2.26 LTO/NMC pouch 
Ener1 SPB150140260 20 3.2 graphite/LFP pouch 
Leclanche LecCell 30Ah High Energy 30 2.3 LATP/NCO pouch 
Zhejiang GBS Energy GBS-LFMP40Ah 40 3.2 carbon/LFMP** soft prismatic 
European Batteries EBattery 45 Ah v1.4 45 3.2 graphite/LFP pouch 
Primary cells (non-rechargeable): Zinc-Air 
QuantumSphere MetAir® SC Series 4.8, 
"new design" 48 1.1 Zn/Air with Mn-C prismatic 
QuantumSphere MetAir® SC Series 4.8, 
"old design" 48 1.1 Zn/Air with Mn-C prismatic 
* A complete battery pack included six of the 18650 Sanyo cells, with connectors and 
electronics as well as outer battery plastic box. 
** LFMP is lithium iron manganese-phosphate. 
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ABUSE TEST TYPES 
Five different abuse test types have been used in the evaluation. 
EXTERNAL HEATING 
External heating was used in Papers I, II and III to evaluate the thermal response, in paper III 
gas emissions were also evaluated. The tests were performed on one cell at a time. The battery 
cell was heated up in an oven. The cell was placed on one or two bricks in the center of the 
oven. The oven was of type Binder FED 115, it had 115 liter inner volume and was 
thermostatically controlled and equipped with a fan for circulation of air in order to have a 
uniform temperature inside the oven. Two different heating procedures were used, continuous 
heating or temperature ramping. In the continuous heating procedure, the oven was heated 
with maximum power, reaching about 200 °C after 1 hour. In the ramping procedure, the oven 
was first set to 80 °C and thereafter the temperature was increased in steps of 10 °C every 15 
minutes. The maximum temperature of the oven was about 300 °C and in some tests the cell 
was heated to that temperature, however for the majority of the tests the heating was manually 
stopped after the thermal runaway/exothermic response, which occurred at temperatures 
below 300 °C. 
EXTERNAL FIRE 
External fire was used in papers II, IV, V, VI and VII in order to evaluate the energy release, 
fire characteristics and gas emissions upon fire. The battery cells were exposed to external fire 
by a propane burner of about 16 kW, placed beneath the cells. Several cells were put together 
and burnt in the same test and the numbers of cells put together varied with cell type, in order 
to achieve similar battery capacity. The tests used the Single Burning Item (SBI) method, EN 
13823 [38], which is normally used for fire tests of building materials according to EN 13501 
[39]. Fire characteristics were measured, e.g. heat release rate, total heat release, gas 
emissions, battery temperature and voltage. In the fire calorimetry calculations the oxygen 
consumption method was used and corrected for CO2 [38]. In the tests a ventilation flow of 
400-600 liter/s were used and the fire was considered as well ventilated (oxygen rich). 
EXTERNAL SHORT CIRCUIT 
External short circuit tests were performed in papers I and II. A fully charged battery cell was 
tested, one at the time, via a low-ohmic short circuit. The cell was short circuited via cable 
shoes with 50 mm
2
 cables connected to a high-current rated contactor. The current was 
measured via a current core capable of measuring up to 6000 A. 
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OVERCHARGE 
Overcharge tests were conducted in papers I and II. A fully charged cell was charged above 
its limit with different C-rate values of currents and up to a maximum voltage of 15.3 V.  The 
current was measured via a current shunt, different types of shunts were used depending on 
the charge current. 
OVERCURRENT 
Overcurrent tests were conducted in paper VIII for primary Zn-Air battery cells. In the 
overcurrent test one cell at the time was exposed to a current greater than the maximum 
allowed current. The maximum allowed current is specified by the cell manufacturer. The 
overcurrent used was less than the short circuit current. 
DATA LOGGING 
Data logging of battery temperature, voltage and current (when applicable) was performed 
every second (1 Hz measurements) using high-resolution data loggers. During this work the 
loggers, Pico Technology ADC-24 and Agilent 34972A using an Agilent 34902A reed 
multiplexer module were utilized in different tests and sometimes combined. In the fire tests, 
the SBI equipment had its own logging system and the gas measurement also had its own 
logging computer and specific program. 
CAPACITY, ELECTROCHEMICAL IMPEDANCE SPECTROSCOPY AND AGEING 
Cell capacities were measured using a Digatron battery tester or a Metrohm Autolab 
PGSTAT302N with 20 A booster module. Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy (EIS) 
was performed as a four wire measurement in a Faraday box using the Metrohm Autolab. 
Cycle ageing of battery cells was conducted using the Digatron battery tester with a current 
rate of C/2 and utilizing the full SOC-window. Ageing was also performed by storing fully 
charged cells for 10 months in a 60 °C oven. 
GAS MEASUREMENT SETUPS 
Gas measurements were performed in external fire tests and in some of the external heating 
tests. The gas emission measurements were focused on detecting fluoride gas emissions, HF, 
POF3 and PF5. Two different Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) instruments 
were used, in some experiments gas-washing bottles were also used. Gas-washing bottles 
continuously collect gas samples which chemically react with a reagent. The contents of the 
bottles are later analysed to obtain total amounts of fluorine. 
20 
 
In the fire tests quantitative gas measurements were performed using a Thermo Scientific 
Antaris IGS analyzer (Nicolet) with a gas cell. The spectral resolution was 0.5 cm
-1
 and the 
gas cell had an optical path length of 2.0 m and an inner volume of 0.2 L. The gas cell and the 
PTFE hose were both heated to 180 °C to avoid condensation. The FTIR gave a new spectrum 
about every 12 seconds consisting of 10 scans, enabling relatively fast real-time 
measurements. The FTIR had been calibrated, the detection limit was 2 ppm for HF and 6 
ppm for POF3 but PF5 could be qualitatively detected [40]. Figure 8 shows a schematic 
illustration of the measurement setup used in the fire tests. The fire tests were performed in 
three test periods. In the first and second test period the FTIR measurements used both 
primary and secondary filters. In the third test period the FTIR was used without secondary 
filter and an additional independent parallel measurement technique was used utilizing gas-
washing bottles. 
 
Figure 8. Experimental setup using gas measurements during external fire tests 
performed during three test periods.  
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The primary filter for each test was analyzed for fluorine content since it is known that HF 
may be partly adsorbed by this type of filter [41].  The FTIR setup gave time-resolved 
quantitative measurements as well as total emissions by integration of the time-resolved 
measurements. The gas-washing bottles gave only a total value of the emissions. 
Gas emission measurements were performed in some of the external heating (oven) tests in 
paper III. The setup is schematically shown in Figure 9, it used a Bruker Alpha FTIR 
spectrophotometer with a DTGS detector equipped with a gas cell. The gas cell had an optical 
path length of 7 cm and an inner volume of 12.4 mL. In order to have rapid measurements, a 
resolution of 4 cm
-1
 was used with an accuracy of 0.19 cm
-1
, and an average of 8 scans was 
used which gave a new spectrum about every 12 seconds, offering a reasonable signal to noise 
ratio. In this setup the gas cell and the hose were not heated, thus condensation could happen 
in the sampling system. 
 
 
Figure 9. Experimental setup using FTIR gas measurements during external heating tests 
in oven. 
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NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
Propagation of fire/thermal runaway between Li-ion cells was studied both experimentally 
and by numerical simulation in paper VII. Experimental fire tests were used as an input to the 
model and for validation of the model. The main aim of the numerical model was to study 
cell-to-cell propagation in different scenarios. 
The Li-ion battery pouch cell was modelled as a prismatic 3D shape with homogenous but 
anisotropic material properties, with the Finite-element method (FEM) utilizing the heat 
transfer module in COMSOL Multiphysics program version 5.1. Total heat generation and 
time dependent heat release from one cell was calculated based on experimental fire tests 
using a propane burner. The thermal data of the cell was taken from literature values. In order 
to validate the model, the propane burner was modelled with the Fire dynamics simulator 
(FDS) program version 6.1.1. FDS use a Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model. 
The numerical simulation work were implemented and performed by Johan Anderson (RISE 
Research Institutes of Sweden). 
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OVERVIEW OF THE INCLUDED PAPERS 
 
PAPER I - ABUSE BY EXTERNAL HEATING, OVERCHARGE AND SHORT CIRCUITING OF 
COMMERCIAL LITHIUM-ION BATTERY CELLS 
Summary 
The aim of Paper I is to study the cell response of commercial cells exposed to three types of 
abuse tests. 
 
Abuse tests: 
 Overcharge 
 Short circuit 
 External heating by oven 
 
Cells: 
 Samsung ICR18650–24F, carbon/cobalt based, 2.4 Ah, cylindrical 
 EiG ePLB-F007A, “newer design”, carbon/LFP, 7Ah, pouch 
 EiG ePLB-F007H, ”older design”, carbon/LFP, 7Ah, pouch 
 European Batteries EBattery 45 Ah v1.4, graphite/LFP, 45 Ah, pouch 
 
Main findings 
 During external heating, the Samsung 18650 cell went into an energetic 
thermal runaway at a temperature of about 220 °C, squirting out ignited cell 
materials, generating a pressure wave and immediate fire with a temperature 
increase rate of about 5000 C/min, see Figure 10. 
 The LFP cells were less energetic during external heating than the Samsung 
18650 cells, however the three different LFP cells show relatively large 
diversity. The newer design of the EiG LFP 7 Ah cell showed a very small 
temperature increase, close to showing no sign of thermal runaway, in 
contrast to the older design which showed a clear thermal runaway 
temperature peak, see Figure 11. These results underline that LFP is just one 
component of a LFP-cell in terms of safety. 
 One LFP cell went into fire during 2C overcharge, while three repeated tests 
did not result in fire, see Figure 12. 
 The short circuit currents were very large for the single cells, about 1000 A, 
see Figure 13. 
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Figure 10. Temperature rate of the average surface temperature of the Samsung 18650 
cell, clearly showing the rapid temperature increase at thermal runaway, 
occurring at an oven temperature of 219.9 °C 
 
 
Figure 11. Temperature results from external heating of EiG LFP 7Ah cells with older 
and newer design. 
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Figure 12. Cell ignited during 2C (90A) overcharge of a 45 Ah LFP pouch cell from 
European batteries. 
 
 
Figure 13. Results from short circuit abuse tests of EiG older design (solid lines) and EiG 
newer design (dashed lines). 
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PAPER II - LITHIUM-ION BATTERY ASPECTS ON FIRES IN ELECTRIFIED VEHICLES ON THE 
BASIS OF EXPERIMENTAL ABUSE TESTS 
Summary 
The aim of Paper II is to discuss and study aspects of Li-ion safety from an electrified vehicle 
perspective. Some principles on how to make a battery system safe and a review of incidents 
and statistics of EV fires are discussed. Experimental results from abuse tests of commercial 
Li-ion cells, part of them automotive-classed Li-ion cells, are presented. 
 
Abuse tests: 
 Overcharge 
 Short circuit 
 External heating by oven 
 External fire 
 
Cells: 
 Samsung ICR18650–24F, carbon/cobalt based, 2.4 Ah, cylindrical 
 EiG ePLB-F007A, carbon/LFP, 7Ah, pouch 
 Lifetech X-1P 8Ah 38123, carbon/LFP, 8 Ah, cylindrical 
 European Batteries EBattery 45 Ah v1.4, graphite/LFP, 45 Ah, pouch 
 EVE F7568270, carbon/LFP, 10 Ah, pouch 
 Zhejiang GBS Energy GBS-LFMP40Ah, carbon/LFMP, 40 Ah, soft prismatic 
 
Main findings 
 The fire tests showed that the higher the SOC-value the higher HRR peaks 
and more rapid heat release, see Figure 14. 
 Safety protection can fail, e.g. a cell safety vent malfunction occurred in one 
of the tested cylindrical cell.  There is thus a risk of hazardous projectiles in 
the event of a cell case explosion, see Figure 15. 
 Large short circuit currents, >1000 A, was measured for a single 45 Ah cell 
as illustrated in Figure 16. As a consequence, the positive terminal tab burnt 
off with flames. 
 High amounts of toxic HF emissions can be released during a battery fire and 
the toxic gases can pose a severe risk 
 High safety is achieved by many safety layer-by-layers, see the “safety 
onion” in Figure 17. 
 Studies of the occurrence of vehicle fires involving electric vehicles 
compared to non-electric vehicles showed: 
o Very limited statistics available for EVs. 
o Tesla Model S: one vehicle fire in about 20000 vehicles, based on 
more than 100,000 vehicles manufactured and 6 fires during October 
2013 and February 2016 (estimation based on internet search, 
February 2016). Comparable numbers for vehicle fires in USA is of 
the order of about 1 fire in 1000 vehicles per year. 
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Figure 14. Heat release rate vs time in external fire test, for SOC 0-100% with inter-SOC 
steps of 25%, for EiG 7 Ah LFP pouch cell, exposed to an external propane 
burner (burner contribution subtracted). 
 
 
Figure 15. Photos (A) before fire test, (B) after the fire test showing one cell propelled 
and was caught in the protected net box. (C)-(E) show photos during tear 
down. 
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Figure 16. Results from short circuit abuse test of a European battery LFP pouch cell with 
45 Ah. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The safety onion, illustration of how to build-up of high safety using layer-by-
layer. 
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PAPER III - GAS EXPLOSIONS AND THERMAL RUNAWAYS DURING EXTERNAL HEATING 
ABUSE OF COMMERCIAL LITHIUM-ION GRAPHITE-LICOO2 CELLS WITH DIFFERENT 
LEVELS OF AGEING 
Summary 
The aim of Paper III is to investigate cell response upon external heating for various 
ageing/status. Selected cells were cycled aged for 100, 200 and 300 cycles, and some other 
cells were stored for 10 months at 60 °C. The study included both working cells (functional 
cells) as well as dead cells. Limited gas measurements by FTIR were conducted in some of 
the tests to measure HF and POF3 gas emissions as well as emissions from electrolyte 
solvents. 
Abuse tests: 
 External heating by oven 
 
Cells: 
 Saft MP176065, graphite/LCO, 6.8 Ah, hard prismatic 
 
Main findings 
 Gas explosions occurred in 5 of 11 tests, for cells aged at all cycle ageing levels; 0, 
100, 200 and 300 charge/discharge cycles. The gas explosion occurred about 15 
seconds after the thermal runaway temperature was reached due to delayed ignition of 
battery vented gases mixed with the air inside the oven. The oven door was forced 
open by the explosion and the video camera outside was typically blown away. The 
oven was not airtight and after first gas explosion actions were taken to protect the 
oven via pressure release actions (gas explosion mitigations), however still four more 
gas explosions occurred. 
 Thermal runaway occurred in all cells. 
 Cycling ageing was found to have an influence on the thermal runaway temperature, 
see Figure 18, with a weak minimum between 100 and 200 cycles (within the tested 
range 0-300 cycles), see Figure 19. 
 Dead cells were significantly less reactive, however they still went into thermal 
runaway, releasing heavy smoke and reaching high temperatures. 
 Three different vents could be specified, see Figure 20 and Figure 21, the 3rd vent 
occurred when the thermal runaway was initiated while the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 vents occurred 
well before thermal runaway. 
 HF and POF3 emissions were detected simultaneously and were first observed in the 
3
rd
 vent. 
 The temperature varied significantly over the cell surface by, about 100 °C, see Figure 
22, while in other tests a temperature peak variation of up to 300 °C was found. The 
2
nd
 vent is clearly shown in the temperature rate plot, see Figure 22, due to outflowing 
gases. Neither the 1
st
 nor the 2
nd
 vents are visually seen on the video. 
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Figure 18. Temperature development before and at thermal runaway for cells with 
different ageing/status. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Thermal runaway temperature for cells with different cycle ageing. 
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Figure 20. Results from external heating abuse of a cell aged with 100 cycles. The cell 
ejected small and short jets and fire flames, but neither gas explosion nor major 
fire occurred. 
 
 
Figure 21. Results from external heating abuse of a cell aged with 300 cycles. A gas 
explosion occurred shortly after the third vent. 
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Figure 22. Results from external heating abuse of a cell, (A) showing average cell surface 
temperature rate, and (B) cell voltage, six cell surface temperatures (T1-T6) 
and two oven temperatures. 
 
 
 
 
PAPER IV - CHARACTERISTICS OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES DURING FIRE TESTS  
Summary 
The aim of Paper IV is to study the characteristics of commercial Li-ion battery cells exposed 
to an external fire. Measurements of toxic gas emissions, heat release rate, temperature and 
cell voltage were performed. The influence of water mist was also studied in one of the fire 
tests. 
Abuse tests: 
 External fire 
 
Cells: 
 EiG ePLB-F007A, carbon/LFP, 7Ah, pouch 
 K2 Energy LFP26650EV, carbon/LFP, 3.2 Ah, cylindrical 
 Lenovo laptop battery pack (Sanyo 18650 cells), unknown type, 2.8 Ah, cylindrical 
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Main findings 
 HRR shows a distinct dependence with SOC. 
 The total heat release (THR), i.e. the integrated HRR values, showed low SOC 
dependence. 
 HF emission rates varied with SOC, the highest HF peaks and total values were 
obtained for 50% SOC, see Figure 23. 
 HF emission peak rate was more or less doubled when water mist was applied, see 
Figure 23 to Figure 26. However, total released HF amounts with and without water 
mist was similar. 
 POF3 was not detected. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Quantitative time-resolved FTIR measurement of HF mass flow vs time for 0-
100% SOC of EiG 7 Ah LFP, exposed to external propane fire. 
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Figure 24. External propane fire test of EiG 100% SOC cells showing the effect of water 
mist. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Water concentrations measured for EiG 100% SOC, test 1-3. The increased 
water level in test 3 due to water mist application is clearly seen. 
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Figure 26. Correlation between water concentration and HF production rate, for water 
mist test. 
 
 
PAPER V - TOXIC FLUORIDE GAS EMISSIONS FROM LITHIUM-ION BATTERY FIRES 
Summary 
The aim of Paper V is to study the release of toxic gas emissions, primarily HF and POF3, as 
well as fire characteristics, e.g. heat release rate and total heat release. Two independent 
measurement techniques were used to measure gas emissions, FTIR and gas-washing bottles. 
Abuse tests: 
 External fire 
 
Cells: 
 EiG ePLB-F007A, carbon/LFP, 7Ah, pouch 
 K2 Energy LFP26650EV, carbon/LFP, 3.2 Ah, cylindrical 
 Lenovo laptop battery pack (Sanyo 18650 cells), unknown type, 2.8 Ah, cylindrical 
 Saft MP176065, graphite/LCO, 6.8 Ah, hard prismatic 
 Lifetech X-1P 8Ah 38123, carbon/LFP, 8 Ah, pouch 
 Ener1 SPB150140260, graphite/LFP, 20 Ah, pouch 
 Leclanche LecCell 30Ah High Energy, LATP/NCO, 30 Ah, pouch 
 
Main findings 
 HF emission rates varied significantly for the different battery types and with different 
SOC values, 20-200 mg/Wh, see Figure 27, possibly indications of a general weak 
local maxima at 50 % SOC. 
 The total heat release, the integrated HRR values, showed low dependence with SOC 
 HRR showed a high SOC dependence. 
36 
 
 The energy ratio, i.e. the ratio between the energy released from the burning battery 
(THR) and the nominal electrical energy content varies significantly for the seven Li-
ion battery cell types, ranging from 5 to 21, however, with low SOC dependence, see 
Figure 28. 
 POF3 was detected, but only for one of the seven battery types and only for the 0% 
SOC case, see Figure 29 and Figure 30. 
 HF emission rates increased momentary with about 35% when water mist was applied, 
however, the total values of released HF with and without water mist were about the 
same. Thus, similar result as in paper IV. 
 
 
Figure 27. The total amount of HF measured by FTIR for seven types of Li-ion battery 
cells and for 0-100% SOC. Open symbols indicate that the test included a 
variant, e.g. water mist. The lines are intended as a guide for the eye. 
* Low value due to that a pre HF-saturation was not applied, therefore a part 
of the HF release was likely to be saturated in the gas sampling system, for 
type C at 50% and 100% SOC and type D at 50% SOC. 
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Figure 28. Energy ratio, i.e. the total heat release divided by the nominal electrical energy, 
and a measure of the chemical energy vs the electrical energy, for seven types 
of Li-ion battery cells and for 0-100% SOC. Open symbols indicate that the 
test included a variant, e.g. water mist. The lines are intended as a guide for the 
eye. 
 
 
Figure 29. Total amounts of fluoride emitted during external fire tests, F
-
 vs SOC for 5-
cells of Li-ion hard prismatic 6.8 Ah cells with graphite/LCO electrodes. The 
results from two independent measurement techniques presented. POF3 was 
only found for the 0% SOC case. 
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Figure 30. Results for 5-cells of Li-ion hard prismatic cell of 6.8 Ah with graphite/LCO 
electrodes during external fire test, showing average cell surface temperatures, 
HRR and production rate of HF and POF3. 
 
 
 
PAPER VI - GAS EMISSIONS FROM LITHIUM-ION BATTERY CELLS UNDERGOING ABUSE 
FROM EXTERNAL FIRE TESTS  
Summary 
The aim of Paper VI is to study the release of toxic gas emissions of HF and POF3 as well as 
fire characteristics, e.g. heat release rate and total heat release on different cells. Two 
independent measurement techniques were used to measure gas emissions in one of the tests, 
FTIR and gas-washing bottles. 
Abuse tests: 
 External fire 
 
Cells: 
 K2 Energy LFP26650EV, carbon/LFP, 3.2 Ah, cylindrical 
 Lifetech X-1P 8Ah 38123, carbon/LFP, 8 Ah, pouch 
 Leclanche LecCell 30Ah High Energy, LATP/NCO, 30 Ah, pouch 
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Main findings 
 HF emissions occurred with some delay compared to the peaks in HRR, see Figure 31. 
 HF was detected at about the same time as the cell voltage of the bottom cell (in tests 
with 2 cells) drops to 0 V, see Figure 31. 
 The amounts of released HF for FTIR and gas-washing bottles measurements were 
similar. 
 The toxic HF gas released from a large Li-ion battery pack can pose a severe risk, 
especially in a confined space. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Results from external fire test of two Leclanche LecCell 30Ah high energy 
cells. 
 
 
 
PAPER VII - THERMAL MODELLING OF CELL-TO-CELL FIRE PROPAGATION AND 
CASCADING THERMAL RUNAWAY FAILURE EFFECTS FOR LITHIUM-ION BATTERY CELLS 
AND MODULES USING FIRE WALLS  
Summary 
The aim of Paper VII is to study spreading of heat between cells and modules. A numerical 
model is formulated to predict cell-to-cell propagation. The model is validated by 
experiments. Heat release from a cell is established by external fire tests. A part of a battery 
system with one module and two half-modules on each side, with fire walls between the 
modules are constructed, see Figure 32. 
Abuse tests: 
 External fire 
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Numerical tools: 
 Comsol Multiphysics, heat transfer module 
 Fire dynamics simulator 
 
Cells: 
 EiG ePLB-F007A, carbon/LFP, 7Ah, pouch 
 
Main findings 
 A model for evaluating different measures to prevent cascading thermal runaways was 
developed. 
 Substantial risk for cascading effects from the thermal runaway, see Figure 33 to 
Figure 35. 
 Cell-to-cell propagation can be affected by cooling and use of firewalls, see Figure 36. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Schematic drawing of part of the battery pack, with one module with 10 cells 
(cell 6-15) and with a firewall between the modules. The boundary conditions 
are shown in the figure. 
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Figure 33. Thermal runaway in cell 6, the first cell in the module closest to the fire wall, 
and neighbour cell 5 on the other side of the firewall and cell 7 next to cell 6 
undergoing thermal runaway. 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Thermal runaway in cell 10, and temperature development in the neighbouring 
cell 9 and cell 11, for 100% SOC and 75 % SOC, for forced convection (left) 
and comparison between forced convention and ideal heat sink 20 °C for 100% 
SOC (right). 
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Figure 35. Thermal runaway in cell 10, creating an overtemperature in the neighbour cell 
9, going into thermal runaway 3.5 min later and the temperature development 
(left) for some adjacent cells (right). 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Thermal runaway in the complete module, cell 6-15, all cells initiated at the 
same time and the cell temperature in the adjacent cell (cell 6 and 16, due to 
symmetry) located in the adjacent module with different thicknesses, between 
0 and 20 mm, of an alumina firewall between the modules. 
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PAPER VIII - OVERCURRENT ABUSE OF PRIMARY PRISMATIC ZINC-AIR BATTERY CELLS 
STUDYING AIR SUPPLY EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY SHUT-DOWN  
Summary 
The aim of Paper VIII is to study a novel safety enhancement principle for metal-air batteries, 
for battery shut-down utilizing shut-off of air supply (suffocation). 
Abuse tests: 
 Overcurrent 
 
Cells: 
 New and old design of primary commercial Zn-Air cells, QuantumSphere MetAir® 
SC Series 4.8, Zn/Air with Mn-C, 48 Ah, prismatic 
 
Main findings 
 The Zn-Air cell was shut-down when its air supply was shut-off, see Figure 37 and 
Figure 38. 
 Demonstrated that shutting-off air supply offers an additional battery shut-down 
possibility for metal-air batteries. 
 Air shut-down also offers possibilities to reduce electrical hazards in large battery 
systems, bringing the battery voltage towards zero while maintaining its capacity. 
 The time to zero Volt was shown to mainly be determined by the trapped air volume. 
 The tested primary Zn-Air cell did not show any particular risks when abused by 
overcurrents. 
 
 
Figure 37. Results from discharge with 4 A (maximum discharge current according to the 
manufacturer’s cell data sheet) with full air supply (Open 1), with sealed air 
supply from the start of the test (Sealed 1) and with sealed air supply until 135 
seconds and then full access to air supply (Sealed then open 1). Voltage as 
filled symbols and current as open symbols. 
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Figure 38. Results from discharge with a current of 4 A and with an overcurrent to 8 A. 
Voltage is shown as filled symbols and current as open symbols. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
RISKS WITH LI-ION BATTERIES 
The risks with lithium-ion batteries are yet not fully studied nor understood. Failure incidents, 
failure mechanisms and failure states are complex and incidents are often seen as stochastic, 
perhaps simply due to lack of knowledge. Examples of research areas that have not been 
studied or have been studied to a very limited extend are; the impact on safety from e.g. 
battery ageing, toxic gas release, risk for gas explosions, firefighting, failure propagation and 
size effects when going from small consumer batteries to large battery systems. More studies 
on these aspects as well as the development of protection strategies (counter actions to 
mitigate risks) are thus urgently needed. 
Today’s knowledge is available mainly for small consumer batteries while it is limited for 
large battery systems, especially regarding how the safety aspects are influenced by the size of 
the battery system, its environment and possible new failure modes, e.g. failure propagation 
within the battery system. Safety knowledge and techniques have their origin in the 
development of safer consumer Li-ion batteries, however, the use in large battery systems can 
be different and some of the cell safety mechanisms developed for consumer batteries, e.g. 
CID and PTC, do not work well in a large battery system [42]. 
For small battery cells and battery packs, e.g. ranging from 10 to 100 Wh, used in consumer 
products, e.g. cell phones or laptops, significant knowledge has been collected through recent 
years. Even though batteries sold on the market have passed all required international safety 
tests incidents do happen. The failure rate per cell is low but the manufacturing numbers are 
very high and incidents therefore happen. For example, minor incidents occur in airplanes 
more or less on a weekly basis and restrictions have been implemented limiting the use of Li-
ion batteries on-board airplanes [19]. It is important to mention here that a cell can fail 
without a resulting severe thermal outcome. 
One indirect risk from consumer Li-ion battery failures is that it can act as a fire source to 
start a large fire involving combustible materials in the surrounding. The small sized 
consumer batteries can also release toxic gases and could thus cause an acute life threating 
situation in e.g. confined spaces, however, the author of this thesis has not yet found any 
reports of such events. Anyhow, the amounts of toxic gas that may be released according to 
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the presented thesis [paper IV-VI] are, at least theoretically, large enough to possibly cause an 
acute toxic situation. 
The safety and incident knowledge is still limited for large battery systems, e.g. ranging from 
kWh to MWh size today and probably as large as TWh size in a relative near future. One 
fundamental source of concern is that a large battery system will use a large numbers of cells, 
which means that the probability for a cell failure within the battery system will increase. For 
example if the cell failure rate would be 1 ppm, the failure rate in a large battery system with 
1000 cells, will be 1 in 1000. Another, perhaps stronger, concern is that the consequences may 
be much larger for a large battery pack than from a small battery, simply because it consists of 
many more cells. Therefore it is motivated to mitigate the risks of propagation, for example, a 
single cell failure should be hindered to propagate to adjacent cells, in other words, to hinder 
cell-to-cell propagation. However, it can be difficult to achieve and in case more than one cell 
is undergoing thermal failure, propagation could still occur. Furthermore, even a single cell 
failure can result in considerable energy release and accompanied events (gas, fire, 
explosion). For example, if a battery design would hinder a single cell propagation for one 
type of abuse conditions, propagation can still occur in case of another abuse type or 
condition, see Figure 7. It can therefore be argued that the propagating strategy should be 
treated in relation to the battery size, its installation space and location taking into account the 
local risk assessment. For a large scale application in an area with high population density, 
hindering/delay of propagation in general should be even more important in order to e.g. 
lower the amount of toxic gas emissions in a major event. 
The energy release from a cell can vary significantly between different cells/battery designs 
and between different abuse types. Furthermore, the measurement and evaluation techniques 
typically strongly affect the energy release values. The energy ratios, i.e. energy release 
compared to energy capacity, are reported between 0.5 (Paper I) and up to 21 (Paper V) in this 
theses. Studies using other methods and cells often report energy ratios values in the order of 
about 1 [43,44]. 
Figure 39 shows examples of thermal response from various abuse tests on some Li-ion cells. 
Upon overheating, the electrolyte starts to evaporate and the cell will swell, the amount of 
swelling depends on how much the cell is physically allowed to swell, e.g. is the cell 
unconstrained in free air or dense packed in cell modules. If the cell is not allowed to swell 
enough in case of excessive temperatures, the cell will open and release (vent) gases. The 
opening can either be controlled e.g. via a cell safety vent, or un-controlled as in a cell case 
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rupture or in a more severe “cell case explosion” or “cell explosion”. The cell rupture is less 
aggressive and can typically occur for moderate abuse conditions and in case the cell safety 
vent does not open or releases pressure to slowly. The cell case explosion can often be 
avoided by having a cell safety vent, releasing overpressure before an extreme cell pressure is 
reached. However, Figure 39 shows a cylindrical cell that was propelled away and caught by a 
protection net due to cell case explosion because of cell safety vent failure. It happened for 
one of five cells simultaneously exposed to external fire demonstrating that also safety 
devices can fail. 
If the vented gases are not immediately ignited and the flammable gases are accumulated in 
an air/oxygen-mixture in a confined or semi-confined space, there is a potential risk for a gas 
explosion upon ignition of these gases. The consequences of the gas explosion can be severe, 
potentially magnitudes larger than the cell case explosion. Compared to the gas explosion an 
instant fire or delayed fire without gas explosion might be less severe. In fire science gas 
explosions are a common phenomenon [45] however not often discussed for Li-ion battery 
safety. 
 
Figure 39. Examples of thermal response upon abuse testing for different Li-ion cells. 
The different Li-ion types have different properties in terms of safety. Two important aspects 
are the heat generation and heat release rate, where LFP is typically considered the safest 
choice, see for example Figure 40 and Doughty and Roth [30]. Sometimes, rumors say that 
LFP cells cannot catch fire, but that is not true, LFP cells have a flammable electrolyte and 
thus it can catch fire. In my abuse testing (fire tests excluded) [Paper I, II, 27], the LFP cells 
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typically has a lower less frequency of catching fire compared to cells with other cathode 
materials but some LFP cells still ignited in my abuse tests. LFP cells thus offers an increased 
safety in terms of heat release, however they might possibly have a safety disadvantage when 
it comes to emission of gases. There might e.g. be an increased risk for gas explosions, since 
LFP is more prone to release flammable gases without combustion, and possibly also 
involving toxic gas emission. This is not yet proven and it is certainly a complex scenario that 
depends on several parameters, e.g. battery system size and design, environmental conditions, 
ventilation and possible sources of ignition, but claiming LFP to generally be the safest type 
of Li-ion battery might not be true. Figure 41 shows examples of burning commercial Li-ion 
cells with carbon-LFP electrodes. In Figure 41a a European battery graphite/LFP cell catches 
fire during external heating (oven), in Figure 41b another LFP cell from the same batch 
catches fire during overcharge. Figure 41c shows five EiG LFP cells, a 5-cell-pack, burning in 
a fire test using a propane burner. It is important to consider battery fires and thermal response 
from both internal sources and from external sources, e.g. an external fire adjacent to a Li-ion 
battery pack. An external fire might actually represent a common failure source. 
 
Figure 40. Temperature development for three commercial types of 18650 cells during 
external heating (oven) abuse tests. The K2 Energy cell has LFP cathode while 
the cells from Samsung and Sanyo have cobalt-based cathodes. 
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              (A)                                             (B)                              (C) 
Figure 41. Fires due to abuse testing in commercial Li-ion cells having carbon-LFP 
electrodes, showing external heating (A), overcharge (B) and external fire 
where the cells are exposure to propane fire (C). 
 
Using LTO, Li4Ti5O12, anodes instead of graphite can improve the safety since LTO shows no 
Li-plating and less heat generation [30]. It is however essential to consider a holistic 
perspective as LTO and other variants, e.g. LATP cells, still have a cathode and a flammable 
electrolyte. In an overcharge abuse test, the LATP cell went into fire as shown in Figure 42. 
Another titanium based cell having a different cathode (NMC), did not ignite during the 2C 
overcharge, while it went into fire during a 7C overcharge, see Figure 43. However, ignited 
cell materials were ejected out of the cell undergoing 2C overcharge, which can be barely 
seen in Figure 43B to the right in the photo. 
 
 
Figure 42. Overcharge abuse with a 2 C-rate current of a 30 Ah cell with LATP/NCA 
during fire caused by the abuse. 
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Figure 43. Photos from overcharge abuse tests of Altairnano 13 Ah LTO/NMC pouch 
cells. (A) before overcharge (B) shows gas release during overcharge with a 
current of 2 C-rate (26 A) and (C) for another cell during overcharge with a 
current of 7 C-rate (91 A) that ignited after gas release. 
 
GAS RELEASE 
Upon heating, the Li-ion cell is designed to let the gas out. If the temperature is high enough it 
will be impossible to contain the internal cell pressure and therefore flammable and toxic 
gases will be released from the battery cell, either controlled or via a cell rupture or cell case 
explosion. A safety mechanism for controlled gassing can be implemented in cylindrical and 
hard prismatic cells by an electrolyte additive with the function of gassing at a predesigned 
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temperature below critical temperatures, the generated gas pressure can then mechanically 
activate a CID built-in in consumer cells, thereby electrically disconnect the cell. This safety 
mechanism can offer protection from e.g. overcharge. This type of mechanism can in general 
not be used for pouch cells due to the significantly different cell design. 
The electrolyte used in Li-ion batteries contains volatile organic solvents which start to 
evaporate at relatively low temperatures as can be seen in Figure 44 where the results from 
the Bertilsson study [46] on evaporation (weight loss) is seen by means of presenting the 
sample weight as function of temperature for some common electrolyte solvents in 
thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) is shown. The boiling temperature and flammability data 
for some solvents are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 44. Thermal analysis of some electrolyte solvents commonly used in Li-ion cells, 
showing the weight loss (evaporation) vs temperature with a constant heating 
rate of 10 °C/min, using a Perkin-Elmer TGS-2 thermogravimetric analyser. 
The sample was purged with N2 gas. Reprinted with permission from 
Bertilsson [46]. 
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Table 2. Flammability data for some common solvents used in Li-ion electrolytes. 
Electrolyte solvent Molecule 
weight 
(g/mol) 
Flash 
point 
(°C) 
[47] 
Boiling 
temperature 
(°C) 
[47] 
Autoignition 
temperature 
(°C) 
[47] 
Flammable limits 
lower / upper  
(vol %) 
 
Ethyl acetate (EA) 88 -3 77 427 2.2  / 9 [48] 
Dimethyl carbonate (DMC) 90 16 91 458 4.22 / 12.87 [48] 
Ethyl methyl carbonate (EMC) 104 24 110 440 N/A 
Diethyl carbonate (DEC) 118 25 126 445 1.4 / 11 [49] 
Propylene carbonate (PC) 102 132 242 455 1.8 / 14.3 [48] 
Ethylene carbonate (EC) 88 143 248 465 3.6 / 16.1 [50] 
 
The cell is typically gassing before thermal runaway and gas will be emitted whether the cell 
undergoes thermal runaway or not. In Paper III three different vents for hard prismatic cells 
undergoing external heating are identified. The first vent occurs about 20 minutes before the 
thermal runaway and the second vent a few minutes before TR and the external heating time 
from room temperature to reach TR was about 60 minutes. The gas release in the first two 
vents was not visually observable. Gases are released as single electrolyte components (e.g. 
DMC, EC) or as decomposed products, e.g. CO, CO2, CH2 and H2. Figure 45 shows an 
example of gas release with white/grey smoke and gas from overcharge abuse of a Li-ion cell 
during venting. 
 
Figure 45. Gas release before fire upon overcharge abuse with a 2 C-rate current of a 30 
Ah cell with LATP/NCA. 
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TOXIC GAS EMISSIONS 
Li-ion batteries are totally sealed under normal conditions and do not emit any gases. When a 
Li-ion battery cell is heated, abused or undergoes failures the cell can emit a large number of 
different and complex toxic substances [2,51,52,53]. The cell can also release CO2 as in most 
combustion processes as well as CO. Toxic fluoride gases in form of a large number of other 
complex fluoride substances may also be emitted from a Li-ion battery cell, yet there are only 
limited studies on this subject. Emissions of hydrogen fluoride have this far gained the most 
attention, however there is so far just a few studies available for complete Li-ion cells. 
Besides emissions from the Li-ion cells, the battery system consists also of other materials, 
plastics, cables, electronics, coolant media, etc which can emit toxic gases during a fire. For 
example, combustion of PVC plastic generates hydrogen chloride (HCl) and combustion of 
polyurethane (PUR) generates hydrogen cyanide (HCN). 
Today all commercial Li-ion cells contain at least one of several possible sources of fluorine. 
The electrolyte contains a Li-salt, mostly, if not always, LiPF6, which has important properties 
needed for a functional Li-ion cell, e.g. it protecting the aluminum anode from dissolution and 
it takes part in the SEI layer formation [22]. Fluorine can also be used for binder materials in 
the electrode, e.g. polyvinylidene fluoride (PVdF). Furthermore, fluorine compounds can be 
found in the electrode materials, e.g. fluorophosphates [54,55] and AlF3-coating of the 
cathode [30,56,57] used as a safety enhancement. Additionally, additives in the electrolyte 
and the separator may contain fluorine, e.g. in flame retardants. 
The fire safety may thus be improved by adding flame retardants; however in terms of toxic 
gas emissions and gas explosion risks such an addition can at the same time result in a 
decreased safety. The resulting safety is application dependent and not easily determined and 
has not yet been studied nor evaluated, at least not publicly. Getting a complete picture of the 
risks is a difficult task and a solution appropriate for one application might not be appropriate 
for another application, it is important to include all safety measures including e.g. 
extinguishing systems in any analysis. 
The decomposition of LiPF6 occurs according to the following reactions [58,59]: 
LiPF6  LiF + PF5          (1) 
PF5 + H2O  POF3 + 2HF        (2) 
LiPF6 + H2O  LiF + POF3 + 2HF       (3) 
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POF3 + H2O  POF2(OH) + HF       (4) 
In an inert environment, LiPF6 decomposes upon heating to lithium fluoride, LiF, which is a 
solid compound at temperatures below 845 °C and phosphorus pentafluoride, PF5, which is a 
very reactive gas and a strong Lewis acid. Hydrogen fluoride, HF, and phosphorous 
oxyfluoride, POF3, produced when water/moisture reacts with PF5 according to eq. (2) or with 
LiPF6 directly according to eq. (3). Kawamura et al. [59] suggested that POF3 and 
water/moisture can react and produce POF2(OH) and HF according to eq. (4). 
The toxicity of HF is well known. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NOISH) in USA stated the immediate dangerous to life or health (IDLH) value for HF to be 
0.025 g/m
3
 (30 ppm) [60]. The IDLH is typically considered as a 30 minute value before 
irreversible damage/death. The lethal 10 minutes HF toxicity value (AEGL-3) is 0.139 g/m
3
 
(170 ppm) [61]. The Swedish Work Environment Authority has exposure limits for HF [62] 
and the maximum allowed concentration of HF in a working environment at any time
†
 is      
1.7 mg/m
3
 (2 ppm) and the mean value during a full working day (e.g. 8 hours)
‡
 is 1.5 mg/m
3
  
(1.8 ppm). 
HF is a light molecule, lighter than air. However, HF can attach via a hydrogen bound to a 
water molecule thereby resulting in a “gas” heavier than air. HF is also very easily solvable in 
water and form very toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid, other names are fluoric acid or 
fluorhydric acid. Surrounding surfaces and walls as well as runoff water from e.g. fire fighting 
may contain high toxic levels and possibly even lethal levels of fluorhydric acid. 
There are no toxicity data for POF3. POF3 is a precursor to produce HF [63]. However POF3 
might be toxic by itself, and act with other poisoning mechanisms than just by formation of 
three equivalents of HF. Critical limits of exposure might be lower for POF3 than for HF as in 
the chlorine analogue POCl3/HCl [62]. 
There are few studies on HF gas release from commercial Li-ion batteries undergoing abusive 
conditions. Time-resolved quantitative HF gas emission measurement from commercial Li-
ion cells under abuse were studied by Ribière et al. [64] and by Larsson et al. [Paper IV, V, 
VI] and for non-commercial Li-ion cells by Lecocq et al. [65]. Lecocq et al. also performed 
time-resolved quantitative HF measurements of gas release from EV and non-EV fire tests 
[66], and found HF emissions from both types of vehicles. The AC coolant medium was 
                                                             
†
 “Korttidsgränsvärde”, KGV value 
‡
 “Nivågränsvärde”, NGV value 
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suggested as a possible source for the HF. Other studies have detected HF during abuse on 
cells [Paper III,51,53,67] and battery packs [68,69], however, they do not report time 
dependent rates or total amounts of HF and other fluoride gas emissions. There are somewhat 
larger numbers of studies of other gas emissions released from Li-ion cells 
[27,29,70,71,72,73,74,75,76] and from electrolytes alone under fire or external heating abuse 
conditions [77,78,79,80,81], where a few present quantitative measurements of HF and POF3 
[80,81]. Electrolytes heated to moderate temperatures, 50-85 °C, were also studied and 
various fluorine compounds were found [58,59,82,83,84] while some other studies include 
both electrolyte and electrode material [2,85]. There is a large need of more studies on real 
conditions having real/complete cells and battery pack. 
Blum et. al. [68] abused a 100 kWh stationary battery pack by a 400 kW propane burner and 
measured HF using a portable HF gas meter, with a simple measurement setup, e.g. without a 
controlled ventilation flow. However, the maximum detection value of 100 ppm was reached 
already after 2 minutes, even though no visible smoke could be seen until an additional 33 
minutes later. Thus, life threating levels might be present without visual observation of gas 
release. 
The time-resolved quantitative detection of POF3 gas emissions from commercial Li-ion cells 
under abuse is so far only reported by Larsson et al. [Paper V] as well as time-resolved 
detection [Paper III]. Andersson et al. [81] studied the production of HF and POF3 from 
electrolyte burning tests and detected HF and POF3 in all tests with HF:POF3 production 
ratios varying between 8:1 to 53:1. Figure 46 shows an example where POF3 and HF are 
produced during a combustion of the LiPF6 salt dissolved in the pure DMC electrolyte [81]. 
The use of water as firefighting medium for Li-ion battery fires may increase the production 
of HF gases, according to eqs. (2)-(4). There are, however, few studies about this in the 
literature [Paper IV, V, 81]. Two fire tests with water mist as firefighting medium are 
presented in Paper IV and Paper V, in both cases the total HF emission is the same, however 
the HF production rate increased significantly when applying water mist, yet only two tests 
were performed. Further studies are thus needed to evaluate the water influence on HF 
production, as well as the toxicity of the run-off water. 
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Figure 46. Burning of 1 M LiPF6 in DMC (dimethyl carbonate) with a spray of 18 ml/min 
during two minutes into a propane burner of 4 kW, showing (top) heat release 
rate and HF concentration and (bottom) concentration of HF and POF3. 
Reprinted from Andersson [81]. 
 
SOME BASIC SCENARIOS REGARDING TOXIC GAS EMISSIONS 
 
When Li-ion batteries are burning, HF is released. Measurements [Paper V] have shown 
amounts of HF between 20 and 200 mg/Wh of nominal electrical energy capacity. These 
values were obtained for seven types of commercial cells with SOC ranging from 0% to 100% 
and a nominal electrical energy capacity ranging from 92 to 138 Wh. These values are state-
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of-the-art and valid for external fire. In order to assess the toxic threat due to HF from large 
Li-ion battery packs undergoing fire, the values can be extrapolated. 
Below are some simplified examples presented as theoretical cases, i.e. they will not represent 
a real case. They are presented only to give the reader a rough indication of the toxicity. 
Scenario 1 
 Fire of a Li-ion battery pack of 100 kWh 
 Homogenously distributed HF, no losses 
 IDHL value: 0.025 g/m3  [60] 
 HF: 20-200 mg/Wh  100 kWh Li-ion battery pack: 2 - 20 kg HF will be released 
 
In order to reach IDHL the HF amount needs to be diluted in 80 000 – 800 000 m3 of air. This 
corresponds for example to a fire in one EV with a 100 kWh battery parked in a multi-car 
park with a volume of one to ten floor levels (each of 3 m height) of 250 x 100 m. 
 
Scenario 2 
 Fire in one parked EV with a 100 kWh battery  
 Underground car park: 50 x 50 m, 3 m height (7500 m3) 
 Concentration: 2 – 20 kg HF   /  7500 m3 = 0.27 – 2.7 g/m3 = 320 – 3200 ppm 
 Death likely to happen within a time frame of maximum a few minutes. 
 
When comparing toxicity it is essential to compare different materials and scenarios. For 
example, a non-EV will emit significant amounts of toxic gases during fire, originating from 
e.g. plastics and rubber in the wheels [86,87,88]. There is a lack of emission studies of 
burning of new vehicles, which typically have significantly larger amounts of plastics. Also 
the AC coolant media, R1234yf (2,3,3,3 Tetrafluoropropene, HFO-1234yf), used nowadays 
for replacing  tetrafluoroethane (R134a), produce HF when burning [89], supplying an 
additional source for HF in vehicle fires, for both EVs and non-EVs. However, comparing a 
non-fire case is also important, e.g. the Li-ion battery can emit HF and other toxic compounds 
without fire as shown in Paper III. Comparing toxicity on scenario basis taking into account 
e.g. production rates, ventilation, different types of toxic substances and combinations of them 
can be performed via e.g. the ISO 13571 standard [90]. Asphyxiant gases are handled by the 
fractional effective dose (FED) and irritant-gases are handled by fractional effective 
concentration (FEC) [90]. 
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DEGREE OF IGNITION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FIRE, EMISSIONS AND GAS EXPLOSIONS 
The gases released from a Li-ion battery are flammable. In principle, after a gas emission 
there may be either no ignition, an immediate ignition or a delayed ignition. If there is no 
ignition, there will only be smoke and gas, probably both toxic and flammable gas. Smoke 
and gas emissions from heated materials are often more toxic if there is no fire or if there is 
not enough oxygen to have complete combustion (under ventilated fire) than with a fire with 
complete combustion. The impact of limited oxygen on burning Li-ion batteries has not been 
studied here, however it is highly probable that limited oxygen will have an adverse impact on 
the emissions from any part of the battery system. The impact of gas emissions released from 
a Li-ion cell is thus probably worse in general without ignition or in under ventilated 
conditions, however no studies are available. 
For a battery system, there may be several ignition sources including an external source 
(outside of the battery system), sparks or hot cable/connection/electronic parts inside the 
battery system, sparks from electrical arcing at internal cell short circuits undergoing 
separator melting or thermal runaway, jet flames or small fire flames due to thermal runaway 
or hot battery surfaces [Paper III]. The autoignition temperature of the electrolyte is about 450 
°C, see Table 2, and a Li-ion cell undergoing thermal runaway can reach even higher 
temperatures [Paper I, II, III, 27]. 
The gases are often ignited rather instantly, at the same time as the thermal runaway occurs, 
resulting in a fire. However if ignition takes place later when a flammable mixture has 
accumulated  in a confined or semi-confined environment, the ignition will result in a pressure 
build-up since the heated gases cannot expand, which can be called a “gas explosion” [45], a 
“smoke gas explosion” or a “smoke explosion”. The study of external heating abuse of 6.8 Ah 
single Li-ion cells reported in [Paper III] showed the occurrence of repeated gas explosions, 
also for different cycle ageing level. Although the cells are relatively small the gas explosions 
were strong enough to open the oven door and to move the video camera, even though the 
oven was not an airtight confinement and additional pressure releases actions were taken to 
mitigate gas explosions in the oven, see Paper III. 
Note that it is important to distinguish a gas explosion from a cell case explosion. When using 
the term “battery explosion” it is unclear which of the two types one is referring to. 
The gas release due to venting often occurs before thermal runaway and can be difficult to 
observe visually [Paper III, 68], even though relatively large amounts of gas release can occur 
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[Paper III]. Thus, without adequate detection equipment/possibilities, situations will occur 
where flammable as well as toxic gases are released without being detected. 
A flammable gas/air mixture can only be ignited if the concentration is within the 
flammability limits. The lower flammability limit (LFL) and the upper flammability limit 
(UFL) for some common electrolyte solvents can be seen in Table 2. The LFL is about 3 % 
for these solvents which means that 30 liters (3 % of 1 m
3
) of electrolyte in gas phase is 
needed to create a flammable mixture with 1 m
3
 of air. This amount corresponds to about 100 
g of solvent (calculated from the ideal gas law with a volume of 30 liters and normal 
temperature and pressure) which in turn corresponds to a cell weight of about 500-1000 g 
(given that the electrolyte weight is 10-20 % of total cell weight). A room of 10 m
3
 can easily 
accommodate a MWh sized Li-ion battery system. With a lower flammability limit of 100 
g/m
3
, only 1 kg of electrolyte, thus just a small fraction of the total amount of electrolyte in 
the system, is needed to create a flammable mixture with risk of gas explosion. 
Upon ignition the gases expand about 5-8 times, causing an overpressure of 5-8 bar if 
confined. Many building structures can withstand only a very limited pressure increase, e.g. 
doors and windows typically about 100 mbar. 
 
BRIEF OVERVIEW ON TODAY’S SAFETY SOLUTIONS  
High safety is achieved using many layers of safety, see the safety onion in Figure 17. For 
high safety, the cell should be made of high quality pure materials using a flawless 
manufacturing process and selected “safe materials”. Since there are no intrinsically safe Li-
ion cells, this is not easily done. Various safety mechanisms are often implemented into the 
battery with the intention to protect the cells from abuse conditions [91]. The BMS is 
essential, without its protection the battery cells will e.g. easily be over/under-charged. For 
high safety, the BMS should be of high quality with adequate sensing enabling adequate 
detection and hinder operation out of battery cell limits. Prudent design also includes keeping 
the cells within an operating window that minimizes the use of the maximum possible cell 
limits, in order to create a safe margin, this is typically done by the BMS. The size of the 
margin will however depend on manufacturer and type of application.  The BMS can however 
unfortunately not protect the battery from all types of abuse situations. Table 3 gives a 
simplified general overview of abuse situations together with the BMS ability to protect for 
the situations. 
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Table 3. A simplified general overview of abuse situations where the BMS can/cannot 
protect the battery system. 
Abuse type BMS 
protection? 
Protection strategy 
External battery pack short 
circuit 
YES 
Disconnect the battery by using fuse or possibly 
contactors 
External cell short circuit POSSIBLE* 
The BMS can protect if the short circuit current is 
possible to interrupt by a circuit breaker. 
Internal cell short circuit NO** - 
Overcharge YES*** Disconnect the battery by using contactors 
Overdischarge YES*** Disconnect the battery by using contactors 
Mechanical cross / 
deformation / penetration 
NO - 
External heating, mild YES Cooling by using Thermal management system 
External heating, strong NO - 
* This case refers to a situation with an external short circuit of one or multiple cells inside the battery 
pack. Theoretically, many short circuit paths are possible, and if the short circuit happens to be within 
a current path involving a fuse or possibly contactors then it is possible to stop the short circuit. 
** Spontaneously starting on micrometer scale inside the cell battery due to e.g. particle 
contamination or dendrite formation. 
*** The detection and the consequent actions until current shutdown must be rapid enough to ensure 
that the battery is not exposed to over/under voltages. 
 
POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED FUTURE SAFETY SOLUTIONS 
There are complex and sometimes conflicting requirements on the battery. It is desired that 
the battery has a low cost, long life time, low weight and volume, i.e. high energy and power 
densities, high safety, high recyclability, low environmental impact, etc. There is always a 
trade-off between all the requirements. From a pure battery system safety point of view, the 
safety of the battery system could be improved from a technical and theoretical perspective, 
but with potential disadvantages regarding other requirements. 
The safety level should be adequate, that means it should relate to the risks for the specific 
situation. There are several factors that determine each situation; the battery size and type, the 
application that use the battery and what the environment around the battery and the 
application looks like. 
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PROPAGATION PROTECTION/MITIGATION 
 
It is essential to mitigate/hinder failure propagation/spreading. The propagation can occur on 
several levels. So far cell-to-cell propagation has been briefly studied [Paper VII,92,93], while 
higher levels of propagation have been the subject of very limited studies [68].  
Figure 47 illustrate four different interfaces of levels where the propagation protection can be 
implemented. The design and installation of the battery system determine to a high degree the 
propagation protection. Installed firewalls as well as passive and active cooling systems can 
have a strong impact on propagation [Paper VII]. In case of a single cell failure the 
propagation should be stopped/delayed at least at the module level. In case of severe damage 
to multiple cells, e.g. by mechanical forces, multiple modules can be engaged in the 
fire/thermal event and the event can be handled on the next level; subpack/pack. In very large 
lithium-ion battery systems separation in different rooms/locations will be an important safety 
enhancement. 
 
Figure 47. Propagation can occur between many levels within the battery system and the 
application user (e.g. the electrified vehicle). The thermal event can be initiated 
at many different levels by different failures/abuse. What will the 
consequences of various initiation scenarios be? Can they be stopped? At what 
level can the propagation be stopped? 
For cell-to-cell propagation for pouch cells, the cell intercooling plates can play an important 
role. For example, if a relatively thick inter-cell plate of e.g. 2-5 mm aluminum would be 
implemented, it would probably significantly decrease the propagation. It might be 
commercially questionable, especially for automotive applications due to increased weight, 
volume and cost, while it might be a more viable option for batteries used for grid storage or 
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for vessels at sea. Separation of the battery system by using distance (free air) could perhaps 
be part of a low cost solution for applications not limited by volume. 
 
GAS PROTECTION/MITIGATION 
 
The release of flammable and toxic gas from heated Li-ion battery cells can be handled by 
different approaches. If the propagation is stopped, the amount of gas release will be limited, 
which is an important achievement. The released flammable gases should be ventilated out 
and possibly with a controlled combustion, e.g. a pilot flame. It might be challenging to keep 
the gas emissions out of the flammability range, but it is important to hinder the occurrence of 
a gas explosion. The toxic gas emissions can be handled with different solutions, e.g. 
ventilation to move emissions to other places and by dilution, to lower exposure 
concentrations. Toxic gas emissions can also be treated by different filters, e.g. CaCl2 for HF. 
Another possible solution not yet studied is the possibility to wash down the toxic gas 
emissions by e.g. water mist, however, the run-off water will contain toxic compounds, e.g. 
hydrofluoric acid, potential lethal concentrations and needs to be handled, yet it might 
transform the toxicity problem from gas to liquid phase. 
For detection of gas release, which can occur before/without thermal runaway, gas sensors 
can be used inside the battery packs and/or inside battery compartments/rooms. Gas sensors 
might offer a significant increase in safety since a gas sensor might be the only detecting 
device of some gas release scenarios [Paper III] as well as offer early detection, which can be 
very valuable in order to increase the time for evacuation and counter actions to take place. 
There may be a need for different types of gas sensors, e.g. one for measuring toxic gases 
such as HF and CO, and one measuring flammable gases, e.g. evaporated solvents, methane 
and hydrogen gas. In large battery installations, e.g. for electrical grid energy storage, it is 
probably very relevant to install gas sensors. For example, failure in a large Li-ion battery 
system having LFP cells, might not induce a cell fire but there is a potential risk that non-
combusted released flammable gases may accumulate in the battery compartment/room, 
posing a risk for a gas explosion. Also, in order to minimize the consequences of a gas 
explosion in large battery installations, explosion reliefs could be utilized. 
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BMS ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENT 
 
In order to improve detection and detection time, the BMS could have better sensoring and 
better and faster algorithms. Better sensing can be obtained using more sensors and/or more 
accurate sensors. For example, having temperature sensor(s) on each cell surface adequately 
placed for a rapid response of cell temperature increase. More rapid, but still accurate, sensor 
monitoring, to limit the time from event to detection and protective action is desired, e.g. to 
hinder over/undervoltage to occur, particularly in the case of high currents. An increased data 
process capacity and improved algorithms can be the key to finding anomalous cells and 
detect them before failure, e.g. finding high ohmic internal cell short circuits. 
Algorithms and hardware can be used to conduct impedance measurements, in order to e.g. 
monitor ageing and anomalous cell(s). In case a “bad” cell is identified, it could be bypassed 
if cells have individual cell circuit breakers. This is, however, probably far from commercially 
viable at cell level. It can also be important to have capabilities to validate BMS failures as 
well as sensor failures by having increased redundancy. 
 
GENERAL AND BROAD RISK ASSESSMENT 
A risk assessment is a well-established important method in order to determine risks. There 
are various types of risk assessment procedures and all of them need adequate reference data 
(input-data). The input-data, i.e. the existing knowledge, is crucial for the robustness of the 
assessment. With poor input-data the risk assessment will generate unreliable output-data and 
not the desired adequate risk determination. At present, major parts of the input-data, 
particularly for large battery systems, are missing or have too low quality. 
Below is a general simplified risk assessment for Li-ion batteries presented. The risk 
assessment aims to be broad and general, covering Li-ion batteries from small size to large 
size Li-ion battery systems, for various applications and environments, and the method 
therefore needs to be simplified. The Li-ion battery hazards are identified and listed and the 
risk assessment is presented in two tables, Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 presents the hazards 
and its sources and how the sources typically can be mitigated or hindered (protection 
strategy). All hazards in Table 4 can potentially come from any of the sources. In Table 5 the 
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same hazards are presented together with its consequences as well as possible mitigation 
strategies. 
The probability and the severity of each hazard are not quantified in detail, since there are not 
enough data available to determine that. Consequently it is not possible to present the rating, 
i.e. probability multiplied by severity. The ultimate goal of a risk assessment is to present the 
real-world risks. In order to do that probability, severity and ratings are needed for each 
hazard and for each battery type/size and application/environment conditions. Today, some 
values might be estimated for small sized Li-ion batteries in consumer products, e.g. a general 
cell failure rate of about 1 ppm, as described in the introduction, anyhow it is difficult to apply 
such data to the detailed hazards in the presented general risk assessment. The data from field 
failures in large Li-ion battery systems are very limited since there are yet too few systems 
and incident statistics available. The risks are also depending on the battery use, the 
environmental conditions and the battery applications. That is, unfortunately not all risk 
numbers are known. Therefore, it is not possible today to conduct a full covering real-world 
risk assessment and it is particularly difficult for large Li-ion systems. Anyhow, risk 
assessments have to be conducted and are important, however, the risk assessment, if done 
properly, can only be as good as the available reference data. Statistical data from incidents in 
the field and investigations of such incidents will obviously be important input-data to 
improve future Li-ion battery risk assessments. 
The risks typically have a strong dependence of battery size and application as well as the 
application environment. The focus has for some time been on reducing the risk of fire for Li-
ion cells by several approaches, e.g. by increased onset temperatures, more stable and less 
reactive cell materials, use of flame retardants etc. For consumer Li-ion batteries a fire is 
typically a worst case scenario that should be avoided. However, for large Li-ion battery 
systems, things become much more complex and the risk analysis is significantly more 
challenging to conduct because it is a new technology and e.g. statistics, failure distribution, 
consequences and mechanisms of the risks are still not well known. Especially for large 
battery system, risks associated with flammable and toxic gases can induce dangerous 
situations in terms of gas explosion and lethal gas concentrations in the battery vicinity. If in 
the future it is found that fire should by all means be avoided the gas threat must anyhow be 
removed by changing the cell chemistry or by other means, e.g. ventilation, minimization of 
the size of the cell(s) involved etc. A fire is a potential source of further fire spreading within 
buildings/vehicles/vessels and should of course be avoided (or handled, e.g. by fire fighting) 
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however not to the cost of a much more severe gas explosion or potential toxic gas emission 
release. However, there are no publicly available studies about these complex aspects and the 
author is not aware of any studies/reports that even mention/discuss this matter. 
Consequently, there is a huge need for future studies about this. 
 
Table 4. General simplified risk assessment of Li-ion batteries for all battery 
sizes/applications; hazard, its sources and mitigation/protection. 
Hazard Source Mitigation/protection strategy 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
S
ev
er
it
y
 
R
at
in
g
 
1. Swelling 
(but no gas release) 
2. Gas release / venting: 
2.1 Toxic gas emissions 
2.2 Corrosive acid / gas 
2.3 Gas explosion* 
3. Electrolyte leakage 
4 High cell pressure 
4.1 Cell case rupture 
4.2 Cell case explosion 
5. High temperatures  
6 Gas explosion** 
7. Fire*** 
7.1 Fire in battery cell 
7.2 Fire in battery pack 
material 
External heating 
If minor, BMS by cooling via 
thermal management system 
Lack of data 
to conduct 
External fire Fire barriers, fire fighting 
Mechanical cross / 
deformation / penetration 
Battery protected box, reinforced 
deformation structure, placing of 
the battery. 
Short circuit, external 
cell  
Circuit breakers, e.g. fuse 
Short circuit, internal 
cell 
Not possible for cell, propagation 
protection by system 
Overcharge 
BMS, possible cell internal cell 
safety mechanisms 
Overdischarge BMS 
8. Electrical voltage 
hazards 
BMS fault 
Electrical insulation, correct 
personal handling technique and 
equipment. 
Mechanical cross / 
deformation / penetration 
* Gas explosion of battery vented gases, at relatively low temperature without a thermal runaway, can 
generate a gas explosion in case of ignition and within the flammability limit. 
** Gas explosion of battery vented gases, in case of thermal runaway having its own ignition source 
(e.g. cell temperature higher than autoignition temperature, spark) in case of within the flammability 
limit. 
*** Fire from the battery cell and/or from fire of non-cell material, e.g. plastics, cables, electronics, 
within the battery system. 
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Table 5. General simplified risk assessment of Li-ion batteries for all battery 
sizes/applications; hazard, its consequence and mitigation/protection. 
Hazard 
Consequence 
(worst case) 
Possible mitigation / 
protection strategy 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
S
ev
er
it
y
 
R
at
in
g
 
1. Swelling 
(but no gas release) 
Acute safety typical ok, a 
balloon of flammable 
gases have increased fire 
risks. 
 BMS 
 Detection and remove/replace 
cell probably important. 
Lack of data 
to conduct 
2. Gas release / 
venting: 
2.1 Toxic gas 
emissions 
2.2 Corrosive acid / 
gas 
 
 
2.3 Gas explosion* 
 
Acute toxicity 
 
 
 
 
 
See point 6. 
 Early detection – warning and 
personal evacuation 
 Propagation mitigation (limit 
problem size/severity) 
 Battery placing 
 Ventilation 
 Detox (anti-dote) gas filters 
 
See point 6. 
3. Electrolyte leakage Increased risk of fire 
(flammable vapours) and 
toxicity (of decomposition 
products). 
 Ventilation 
 No heat/ignition sources 
4 High cell pressure 
4.1 Cell case rupture 
 
4.2 Cell case explosion  
Spreading out of 
combustible material, 
increased fire risk. 
Ballistic projectile hazards 
for persons/vehicles/etc. 
 Cell designed to release gas 
before extreme internal pressure is 
reached 
 
 Ballistic projectile protection 
5. High temperatures Burn hazards for persons, 
ignition source 
 Cooling by thermal management 
system (if still operational)  
6 Gas explosion** Damage to building and 
persons, potentially severe 
(life threating). 
 Pressure release in battery pack 
 Propagation mitigation  (lower 
amount of gas) 
 Ventilation (dilution) 
 Pilot flame / controlled ignition 
7. Fire*** 
7.1 Fire in battery cell 
7.2 Fire in battery 
pack material 
Heat release 
Fire source to spread to 
adjacent structures. 
 Propagation mitigation 
 Fire fighting 
8. Electrical voltage 
hazards 
From small burn to 
potential lethal injury. 
 Insulation 
 Floating ground 
 BMS 
 Adequate personnel training on 
electrical hazards and equipment 
 
*, **, *** See notes in Table 4. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Lithium-ion battery safety is complex and a holistic perspective is needed. The safety aspects 
differ significantly between small Li-ion batteries in consumer products and for large sized 
Li-ion battery systems used in e.g. electrified vehicles, electrical grid and vessels at sea. Risks 
should not be overestimated and there can sometimes be a tendency in media to report battery 
fires improperly, since battery fires seem to have a rather large news value. The risks and 
failure mechanisms for Li-ion batteries are still not well known and some areas have been 
studied to a very limited extent. Examples of areas that need considerable more studies in the 
future are size scaling effect for large battery systems of various types and for different 
environments, propagation protection, ageing effects on safety, fire fighting, toxic gas 
emissions and gas explosion risks. So far failure statistics are limited, particularly for large Li-
ion battery system. Because of the lacking knowledge today, a complete risk assessment can 
simply not be performed. Furthermore, without that knowledge, counteractions cannot be 
studied/developed to handle potentially severe but still unknown risks. With further studies in 
the future, adequate risk assessments can be conducted as well as the very important 
development of counteractions to mitigate risks. 
An external fire that spreads to the battery is a probable event that no built-in battery safety 
mechanism can protect against. Significant amounts of toxic hydrogen fluoride, 20-200 
mg/Wh, can be emitted from Li-ion battery fires. Gases can be released before and without 
going into thermal runaway. If these gases are not instantly ignited a gas explosion can occur 
if the gases are mixed with air in a confined space and later ignited, e.g. by spark or 
autoignition (by contact to a hot surface). LFP cells are considerably less thermally active, 
and ignite more seldom, however, the gas threat might potentially be more severe in terms of 
gas explosion and toxic gas emissions although this is not studied in the present work, or 
elsewhere found, at least not publically. 
Examples of methods that can offer increased safety are firewalls between modules and 
suffocation methods for metal-air battery cells. Firewalls have been shown to give 
significantly propagation protection according to the simulation studies, hindering a thermal 
event from propagation is essential for battery pack safety. Suffocation might offer an 
additional safety protection strategy via air shut-down for metal-air batteries without 
damaging the battery performance. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A wide perspective is essential, including e.g. failure type, battery size, application and 
environment. Some battery safety aspects need general extra attention:
 
 Size scaling effect for large battery systems of various types and environments 
 Propagation protection/mitigation 
 Toxic gas emissions 
 Gas explosion (delayed ignition of vented battery gases) 
 Fire fighting 
 Ageing effects on safety 
 Finding counteractions to mitigate risks, especially from gas threats and for large Li-
ion batteries. 
It is recommended that the use of fluorine components and additives in Li-ion cells are 
minimized even if those compounds have positive effects from other points of view. In 
general, a holistic perspective is needed in terms of safety (e.g. heat, fire, toxicity, gas 
explosion). It is essential to investigate future incidents and compile better failure statistical 
data including failure mechanism, probability and severity to use in risk assessments. It is also 
important to follow the development of high energy density batteries, since these have a 
general built-in increased safety risk. It is recommended to include safety aspects earlier in the 
research and development (R&D) processes to have safety built-in, instead of trying to 
achieve high safety at the end of the R&D process, by adding safety additives or functions. 
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Abuse by External Heating, Overcharge and Short Circuiting
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Lithium-ion batteries offer great energy and power densities but the thermal stability is an issue of concern compared to other
battery technologies. In this study different types of abuse testing have been performed in order to compare the battery safety for
different types of commercial lithium-ion battery cells. The results show large differences in abuse response for different cells.
Exposed to external heating laptop cells with cobalt based cathode developed a thermal runaway resulting in pressure release, fire
and temperatures over 700◦C. Lithium iron phosphate (LFP) is known to be a very thermally stable cathode material and LFP-cells
showed a significantly lower thermal response, a thermal runaway could, however, be detected for some of the cells in the external
heating test. The overcharge tests of LFP-cells were in most cases uneventful but in one case the test resulted in a violent fire. The
short circuit tests showed modest temperature increases of the cells in spite of high currents peaking at around 1000 A. Although the
development of safer lithium-ion battery cells has been successful thermal runaway events may still occur under extreme conditions.
© 2014 The Electrochemical Society. [DOI: 10.1149/2.0311410jes] All rights reserved.
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The high energy and power density of lithium-ion batteries have
made them the preferred type of battery for battery electric vehicles
as well as for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Lithium-ion batteries
have many advantages but the reactive, volatile and flammable mate-
rials present in the battery are a concern and may be a threat to safety.
Lithium-ion batteries are produced in large quantities, mainly for small
consumer products such as cellular telephones and other portable elec-
tronic devices. Using them in electric vehicles poses another situation
since the large size of the battery as well as the environmental condi-
tions that the battery is exposed to in terms of temperature, vibrations
etc have an influence on the safety. In addition, requirements such as
long life time and the possibility for a fast recharge of the battery calls
for other demands on the cells. All these aspects have an effect on
the safety of the vehicle, including the safety for people inside and
outside the vehicle, for service personnel involved in maintenance and
of rescue personnel in case of an accident.
Lithium-ion batteries have a limited window of stability regarding
temperature and voltage. Overheating may start exothermal reactions
that release even more heat which in turn can lead to an accelerated
process called a thermal runaway. A thermal runaway can be dev-
astating if it spreads to a complete battery system, releasing large
amounts of energy. Such a process could start due to overcharge,
overdischarge, mechanical deformation, external heating or an exter-
nal or internal short circuit, see Figure 1. The heat generated by any
of these events may start exothermal reactions in the battery that in
turn could lead to cell venting, fire or explosion.
These risks are well known1–8 and are not only associated with the
heat and high temperatures that may develop, the emission of harmful
or poisonous gases also pose a danger that has been emphasized in
literature,9,10 but also other gases which can be flammable may be
emitted.11–13 The reactions during overheating are typically due to the
decomposition of the solid electrolyte interphase (SEI) layer, anode
and cathode as well as electrolyte decomposition and combustion.5,14
These reactions are exothermal. In addition to this separator melt-
ing, an endotherm event, may occur. Oxygen may be released at the
positive electrode during decomposition; this oxygen can provide the
oxidant for the combustion of the electrolyte. Large efforts have been
spent on improving the safety of Li-ion cells, e.g. by replacing the
cobalt based electrode by lithium iron phosphate15 which is more
thermally stable and has long life time and high power density but
lower energy density.16 Another common practice for commercial
cells is to use a number of additives to the electrolytes to improve
safety, e.g. including fire retarders.17–20
Incidents involving lithium-ion batteries have been reported in
small as well as large battery systems, see for example Wang et al.21
zE-mail: vegan@chalmers.se
and Mikolajczak et al.22 Abuse tests of batteries are therefore of prime
importance in order to evaluate and improve the level of safety for
these types of battery systems. In this article results from abuse tests
of commercial Li-ion batteries of different type, chemistry and size
are presented to illustrate the problems that may arise under abnormal
operating conditions.
Experimental
Four types of commercial cells were tested; a Samsung 18650-cell,
i.e. a cylindrical cell 18 mm in diameter and 65 mm long, typically
used in laptops; two EiG cells of pouch-type with lithium iron phos-
phate (LiFePO4) cathode, and a carbon-based anode (a newer and
an older cell design); a European Batteries cell of pouch-type with
lithium iron phosphate cathode and graphite anode. A summary of
the cell specifications is provided in Table I. The EiG cells were op-
timized for power application while the European Batteries cell as
well as the laptop cell was optimized for energy applications. All cells
were fully charged, 100% State of Charge (SOC), according to the
manufacturer’s instructions.
Three types of abuse tests were performed; external heating, over-
charge and short circuit tests. All measurements were performed in
a similar but not identical condition as described in international test
standards for batteries such as FreedomCAR23 or SAE J2464.24 Cells
of different sizes, packaging, chemistries and manufacturers were
tested. Most tests were repeated in order to account for the variations
between individual cells. The tests presented in this paper are a selec-
tion of representative examples of these tests. For the Samsung 18650
cell only results from external heating tests are presented since over-
charge and short circuit tests would not be of interest due the built-in
cell protection mechanisms in the cell.
External heating test.— In the external heating test, the cells were
heated to excessive temperatures in order to examine their thermal
stability. This test is sometimes referred to as thermal ramp test. The
tested cell was placed inside a thermostatically controlled oven, Binder
FED 115. The oven has a microprocessor control and a PT 100 temper-
ature sensor for internal regulation of oven temperature. The oven’s
internal fan was set on full speed in order to circulate the oven air
to obtain a uniform temperature around the tested lithium-ion cell.
The cells were placed on one or two bricks in the center of the oven
and tested one at a time, see Figure 2. For the pouch cells the oven
temperature was first set to 80◦C and thereafter increased in steps of
10◦C every 15 min until either any thermal runaway had occurred or
to the maximum temperature of the oven (300◦C). For the 18650 cell
the oven was set to the maximum temperature (300◦C) with continu-
ous maximum heating. Both heading procedures were relatively slow.
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Figure 1. Lithium-ion thermal runaway overview from cell event to potential system event.
Table I. Basic data of tested cells.
Cell type Cell packaging Nominal voltage (V) Nominal capacity (Ah)
Samsung ICR18650–24F Cylindrical 3.6 2.4
EiG ePLB-F007H In article referred as “older design” Pouch 3.2 7
EiG ePLB-F007A In article referred as “newer design” Pouch 3.2 7
European Batteries EBattery 45 Ah v1.4 Pouch 3.2 45
With the continuous heating method it took around 90 min for the
oven to reach 200◦C.
The cell voltage and the cell surface temperature were measured
with a sample rate of 1 Hz with a data logger, Pico Technology ADC-
24. There were up to five type K thermocouples evenly distributed
on both sides of the cell’s surface and one additional thermocouple
measuring the oven temperature.
Overcharge test.— In the overcharge test, the lithium-ion cells
were abused by being charged beyond their limits. The charger was
limited to the preset maximum current of each experiment and up to
max 15.3 V. The 7 Ah EiG cell was charged with 70 A (corresponding
to 10 C-rate) considering that the cell is optimized for power applica-
Figure 2. Photo of oven set up, showing a cylindrical 18650 cell fastened onto
a brick with steel wire.
tions while the 45 Ah European Batteries cell was overcharged with
90 A (corresponding to 2 C-rate) due to its optimization for energy
applications. The cell surface temperature was measured with five
type K thermocouples; one of the sensors was directly attached to
the cell surface while four were so called plate-thermometers, that
is a thermocouple attached to a 10 × 10 cm metal plate. The plate-
thermometers were distributed around the cell, one directly under the
cell, the others placed with an air gap from the cell. The current was
measured using a current shunt (accuracy 0.5%). Cell voltage, current
and temperature were measured with a sample rate of 1 Hz with a data
logger, Pico Technology ADC-24.
Short-circuit test.— EiG and European Batteries cells were short
circuited using 50 mm2 copper cables and a high current contactor,
Telemecanique LC1F630, with a low internal resistance of 40 μ.
The short circuit current was measured by a current core, Hitec 6000E
Topacc 1.0, which can measure currents up to 6000 A. The cell sur-
face temperature was measured with eighteen type K thermocouples
equally distributed on both sides of the cell surface. The cell voltage,
current and temperature were measured at 1 Hz using two data log-
gers, Pico Technology ADC-24 and Fluke Hydra Series II, as well as
by a Tektronix TDS 3034 oscilloscope.
Results
External heating test.— Figure 3 shows the results of an external
heating test on the 18650 cell. At 220◦C, a very rapid temperature
increase occurs when the cell catches fire and a pressure wave is ob-
served. The maximum average temperature at the cell surface reaches
743◦C which is higher than the melting temperature of aluminum,
660◦C. The maximum cell surface temperature measured by a sin-
gle sensor was 775◦C, the temperature of the cell interior was thus
probably even higher. Based on the average surface temperature in-
crease, the corresponding energy released from the thermal runaway
.  
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Figure 3. Temperature and cell voltage development during external heating
of a Samsung 18650 cell.
can be roughly estimated since the cell is likely to be under adiabatic
conditions during the short duration of the thermal runaway, approxi-
mately 20 seconds. The specific heat capacity of a complete cell varies
between cylindrical and pouch cell packaging and is also dependent
on size, energy/power optimization etc. In the estimations we use an
approximate value of 700 J/kg◦C based on published values for dif-
ferent cell types.5,25–29 Using the measured temperature increase of
523◦C the energy released can be estimated to 15.6 kJ (4.33 Wh). The
calculated released energy is thus about half of that of the electrical
energy available in the cell, 8.64 Wh. It may also be noted that just
prior to the runaway, burning electrolyte is squirting out of the cell
seen in Figure 4, which releases energy which is not included in the
above value for the energy release calculation. Figure 5 shows the
derivative of the average cell surface temperature; the figure shows
that the thermal runaway temperature is 220◦C and that the rate of
temperature increase is very high, initially close to 5000◦C/min.
Cells with lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathode have an enhanced
thermal safety compared to cells with cobalt oxide based cathode.
Figure 6 shows the results for two LFP-cells during external heating.
The old cell design shows a clear but relatively small thermal runaway
event while the new cell design shows no obvious signs of thermal run-
away. Actually, a minor exothermic event, hardly visible in Figure 6,
can be detected in the same temperature region as the thermal run-
away in the old cell design also for the new cell design. The chemical
and/or physical changes in the cell design are not known or studied in
this report. Complementary experiments where the temperature was
continuously increased also resulted in a similar behavior as that in
Figure 6. The time to reach the thermal runaway temperature was
approximately 90 minutes for the test using continuous heating and
approximately 200 minutes for the test using temperature-ramping.
Figure 4. Samsung 18650 cell at the beginning of thermal runaway releasing
ignited material.
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Figure 5. The rate of the cell surface temperature for the Samsung 18650 cell
in the temperature region of the thermal runaway peak.
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Figure 7 shows the results of the European Batteries cell during
external heating. A moderate thermal runaway is detected also for this
LFP-cell, with temperatures reaching well above 300◦C. The runaway
temperature was 183◦C within ± 1◦C for these cells, this value is close
to the value observed for the older design EiG cell, 189◦C. The run-
away temperature was thus somewhat lower than for the laptop-type
cell. The energy released at the detected thermal runaway estimated
using the same method and specific heat capacity value as for the
Samsung cell above is also much smaller than for the laptop cell.
While the ratio of energy released to the electric energy stored in the
fully charged battery is of the order of 50% for the laptop battery it is
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Figure 7. Temperature development during external heating of European Bat-
teries cell.
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Figure 8. Overcharge of EiG cell of newer design.
between 10 and 30% for the LFP-type cells that showed a thermal run-
away. The rates of temperature increase at the thermal runaway for the
LFP-cells were 500◦C/min for European Battery cell and 60◦C/min
for EiG older design while the rate was not detectable for EiG newer
design. The 18650 cell lost 30% of its weight in the external heating
tests while the LFP cells lost between 16–26%, the EiG new design
had the lowest weight loss of 16%.
Overcharge test.— Figure 8 shows the result from an overcharge
test of the EiG cell of newer design. The cell surface temperature
reached a moderate temperature of 70◦C. An almost negligible weight
loss was measured, probably due to minor venting of electrolyte.
The overcharge test for one of the European Batteries cells is shown
in Figure 9. After approximately 5 minutes of charging at a state
of charge level of 115%, the cell suddenly caught fire, as seen in
Figure 10. The temperature reached 855◦C for a sensor placed in the
center of the top surface of the cell. During the fire, the top layer of
the cell was blown away so the cell temperature presented in Figure
9 may include the temperature of the flames and does not reflect the
cell temperature after this event.
The overcharge test on the European Batteries cells was repeated
three more times without any occurrence of fire and Figure 11 shows
the results of one of the repeated tests. The surface temperature reached
a maximum of 79◦C, a value comparable to that of the EiG cell. It
may be noted that all overcharged cells were swollen with a thickness
increase after the test ranging from 350 to 850% of the initial thickness.
Short-circuit test.— The results from short circuit tests for EiG
cells of both newer and older design are shown in Figure 12. There
were no significant differences between the two types of cells. Be-
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Figure 9. Overcharge of a European Batteries cell resulted in fire, in this case
the charger was manually stopped at 9.5 min due to the fire.
Figure 10. Overcharge of a European Batteries cell resulted in fire.
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Figure 11. Overcharge of a European Batteries cell that did not result in a
fire.
tween 20 and 30 seconds after the start of the short circuit the cell
swelled up quickly. The following 2 minutes the cell vented (with
no visual smoke) and swelling decreased considerably. The follow-
ing 5 minutes the cell contracted further to a thickness close to that
of the untested cell. The peak current reached almost 900 A which
corresponds to a discharge rate of 128C. The maximum cell surface
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Figure 12. Short circuit of EiG cell of newer design (dashed lines) and EiG
of older design (solid lines).
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Figure 13. Short circuit of European Batteries cell, photo (left) showing the flame and smoke from the burnt off positive terminal tab, the photo (right) after the
test shows the burnt off tab.
temperature was about 100◦C and both types of cells were discharged
to about 43% SOC.
In the short circuit test of the European Batteries cell the positive
tab of the cell burnt off, which stopped the short circuit current, see
Figure 13. The current just before this event was 1084 A and due to
the very short time for the short circuit the cell temperature and SOC
changed very little, less than 6◦C and 4% respectively.
Discussion
When the Samsung 18650 laptop cell was exposed to external heat,
the open circuit voltage remained stable until about 135◦C, measured
on the cell surface, as seen in Figure 3, then it falls abruptly. The melt-
ing points of typical shutdown separator materials, polyethylene and
polypropylene, are about 130 and 165◦C, the measured values are thus
reasonably close to these values, where the final voltage drop occurs at
about 158◦C. The difference may be due to a delay in the temperature
measurement due to the slow heat transfer in the interior of the cell.
The runaway temperature, 220◦C, and the temperature increase during
the thermal runaway, 532◦C, is in the same order as reported in our
previous study.30 The rate of temperature increase in the initial phase
of the thermal runaway is extremely high, close to 5000◦C/min. Jhu et
al.28 found for a similar cell a peak value of about 37000◦C/min with a
more sensitive technique, and in another study by Jhu et al.29 temperate
rates beyond 70000◦C/min were found. The state of charge can have
a strong influence on the cell behavior during abuse situations and
the influence may vary with different types of abuse. Jhu et al.28,29 and
Doughty et al.17 showed that lower SOC gives lower energy release
during external heating.
A comparison of the results of the external heating tests for the
18650 laptop cell (Figure 3) and the LFP-cells (Figure 6 and Figure 7)
shows that the behavior is much less dramatic for the LFP-cells. Two
of the three LFP-cells still go into thermal runaway but the energy
released is much less than that from a cell with cobalt-based cathode.
This is well-known from other studies2,13,20,31–36 and attributed to the
stability of the olivine structure of LiFePO4. The electrode influence
on the thermal stability of a LFP-cell is therefore dominated by the
anode material. Swelling and venting occurred for all pouch-type cells
while the laptop cell vented with a rapid release of gas, accompanied
by a pressure wave and immediately followed by fire.
The runaway temperature for the LFP-cells was lower than for
the laptop cell, 189◦C for the EiG older design and 183◦C for the
European Batteries cell. The thermal runway in the external heating
test for the new design of EiG is significantly reduced compared to
that of the older design. It may be noted that the EiG cell is designed
to target electrified vehicles in the automotive sector and is currently
in use there. The rates of temperate increase at runaway differ con-
siderably for the different cells; 5000◦C/min for the Samsung laptop
cell, 500◦C/min for European Battery cell and 60◦C/min for EiG older
design. This highlights the large differences for Li-ion cells and par-
ticularly underlines the importance of thermal stability.
Cell venting is an important safety factor to protect a Li-ion battery
from reaching too high pressure, especially in the case of cylindrical or
hard prismatic cell packaging. In fact, cell manufacturers may include
so called shutdown additives in the electrolyte in order to activate
cell venting at a pre-designed stage by gas generation from poly-
merizing of the additive molecules, before the cell reaches extreme
conditions.20 Upon heating of a cell, ventilation is also unavoidable
since the electrolyte typically consists of a Li-salt dissolved in volatile
organic solvents. Even in cases when fire or explosion does not oc-
cur, emitted flammable and toxic gas can be a serious problem as
mentioned in the introduction.
Abuse by overcharging and external heating adds energy to the
system due to the input of electric power or heat, while in a short cir-
cuit test no energy is added to the cell. Therefore, the overcharge and
external heating test can theoretically be seen as a more severe abuse
due to the addition of external energy to the cell. In the overcharge
tests presented the additional charged energy is between 20–30% in
terms of battery capacity. The energy released in the external heating
tests presented in this paper is calculated based on the change of the
cell surface temperature and are of the order of 50% or less of the elec-
trical energy within the cell. Those values do not represent the total en-
ergy release and neither the possible maximum energy release during
the most severe abuse situations when the cell materials are allowed to
fully combust. During the external heating, part of the electrolyte, and
particularly low boiling components (e.g. dimethyl carbonate), can
evaporate due to venting and cell opening. However, some electrolyte
is still present since thermal runaway does occur. For example, for the
18650 cell, electrolyte is squirting out of the cell prior to the thermal
runaway as seen in Figure 4, releasing energy which is not included in
the calculations. Besides, several other parameters also affect the re-
sults e.g. abuse test methods, cell chemistry, capacity size, cell design
and cell venting characteristics. Values typically found in the liter-
ature show a released energy of 2–3 times the electrical energy.1,38
The results presented in this article are lower presumably due to
the reasons discussed above. However, the energy release, 15.6 kJ,
of the thermal runaway for the 18650 cell in the external heating test
can be compared to 19.2 kJ measured for a similar 18650 cell.28
10 C-rate overcharge tests of the EiG newer design did not re-
sult in a thermal runaway and the peak surface temperature reached
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a moderate 79◦C. A similar result was obtained for one of the Euro-
pean Batteries cells, seen in Figure 11. However, one of the European
Batteries cells that was overcharged ignited with a resulting fire. This
behavior was not reproduced in three other tests. Excluding the ignited
cell, no thermal runaway could be detected even though all cells were
heavily affected by large swelling and venting. Hund and Ingersoll38
studied 1 C-rate overcharge of LiFeBatt 10 Ah LFP cells which re-
sulted in a significantly higher temperature of 160◦C but no fire or
sparks. He et al.39 used 2 Ah LFP cells and found a temperature peak
of 90◦C without fire during 1 C-rate overcharging. The incident of the
fire in our test is interesting but we can only speculate on the reason.
It could be a bad cell due to errors in the manufacturing process or
induced by some small variety in the test setup. An event like this in
the field could be referred to as a field failure, but field failures rarely
happens on cell-level, the probability is typically less than 1 ppm.21,22
For an overcharge situation to occur in a battery system a failure of
the Battery Management System (BMS) is required allowing the cell
to be charged above it limits. Secondly, as we have seen above, the
cell itself does not necessarily go into thermal runaway because it
is overcharged. Studies have, however, shown that LFP-cells have a
smaller margin with respect to the amount of overcharged capacity
compared to other common Li-chemistries, although the exothermal
response for LFP is significantly lower.2
The tested large-sized LFP pouch automotive cells have low inter-
nal resistance, enabling high short circuit currents known from other
studies.40 The short circuit current of the EiG cells was close to 900 A,
corresponding to a 128 C-rate. These cells are power optimized and
capable of delivering 20–30 C-rate in normal use. The short circuit
current for the six times larger capacity European Batteries cell is
close to 1100 A, i.e. a 24 C-rate. The European Batteries cell is en-
ergy optimized and made to deliver up to 4 C-rate in normal use. The
cell voltage seen in Figure 12 drops quickly due to the short circuit,
but does not reach 0 V instantly even if it is a hard short circuit with
low connection resistance. The current curve in Figure 12 quickly
rises and then falls to about half the value and then increases again.
This behavior could be explained by the fact that the extreme current
cannot be sustained due to limitations of the transport process of the
lithium ion in the cell resulting in a current drop, while the cell is
quickly heated due to the ohmic losses. The increased temperature
finally enables a higher transportation of lithium ions resulting in an
increased current. The time frame for these phases is less than 30 sec-
onds as seen in Figure 12. No thermal runaway is observed, however
the cell temperature increases fast during a short period of time.
The short circuit test of the European Batteries cell resulted in that
the positive terminal tab burnt off as seen in Figure 13 which stopped
the short circuit. In one perspective this can potentially be seen as
positive for the safety since the tab functioned as a “fuse” that stopped
the short circuit at an early stage. However the flame can be a potential
source of ignition of e.g. vented and flammable battery gases or other
easily ignitable materials inside a battery system.
Lithium-ion cells can be equipped with a variety of reversible
and irreversible safety mechanisms.41 The 18650 cells typically have
protection for short circuit, by the use of for example CID (current
interrupture device) and PTC (positive temperature coefficient), the
latter causing the cell resistance to increase rapidly at increased tem-
perature reducing the current going through the cell. Many of these
safety mechanisms were developed specifically for the Li-ion con-
sumer battery. The use of Li-ion batteries in other applications such
as within automotive give rise to more and different demands on the
safety as well as other aspects, e.g. cost, life time, energy and power
density. The environmental conditions in automotive applications are
different to those in consumer products; vibrations, extreme temper-
atures and varying humidity can be challenging. The risks involved
in case of electric vehicle crash deformations must also be taken into
consideration. In the automotive industry large capacity cells are re-
quired and typically hundreds of these are connected in series. Safety
mechanisms within the cell used in commercial Li-ion battery systems
do not always give the same protection in e.g. automotive applications.
A first example is the shutdown separator which can give an increased
safety for some cell abuse situations. However, the use of shutdown
separators in a large battery pack with higher voltage due to hundreds
of cells connected in series might not give the same safety due to
e.g. voltage breakdown of the separator.42,43 A second example is the
PTC which has a relative low voltage tolerance in cell-strings, po-
tentially as low as 30 V, which can result in spontaneous ignition in
case of overvoltage.44 Besides the safety concern the PTC also add
parasitic resistance in a large battery pack. A third example is the
CID which cannot offer the same safety in case of higher voltage
systems.44
The battery module design as well as the rate of energy release and
the total energy release from a thermal runaway in one cell determines
if neighboring cells are effected or not. From a safety perspective it
is essential to minimize the probability for a thermal event to occur
but also to minimize the consequences of such an event and prevent
damage to neighboring cells, avoiding the potential propagation of a
thermal runaway from cell to system-level as shown in Figure 1.
Conclusions
The abuse tests conducted on various types of Li-ion cells give
valuable information regarding diverse aspects of the cell safety. Risks
associated with thermal runaway situations; fire, smoke and gas emis-
sions are especially important for the use of Li-ion batteries in au-
tomotive applications. The external heating test of the 18650 laptop
cell resulted in a rapid thermal runaway accompanied with a pressure
wave and immediate fire. In large battery packs using multiple cells
in series and/or parallel the effect of a propagation scenario in thus
a concern. Safer chemistries like the LFP-cells are in general signif-
icantly less energetic. Nevertheless our results show that LFP-cells
can still go into a thermal runaway event even though the tested LFP
cells showed various results. During external heating up to 300◦C a
LFP-cell with a newer design did not show any substantial thermal
runaway while older design LFP cells showed a moderate thermal
runaway. Overcharge of the newer designed LFP-cell did not result in
thermal runaway either. However, overcharge of another LFP pouch
cell did result in a fire, even if that event could not be reproduced in
this study.
The energy released during a thermal runaway based on the results
reported above for a 18650 cobalt-based cell can be used to estimate
how much energy may be released in a thermal runaway of a 300 kg
battery system for an electric vehicle. The answer is perhaps somewhat
surprising, the calculation shows that the energy released could be in
the order of 70 MJ, corresponding to the combustion of about 2 liters
of gasoline. However, our estimate is low, as described above, and
using the highest value reported earlier one can expect a value up to
six times that calculated here. This is still considering the battery type
that has the largest energy release while other more safe chemistries,
e.g. LFP will have lower values. The presented results thus show
that although the safety aspects of Li-ion batteries are still a concern,
the safety is improving with safer chemical components and design
improvements.
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Abstract: Safety issues concerning the use of large lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries in electrified vehicles
are discussed based on the abuse test results of Li-ion cells together with safety devices for cells.
The presented abuse tests are: overcharge, short circuit, propane fire test and external heating test
(oven). It was found that in a fire, cells with higher state of charge (SOC) gave a higher heat release
rate (HRR), while the total heat release (THR) had a lower correlation with SOC. One fire test resulted
in a hazardous projectile from a cylindrical cell. In the fire tests, toxic gas emissions of hydrogen
fluoride (HF) were measured for 100%, 50% and 0% SOC.
Keywords: lithium-ion (Li-ion); battery; electrified vehicle; safety; thermal runaway; fire; hydrogen
fluoride; toxic gases; abuse test
1. Introduction
Lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery technology can enable a broad introduction of electrified vehicles,
mainly due to its high energy capacity. Li-ion batteries also have other important properties, e.g., long
lifetime and the possibility of fast charging. However, Li-ion batteries have a drawback compared
to most other battery technologies in that the electrolyte is flammable and the battery may go into
a thermal runaway, that is, the battery may self-heat, resulting in a rapid pressure and temperature
increase in the cell; this will release flammable and toxic gases but can also cause projectiles and
fire [1–7]. Thermal runaway may happen when the battery moves out of the stable operating
window of the Li-ion cell and can be caused by, e.g., short circuiting, overheating, overcharging
or mechanical damage.
Li-ion batteries are used in very large numbers for consumer products like cell phones, laptop
computers, etc. Incidents have occurred with these batteries, but the consequences are in most cases
not that serious due to the limited size of the batteries. With the increased number of electric vehicles
(EVs) on the roads, the safety issues surrounding Li-ion technology have become more important,
taking into consideration the large size of the batteries in automotive applications. Incidents involving
EVs have indeed happened, some of them resulting in fires. But these fires have not yet resulted in any
more serious consequences.
Notable EV fires include three car fires involving the battery EV (BEV) Tesla Model S that occurred
in 2013. In two of them, the driver hit road debris at highway speed, while one was caused by a crash
into a concrete barrier and a tree resulting in significant deformations. The first fire was a result of
Batteries 2016, 2, 9; doi:10.3390/batteries2020009 www.mdpi.com/journal/batteries
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penetration from beneath of the battery pack. Mass media attention was high regarding these incidents
and the fires caused a drop in Tesla Motors stock prices. Up to the present time, the authors are aware
of three additional incidents involving the Tesla Model S, however, possibly caused by electrical faults
outside of the vehicle. In any case, compared to the annual average number of automobile fires in the
USA, of the order of 1/1000 automobiles [8], the number of car fires in the Tesla Model S is significantly
lower. Larsson et al. [9] estimated in 2014 the number of fires in the Tesla Model S as 1/10,000 cars.
With the increased statistics now available, although with still limited amounts of data, and with
the sales numbers of more than 100,000 Model S vehicles, the estimate deceases somewhat to about
1/20,000 cars. This comparison does not take into account the age of the cars involved, as older cars
may be more prone to fires, but it still shows that the risks involving EVs should not be overstated.
In 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigated the fires and did
not find any defect trends [10], but Tesla did voluntarily chose to reinforce the underbody of their cars
with arming plates [11] in order to lower the frequency and the effect of hitting road debris.
Other incidents include the Fisker Karma plug-in hybrid EV (PHEV). In October 2012, Hurricane
Sandy caused the flooding of a harbor in Newark, New Jersey. The flooding lasted several hours and,
thereafter, 16 brand-new Fisker Karma were destroyed by fire. The cars were completely covered
with salt water during the flooding, an extreme situation where electrical short circuits are likely to
occur. Mass media attention was high on the Fisker Karma fires even though other vehicles including
other PHEVs/hybrid EVs (HEVs) also burnt. Prior to Hurricane Sandy, some other fire incidents
occurred involving Fisker Karma, one of them outside a supermarket shortly after the driver left the
car. These incidents are examples where EV fires have been the focus of the mass media. Other fires
have happened, during charging or as spontaneous fires, but have not gained as much media interest.
Besides the few incidents in electrified vehicles, incidents have occurred in other situations.
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li-ion battery fire incidents in 2013–2014 [12], as well as serious accidents
on cargo airplanes involving Li-ion batteries in the cargo hold, have increased the awareness of the
safety risks associated with this type of battery [13]. In 2016, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
warned that there is a risk of catastrophic aircraft loss if a Li-ion battery fire or explosion occurs in the
cargo hold since existing fire suppression systems cannot control such a fire [14]. As a consequence,
the ICAO Air Navigation Commission (ANC) has issued strict regulations, effective 1 April 2016, for
the transportation of Li-ion batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft [15].
These incidents and their consequences clearly demonstrate the necessity of putting safe vehicles
on the market, not only for the safety of humans in or near the vehicles, but also for economic and
environmental reasons. The EV has the potential to be safer than conventional combustion engine
cars, simply because the main fire source, gasoline/diesel, is removed [16]. In any case, the safety of a
battery system depends on several things, e.g., cell chemistry, cell design and system design, including
thermal management system and control strategies. Common cathode chemistries contain cobalt,
e.g., lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), LiCoO2, lithium nickel manganese cobalt (NMC), LiNixMnyCozO2,
and lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA), LiNixCoyAlzO2. Lithium phosphates [17] are also used,
e.g., lithium iron phosphate (LFP), LiFePO4. For the anode, various forms of carbon are dominant,
while lithium titanate oxide (LTO), Li4Ti5O12, is used in lower volumes. This paper focuses mainly on
carbon-LFP cells, which are currently seen as state of the art on the market when it comes to safety,
although many battery systems for automotive applications use less stable chemistries in order to
obtain, e.g., higher energy density. Abuse test results from cell level are presented and their impact is
discussed on battery system and vehicle level.
2. Cells Studied
Cylindrical cells as well as pouch and soft-can prismatic cells have been tested. Cylindrical cells
have a spirally wound layers inside an outer metal cylinder. The soft-can prismatic cell has a block
shape and an outer cell packaging made of plastic material, in contrast to the hard-can prismatic cell,
which has an outer metal packaging. In the pouch cell, the layers are stacked on top of each other and
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sealed by an aluminum-polymer bag. The pouch cell is often called a coffee bag cell or a polymer cell.
Figure 1 shows an X-ray photo of the EiG pouch cell. The layered structure is clearly visible, where the
white-/gray-colored layers are the separator material.
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Table 1 shows the cells and their specifications for the abuse tests presented in this paper and
Figure 2 shows photos of the cells. Most of the cells have a LFP-cathode and a carbon-based anode as
seen from Table 1. The initial state of charge (SOC) level of the cells was achieved by charge/discharge
procedures using a Digatron battery test equipment or an ordinary laboratory power aggregate.
The cells had not been used prior to the measurements, but had different calendar ageing. The EiG
and Lifetech cells had approximately two to three years of calendar aging, while the European Battery
cells were less than six months old and the Samsung, EVE and GBS cells were about one year old.
Cylindrical cells of type 18650, i.e., 18 mm in diameter and 65 mm long, are produced in very large
volumes and are traditionally used in laptops, power tools and electric bikes. Laptop computers are
nowadays often too thin to use 18650 cells and use instead pouch cells. Besides the use of 18650 cells
in portable devices, Tesla Motors has chosen the 18650 cell format as a basis for its serial-production of
EVs, while other vehicle manufacturers have chosen the prismatic or pouch cell type.
Table 1. Cell and test specifications. SOC: state of charge; LFP: lithium iron phosphate; and LFMP: LFP
with manganese.
Cell Nominal CellCapacity (Ah)
i l C ll
Voltage (V) Cathode/Anode
Cell
Packaging
Test Type Pres nted
in This Paper
Initial
SOC (%)
EiG ePLB-F007A 7 3.2 LFP/carbon Pouch Propane fire,overcharge 0–100
Lifetech X-1P 8 . LFP/carbon Cylindrical Propane fire 100
European Battery 45 . LFP/carbon Pouch Short circuit,overcharge 100
Samsung
ICR18650-24F 2.4 .
Cobalt
based/carbon Cylindrical
External heating
(oven) 100
VE F7568270 10 3.2 LFP/carbon Pouch Overcharge 100
GBS LFMP40Ah 40 3.2 LFMP/carbon Prismatic Overcharge 100
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3. Thermal Runaway
Thermal runaway was studied using the external heating abuse test for a commercial 18650 laptop
cell that is produced in large quantities by Samsung. The cell was fastened to a brick and placed inside
a thermostatically controlled oven, the Binder FED 115, and heated up in about 1 h to the thermal
runaway temperature [3]. The cell voltage and the cell surface temperature (measured by four type K
thermocouples) as well as the oven air temperature (measured with one type K thermocouple) were
measured with 1 Hz. Figure 3 shows the cell voltage and the differential temperature, ∆T, as a function
of the oven temperature. The differential temperature is the difference between the average cell surface
temperature and the oven temperature. Before the thermal runaway, the cell voltage breakdown occurs
due to melting of the separator, an endothermic process which is observable as a small local decrease of
∆T. ∆T has negative values up to 220 ˝C due to higher oven temperature than cell temperature, while
the thermal runaway occurs at 220 ˝C. The cell surface temperature increases to close to 800 ˝C (∆T
above 500 ˝C), with a maximum rate of around 5000 ˝C/min. Observations from the video recording
showed that the thermal runaway is accompanied with a pressure wave (i.e., shaking the video camera)
and instant ignition. The duration of the fire is approximately 1 min.
Batteries 2016, 2, 9 4 of 13 
placed inside a thermostatically controlled oven, the Binder FED 115, and heated up in about 1 hour 
to the thermal runaway temperature [3]. The cell voltage and the cell surface tem erature (measured 
by four type K thermocouples) as well as the oven air temperature (measured with one type K 
thermocouple) were measured with 1 Hz. Figure 3 shows the cell voltage and the differential 
temperature, ΔT, as a function of the oven temperature. The differential temperature is the 
difference between the average cell surface temperature and the oven temperature. Before the 
thermal runaway, the cell voltage breakdown occurs due to melting of the separator, an endothermic 
proc ss which is observable as a small local decrease of ΔT. ΔT has nega ive values up to 220 °C due 
to higher oven temperature than cell temperature, while the thermal runaway occurs at 220 °C. The 
cell surface temperature increases to close to 800 °C (ΔT above 500 °C), with a maximum rate of 
around 5000 °C/min. Observations from the video recording showed that the thermal runaway is 
accompanied with a pressure wave (i.e., shaking the video camera) and instant ignition. The 
duration of the fire is approximately 1 min. 
 
Figure 3. External heating test of a Samsung 18650 laptop cell. 
4. Fire Characteristics on Cell Level 
The measurement and gas collection system of the single burning item (SBI) apparatus were 
used for the fire tests. The SBI apparatus is normally used for the classification of building materials 
according to the European Classification scheme EN13823 [18]. The experimental setup is shown in 
Figure 4. The battery cells were placed on a wire grating. A 15 kW propane burner was placed 
underneath the cells and was ignited 2 min after the start of the test. 
 
Figure 4. Schematic illustration of the experimental setup. NDIR: non-dispersive infrared; FTIR: 
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy; and SBI: single burning item. 
Figure 3. External heating test of a Samsung 18650 laptop cell.
4. Fire Characteristics on Cell Level
The measurement and gas collection system of the single burning item (SBI) apparatus were
used for the fire tests. The SBI apparatus is normally used for the classification of building materials
according to the European Classification scheme EN13823 [18]. The experimental setup is shown
in Figure 4. The battery cells were placed on a wire grating. A 15 kW propane burner was placed
underneath the cells and was ignited 2 min after the start of the test.
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Tests were performed on EiG and Lifetech cells. Five cells were tested at the same time. The EiG
cells were fastened together with steel wire, while the Lifetech cells were placed inside a protection
box made of walls of non-combustible silica board and steel net at the bottom and top. Additionally, a
secondary layer of steel net was used at the top, nailed to the wire grating to protect from hazardous
projectiles (Figure 5). A blank test was conducted at the beginning of each test day in order to make
a blank for the gas analysis and to measure the burner influence on the heat release rate (HRR).
HRR values were calculated by the oxygen consumption method and corrected for CO2 [18]. The gases
from the fire were collected in the duct flow as seen in Figure 4. In the tests of EiG cells with 100%
SOC a duct flow of 0.6 m3/s was used, while for the other tests of EiG cells and for the Lifetech cells,
the flow was decreased to 0.4 m3/s in order to increase emission concentrations. All tests were video
recorded. A heated (180 ˝C) sub-flow was taken out to the Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy
(FTIR, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA) with an Antaris IGS analyzer (Nicolet), with a gas
cell (heated to 180 ˝C), that measured gases, e.g., hydrogen fluoride (HF). Each test used a fresh primary
filter (heated to 180 ˝C) which was analyzed for fluoride content after the test. All fluoride found
was assumed to be in the form of HF. For the measured HRR the combined expanded uncertainty is
+/´5 kW. The detection limit was 2 ppm for HF. For a detailed description of the experiment, see
Larsson et al. [4] and Andersson et al. [19].
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For an example of an outburst see Figure 7. The total heat release (THR) has a relatively low
dependence on SOC and was roughly 8 MJ for the five-cell-pack, corresponding to 6.5 MJ/kg battery
cell. Ribière et al. [5] found, based on an 11 Wh pouch cell with LiMn2O4 (LMO) cathode, a heat of
combustion of 4 MJ/kg, which is in the same order as that measured in our study.
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Batteries can also cause projectile risks, which was demonstrated in one of the fire tests.
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A simple teardown was conducted but no indications were found to understand why that cell
exploded. Figure 9 shows photos during teardown. No separator could be observed in the cell, which
was expected due to the high fire temperatures. The positive current collector of aluminum foil seemed
to have melted completely. The copper foil was still present. The weight loss of the cell was 27%.
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6. Cell Venting and Toxic Gases
The ga es released from a Li-ion battery cell can be toxic, .g., CO, bu the fluoride emissions are
of most concern. Hydrogen fluoride (HF) is on of them, bu there are also others, e.g., phosphorous
oxyfluoride (POF3). They are formed from the fluorine content used in the Li-ion cell; the binder (e.g.,
PVdF) and the commonly used Li-salt, hexafluorophosphate (LiPF6). The reaction formulas for the salt
decomposition can be seen in the following equations [20]:
LiPF6ÑLiF ` PF5 (1)
PF5 ` H2O “ POF3 ` 2HF (2)
LiPF6 ` H2OÑLiF ` POF3 ` 2HF (3)
HF has a relatively well-known toxicity [21], while the toxicity of POF3 is unknown.
However, POF3 might be more toxic than HF as in the case of the chlorine analogue POCl3/HCl [22].
POF3 could not be observed in the fire tests on Li-ion cells reported here, but a fire study on
electrolytes in a Cone calorimeter by Andersson et al. [19] indicated that the POF3 production might be
approximately 1:20 of the HF production, which indicates that POF3 may also have been released in
the present tests, but that the concentr tion as below the detecti n limit (6 ppm). In the previous
study [4], the real time HF producti n rate for EiG cells was determined. Figure 10 shows the HF
production rate for EiG cells with different SOC during the fire tests. The highest rate is for 50% SOC,
while 100% SOC has the lowest rate. The total amount of HF from both FTIR and the sampling filter
is shown in Table 2, and values are between 5.6 g and 14 g HF for a five-cell-pack. Ribière et al. [5]
measured HF in their studies of another type of pouch cell and, if we normalize their values against
the cell electrical energy, a value of 37–69 mg/Wh is obtained, with the higher HF amounts for lower
SOC, as s en n Table 2. These amounts r in th same orde as our results, 50–120 mg/Wh; however,
in contra t to this study, Ribière et al. [5] found the highest HF production rate for the fully charged
(100% SOC) cells.
The extrapolation of the Larsson et al. [4] data to a larger battery pack size typically used in EVs
gives an indication of the potential amount of released HF. A battery pack for an EV, based on the tested
EiG cell, could, for example, have 432 cells. This corresponds to 108 cells in series and four cells in
parallel, which results in a battery pack with 9.7 kWh and a 346 V nominal voltage. The extrapolation
factor is then 432/5 = 86.4, resulting in about 400–1200 g HF, depending on the SOC level. These values
are in the same order of magnitude as those reported by Lecocq et al. [23] for fire tests on a complete EV.
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Table 2. Emissions of hydrogen fluoride for 100%, 50% and 0% SOC based on results from
Larsson et al. [4].
SOC (%)
Max Rate of HF
Production (mg/s)
Total Amounts of
HF (g)
Total Amount of HF (mg/Wh)
Our Measurements Calculated from Ribière et al. [5]
100 8.3 5.6 50 37
50 16 14 120 39
0 10 11 100 69
7. Cell Safety Mechanisms
Cylindrical 18650 cells for consumer products typically have a cobalt or cobalt mixture-based
cathodes (e.g., NMC, NCA), which are not as thermally stable as LFP [24]. A number of safety
mechanisms [25] are often inclu ed in 18650 cells used in consumer products for low voltage systems.
An example f such a safety mechanism is the current interrupter devic (CID). The CID is a disc which
is part of the current pathway. In case of overpressure in the cell, the CID is mechanically released
due to the pressure, letting the cell go into open circuit mode. The CID is typically activated at a
predesigned stage, before the cell can go into thermal runaway, by using shutdown additives [26].
Positive temperature coefficient (PTC) is another safety mechanism, which protects the cell by rapidly
increasing the resistance in the current pathway when trigged by an overtemperature, significantly
lowering the current passing through the cell. In any case, the CID and PTC do not work that well in
battery systems with multiple cells that are electrically connected in a series and thereby at a higher
voltage [27], e.g., in batteries used in electrified vehicles. Figure 11 shows a cross section X-ray photo
of an 18650 cell where PTC and CID are shown.
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Shutdown separators are widely used in commercial Li-ion batteries as a safety protection for
some abuse situations, e.g., overcharge and short circuit. The pores in the separator are closed at
overtemperatures, which lead to a hindered ion transport between cathode and anode and thus
an open circuit. The shutdown separator usually consists of a layered structure where one layer
has a lower melting temperature than the other layer. When the first layer melts the pores in the
separator are closed, while the second layer sustains the cell integrity, thereby prohibiting internal short
circuit. Figure 12 shows differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) measurements of a polypropylene (PP)
separator and of a shutdown separator with polyethylene (PE) and PP; the latter exhibits two melting
temperatures, corresponding to the two materials. In case of, e.g., an overcharge leading to an increased
cell temperature, the PE will melt at around 130 ˝C, lowering the current and thereby the heating
process. It may work less well in some situations, e.g., when the current is interrupted too late or when
the cooling is poor due to the battery system design. In those cases, the melting temperature of the
second layer of PP, around 160 ˝C, can be reached, leading to the total disintegration of the separator,
followed by an internal cell short circuit. The use of shutdown separators in large battery systems has
shown not to have the same safety benefits as in small batteries, since the higher battery voltage in
cases where many cells are electrically connected in a series, as with EV batteries, for example, can
lead to separator breakdown [28].
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between 7 Ah and 45 Ah. The GBS cell has a cathode of LFMP, i.e., LFP with manganese. The charger
voltage was max 15.3 V and the charger was started after 1 min and was active during the complete
test; however, for the overcharge of EVE, the charger was switched off at around 17 min, as seen by the
voltage drop in Figure 14. The temperatures reached l ss than 80 ˝C, well below the onset temperature
of the thermal runaway. However, the cells swell and gases are emitted. Four European battery cells
were tested and the result from one of them is shown in Figures 13 and 14. In fact, one of the European
Battery cell unexpectedly caught fire. A situation of an overcharge abuse in the field might occur in
case of a failure in the battery management system (BMS). High charge currents can occur, e.g., during
fast charging or during breaking (recuperation) of an EV, which makes those cases especially sensitive
to errors in the overcharge protection. In principle, the consequences for overcharging of LFP cells are
less dramatic than for other Li-ion chemistries, but the temperature increase starts at a lower state of
overcharge [24].
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In the case of a short circuit of a Li-ion batter , the current can be very high [3]. A measurement
of a low-ohmic short circuit on a single pouch cell from European Battery is shown in Figure 15.
The voltage and current were measured with 1 kHz by an oscilloscope and cell surface temperatures
(by 18 type K thermocouples on both sides of the cell) by a data logger at 1 Hz. The short circuit peak
current is close to 1100 A and then lowered to a plateau of about 700 A. High currents generate a lot
of heat, but for this cell the average temperature increase is only about 5 ˝C since the short circuit is
stopped when the positive ter inal burns off from the c ll. In the case of a large battery pack with cell
termin ls that do not burn off, the current and the generated heat can be substantial, and in the case of
burnt off terminal tabs the flames might ignite vented flammable battery gases or plastic parts inside a
battery system.
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8. Battery System and Electric Vehicle Level
High battery safety is accomplished by using many layers of actions of various safety techniques.
Figure 16 shows the safety onion with examples of diverse safety actions used to ensure a low
probability for fault, and to minimize the consequences of a fault. First, the cell chemistry is essential
since this is the basis of the thermal stability. Second comes the cell design and packaging. In principle,
there are three main levels: cell, battery system and vehicle level.
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9. Conclusions 
There is relatively good knowledge about the safety risks and safety devices used in consumer 
cells. Using Li-ion in the automotive sector puts higher demands on the battery since the batteries 
are significantly larger and have harsher environmental conditions, e.g., vibrations, humidity, larger 
temperature variations. The different Li-ion chemistries show diverse hazards where the LFP is less 
reactive but safety measures are still needed for all Li-ion batteries. A high level of safety is achieved 
by adding several safety layers from the cell to vehicle level; however, the risk for a cascading fire in 
a complete battery pack starting from a single cell is not yet well studied, and the knowledge about 
possible counteractions is thus also limited. Sometimes things go wrong even though smart safety 
strategies are used. The exploded cylindrical cell due to a cell vent malfunction showed this and 
underlines the importance of using many safety layers. 
The toxic gas emissions from Li-ion batteries, e.g., HF and POF3, can pose a serious risk for a 
person. A replacement of the Li-salt LiPF6 to a non-fluorine salt and change of fluorine binder could 
resolve this risk. Intense research is ongoing in this field, but the required properties for a Li-ion 
battery in EVs are complex and demanding. 
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9. Conclusions
There is relatively good knowledge about the safety risks and safety devices used in consumer
cells. Using Li-ion in the automotive sector puts higher demands on the battery since the batteries
are significantly larger and have harsher environmental conditions, e.g., vibrations, humidity, larger
temperature variations. The different Li-ion chemistries show diverse hazards where the LFP is less
reactive but safety measures are still needed for all Li-ion batteries. A high level of safety is achieved
by adding several safety layers from the cell to vehicle level; however, the risk for a cascading fire in
a complete battery pack starting from a single cell is not yet well studied, and the knowledge about
possible counteractions is thus also limited. Sometimes things go wrong even though smart safety
strategies are used. The exploded cylindrical cell due to a cell vent malfunction showed this and
underlines the importance of using many safety layers.
The toxic gas emissions from Li-ion batteries, e.g., HF and POF3, can pose a serious risk for a
person. A replacement of the Li-salt LiPF6 to a non-fluorine salt and change of fluorine binder could
resolve this risk. Intense research is ongoing in this field, but the required properties for a Li-ion
battery in EVs are complex and demanding.
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Abstract  
Commercial 6.8 Ah lithium-ion cells with different ageing/status have been abused by external 
heating in an oven. Prior to the abuse test, selected cells were aged either by C/2 cycling up to 
300 cycles or stored at 60 °C. Gas emissions were measured by FTIR and three separate vents 
were identified, two well before the thermal runaway while the third occurred simultaneously 
with the thermal runaway releasing heavy smoke and gas. Emissions of toxic hydrogen fluoride 
(HF) and phosphorous oxyfluoride (POF3) were detected in the third vent, regardless if there 
was a fire or not. All abused cells went into thermal runaway and emitted smoke and gas, the 
working cells also released flames as well as sparks. The dead cells were however less reactive 
but still underwent thermal runaway. For about half of the working cells, for all levels of cycle 
ageing, ignition of the accumulated battery released gases occurred about 15 s after the 
thermal runaway resulting in a gas explosion. The thermal runaway temperature, about 190 °C, 
varied somewhat for the different cell ageing/status where a weak local minimum was found for 
cells cycled between 100 and 200 times. 
Keywords: gas explosion, lithium-ion, safety, gas emission, ageing, thermal runaway 
Highlights: 
 Gas explosions due to delayed ignition of battery emitted gases in air mixture 
 Three separate vents were detected, two vents before thermal runaway 
 Gas emissions of HF and POF3 detected in 3
rd vent with and without fire  
 Dead cells significantly less thermally reactive than working cells 
 Dead cells still undergo thermal runaway 
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1. Introduction 
Lithium-ion batteries have revolutionized many products since they have a high energy density 
combined with several other attractive properties. Li-ion cells are used in very high numbers in 
e.g. cell phones, laptop computers and power tools. Besides, they are being rapidly introduced 
in large systems and are found in kWh to MWh energy capacity applications used in e.g. 
electrified vehicles, ships and stationary grid storage plants. 
The use of Li-ion batteries is, however, associated with more pronounced/different risks of 
developed heat, gas emissions, explosions and fire respect to other battery types. These risks 
are yet far from being fully understood and there is a potential for increased safety through 
research studies as well as from the analysis of incidents. The type and the severity of the risks 
depend on different applications and battery system sizes. Failure consequences can be 
significantly increased with increasing battery system size due to cell and module failure 
propagation [1,2,3]. 
The Li-ion cell contains all three parts of the fire triangle that are necessary to have a fire; 
heat/igniter, combustible material and oxygen. Furthermore, upon overtemperatures, starting 
from typically 70-120 °C, the Li-ion battery starts to swell and can release gases (venting). The 
vented gases are flammable and toxic [4]. If the temperature is high enough, of the order of 
150-200 °C, an accelerated self-supporting rapid temperature increase, thermal runaway (TR), 
can also occur [5,6].The term onset temperature of thermal runaway is referring to the 
temperature where the exothermic reactions starts that eventually leads to thermal runaway, 
while the term thermal runaway temperature refers to when the thermal runaway occurs with 
very rapid temperature increase.  The thermal runaway is typically associated by a release of 
large quantities of smoke and gas, a possible cell case rupture/explosion, fire or a gas explosion. 
There are thus two main types of explosions, an internal cell case explosion or a gas explosion of 
the flammable vented gases mixed with air. Cylindrical and hard prismatic cells can build high 
pressures and are therefore designed to release the gases via a built-in cell safety vent, however 
in case of e.g. malfunction, extreme pressures can built up inside the battery cell, resulting in 
the cell case explosion. A gas explosion occurs by a delayed ignition of vented combustible 
battery gases mixed with air accumulated in a confined or semiconfined enclosure. The 
consequences of a gas explosion can be more severe than a cell case explosion. 
The vented gases can contain both evaporated solvents and decomposition products, e.g. CO, 
CO2, H2, CH4 [7,8]. Beside CO and CO2, a large number of different toxic compounds can be 
released [9,10,11] including fluoride gases. Hydrogen fluoride (HF) has caused most attention 
and is very toxic [12,13,14]. There are few studies published that report measurements of 
released HF amounts from commercial Li-ion battery cells during abuse [15,16,17,18,19] and 
some on HF release during electrolyte fire tests [20]. The fluorine in the cells comes from the Li-
salt, e.g. LiPF6, but also from electrode binders, e.g. PVdF, electrode materials and coatings, e.g. 
fluorophosphates [21,22] and AlF3-coated cathodes [5,23,24], as well as from fluorine 
containing additives, e.g. flame retardants. Battery safety is complex and a holistic perspective is 
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essential, for example by introducing AlF3-coatings, the risk for a thermal runaway to occur can 
decrease while the one for emission of toxic fluoride gases might increase as well as the one of 
gas explosion.. The overall safety is therefore difficult to evaluate, and depending on battery 
size and scenarios, it might be improved or worsened. 
There are many different types of abuse tests available [25] and a common one is external 
heating. There are several types of external heating methods for Li-ion battery cells, e.g. heating 
in an oven [6,25], by IR radiation [18,19,26,27,28], by cartridge or other heaters [29,30,31], in a 
closed chamber using e.g. accelerated rate calorimeter (ARC) [5,32] or other types [8,33,34]. So 
far most studies have tested new/fresh cells, i.e. non-aged cells, and few studies are yet 
available investigating the influence of ageing on safety. Still it is essential to have a high battery 
safety level over the complete battery life time, since properties of the components may change 
during ageing. Ageing is typically seen in terms of calendar and cycle ageing. In order to shorten 
test time, storing and cycling the cells are often performed at increased temperatures, e.g. 35-
55 °C, however, at these temperatures the results will differ from those obtained during use at 
ambient temperature, e.g. 20 °C because of other side and decomposition reactions. The ageing 
processes of Li-ion cells are non-linear and complex [35,36,37] and not yet fully understood. For 
example, during ageing the solid electrolyte interphase (SEI) layer is changed and SEI plays an 
important role and in the pre-stage of the thermal runaway. 
Roth and Doughty [38] studied the thermal stability of calendar aged Sony 18650 cells by ARC-
tests and found that aged cells, up to 70 °C, showed higher exothermic onset temperatures. Wu 
et al. [39] studied 0.75 Ah non-commercial graphite/LCO Li-ion cells after 10 and 200 cycles and 
found that in nail penetration abuse tests thermal safety decreased after  200 cycles. Röder et 
al. [40] studied 2 Ah graphite/LMO-NMC Li-ion 18650 cells stored at 60 °C up to 36 weeks and 
found in ARC-tests that exothermic reactions and thermal runaway onset temperatures are 
lower for cells aged 36 weeks. In contrast, Zhang et al. [41] studied 4.6 Ah graphite/LMO Li-ion 
cells stored at 55 °C for a duration between 10 and 90 days and found that the onset 
temperature of self-heating and thermal runaway increased for increased ageing. 
Fleischhammar et al. [42] studied the influence of cycle ageing on the thermal response in ARC 
tests for 1.5 Ah graphite/LMO-NMC high-power Li-ion 18650 cells and found significantly lower 
onset temperatures for first exothermic response as well as for the thermal runaway, with 
starting temperatures as low as 30.7 °C, and also found lithium plating on the anode for cells 
undergoing 1C cycling at -10 °C. Friesen et al. [43] studied safety in ARC tests of graphite/NMC 
18650 fresh and  cycle aged cells using 1C  at 0 °C down to 70% state of health (SOH). Cells 
showed decreased thermal safety, aged cells had as low as 30 °C, onset temperatures as well as 
earlier thermal runaway. The same authors also studied safety by nail penetration abuse tests 
and found that aged cells have a delayed but more reactive thermal runaway. In general, 
formation of lithium metal-plating on the anode at low temperature cycling and/or at too high 
charging currents poses increased risks for Li-ion batteries [42,43,44,45]. 
In this work Li-ion cell safety is studied for non-cycled cells stored at 20 °C and 60 °C as well as 
for cells aged by 100, 200 or 300 deep C/2 cycles, all are of the same cell type, a commercial 6.8 
Ah nom graphite/LiCoO2 Li-ion cell. The safety is assessed by abuse testing in form of external 
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heating (oven) accompanied with FTIR gas measurements. One ARC test is performed for 
comparison of the safety evaluation methods. 
 
2. Experimental 
2.1 Cells tested 
The cells, from the same batch of commercially available lithium-ion cells, had nominal capacity 
and voltage of 6.8 Ah and 3.75 V, respectively, a lithium cobalt oxide (LCO) cathode, a graphite 
anode, a polymeric separator and prismatic packaging, see Table 1 for detailed cell 
specifications. The cells contained fluorine due to the presence of LiPF6 salt in the electrolyte, 
however, other parts in the cell might also contain fluorine, see examples in the introduction 
section. Anyhow, the cell was not analyzed for other potential sources of fluorine. 
Table 1  Specification of the commercial Li-ion cell, from cell datasheet, electrolyte from 
TG-FTIR analysis [46] and separator from DSC-analysis [47]. 
Parameter Value 
Nominal voltage 3.75 V 
Nominal capacity  6.8 Ah (20 C, C/5 to 2.5 V cut-off) 
Packaging  Jellyroll in aluminum hard prismatic can  
Weight 140.2 g 
Cycle life according to datasheet >70% capacity after 600 cycles with 0.5C, 
100% DOD, 20 C 
Max continuous discharge current 14 A 
Max recommended continuous charge current 7A 
Anode Graphite 
Cathode Lithium cobalt oxide, LiCoO2 
Electrolyte Salt: lithium hexafluorophosphate, LiPF6 
Organic solvents: EC, DMC, EA 
Additives found: VC, presumable low 
molecular weight ketone 
Separator Shutdown separator, PE-PP 
 
2.2 Electrical characterization 
Four-wire electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS) in the frequency range 100 kHz - 5 
mHz, with 60 points logarithmically distributed, was performed using a Metrohm Autolab 
PGSTAT 302N and the Metrohm Nova 1.11 software in the Galvanostatic mode with an 
amplitude of 0.1 A. The cell was at ambient temperature, about 20 °C, in a Faraday cage. Sense 
and current measurement cables were twisted and separated, in opposite circles, to minimize 
interference. 
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The capacity of each cell was measured using either a multichannel Digatron battery tester or a 
Metrohm Autolab with Booster 20 A module. For the capacity measurements used voltage limits 
of 2.50 V and 4.20 V, a current of 1.4 A (about C/5) and a cut-off charge current of 0.05 A. After 
the first charge, three complete discharge-charge cycles was applied. Before ageing, the 
discharge-capacity was measured in the first of the three cycles while after ageing the 
discharge-capacity of the third cycle was used to determine the cell capacity.  
The battery cells were fully charged “First charge” (100% SOC) before the EIS measurement. The 
cycle numbers presented in this paper do not include the three charge-discharge cycles used to 
measure the cell capacity.  
2.3 Ageing procedure 
2.3.1 Ageing by cycling 
The cells were cycled individually using a Digatron battery tester, with 100% depth of discharge 
(DOD) between 4.20 V and 2.50 V. The current of 3.4 A (C/2), was applied for both charge and 
discharge and a cut-off charge current of 0.34 A (C/20). The cells were cycled at ambient 
temperature, average temperature of 21 C, with forced convection cooling. Each cell had a 
temperature sensor attached on the largest side surface. 
2.3.2 Ageing by temperature 
Fully charged cells were stored for 10 months in a 60 °C oven, which is the maximum allowed 
storage temperature according to the cell manufacturer’s data sheet. The cells were stored at 
20 °C before and after storing at 60 °C. 
2.3.3 Complete cell ageing history 
Firstly, the cells were stored un-used in their shipment boxes at room temperature, about 20 °C, 
during 12 months. Secondly, the cells underwent their first charge and the capacity and 
impedance was measured for each cell. Thirdly, cells selected for cycle ageing underwent cycling 
up to about two months (for 300 cycles) . Fourthly, the capacity and the impedance were 
measured and the cells were stored at room temperature. Fifthly, a few non-cycled cells were 
selected and stored in a 60 °C oven for 10 months 
The external heating abuse tests were performed about 2 years and 4 months after the 
manufacturing date. Therefore, all cells were of equally long calendar age, but during their life 
time, some cells had been cycled and some had been stored at 60 °C for part of its lifetime (10 
of 28 months). 
2.4 External heating abuse tests 
2.4.1 General setup 
In total 14 external heating abuse tests were performed. The battery cells were individually 
heated using a thermostatically controlled oven, Binder FED 115, with an inner volume of 115 
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liter. The battery cell was centrally placed inside the oven and mechanically fastened with steel 
wire (0.8 mm diameter) on a brick, see Fig. 1. The oven was turned on 1 minute after the start of 
the test and set to 300 °C, utilizing the maximum heating rate capability of the oven. 
The oven was custom-made with four 50 mm diameter access ports, sealed with silicon plugs 
and was equipped with  an internal fan set to maximum speed in order to homogenize the 
internal temperature. The ventilation outlet, placed on the back of the oven, was set to be fully 
closed. However, it was not a perfect sealing and during the abuse tests it was partially 
deformed. The oven door was closed by the handle in the first test but since the door opened 
during the gas explosions, the door was instead fastened by duct tape in the following tests. 
Also, one of the silicon plugs on top of the oven was attached relatively loosely, to act as a 
pressure vent. 
Between each test the oven was lightly cleaned/washed to minimize potential interference from 
e.g. particle contaminations. The glass door window (triple-glass) did not mechanically break but 
was heavily polluted and etched so it was replaced a few times, to have reasonable video 
quality. 
The cell voltage and temperature were measured at 1 Hz using an Agilent 34972A with Agilent 
34902A reed multiplexer module. The cell voltage was measured via a type K thermocouple 
cable fixed by twisting the cables in small drilled holes (0.8 mm diameter) in the electrical tab 
connectors. The Li-ion cell surface temperature was measured using type K thermocouples 
attached with glass fiber tape (3M, electrical tape Scotch, 19 mm wide), measured at up to six 
locations, T1-T6, see Fig. 1D. Thermocouples of type K were also used to measure the ambient 
temperature (outside of the oven) and the internal oven temperature, the latter one measured 
at two locations, as seen in e.g. Fig. 1 A and B. The abuse tests were video recorded by a camera 
placed outside the oven door window. In some tests, a second video camera was also used, 
placed at a distance, varying between about 2 and 7 meters, from the oven. 
Cell thickness was manually measured using a caliper (gap about 150 mm long) and the cell 
thickness value noted was the greatest value, which was found at about the mid-mid center 
position on the largest side of the cell. 
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Fig. 1.  Photos (A-B) showing the battery cell placed inside the oven, photo (C) showing 
the oven with closed door, the battery cell can be seen through the glass window 
of the oven door, the schematic drawing (D) shows the placement of the six 
thermocouples on the cell surface. 
 
2.4.2 Specific setup for measurements of gas emissions using FTIR 
In four of the tests, FTIR measurements of the gas emissions were performed using a Bruker 
Alpha FTIR spectrophotometer with accuracy of 0.19 cm-1. The transmission module was used 
with a gas cell of 7 cm long optical path and CaF2 windows. The non-heated gas cell had a 
volume of 12.4 mL and was fed via a non-heated 0.73 m long HDPE hose of 1 mm inner 
diameter and 3 mm outer diameter, having a dead volume of 0.57 mL. The sampling was 
conducted from a central top position in the oven using an aspirator pump with a controlled 
flow. The temperature sensor at the top of the oven was located right at the gas outlet. All 
measurements and elaboration were managed with the accompanying software OPUS v7.2 
inclusive of the package Reactmon for sequencing. 
In order to have rapid measurements, the following settings were selected:  resolution of 4 cm-1, 
average of 8 scans. This resulted in a new averaged spectrum about every 12 seconds and an 
acceptable signal to noise ratio. Atmospheric compensation for H20 and CO2 was applied. Two 
8 
 
different flows were used in the experiments, 10 liter/hour (test 3 and 10) and 100 liter/hour 
(test 5 and 8). A new background scan was made before the start of each measurement series. 
The start times for the FTIR and the other measurements were synchronized. The time delay 
from gas release in the oven until detection by FTIR was approximately 1 spectrum (12 seconds). 
For the FTIR measurements, the baseline of the background spectrum is shifting during the 
relatively long measurement series probably due to water condensation in the FTIR 
measurement cell. To compensate for such shifts, a baseline correction of each absorbance 
trace of a specific wavenumber against time was performed using the OPUS software built-in 
Rubberband correction method. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Ageing – capacity fade and impedance 
The cell in test 12, was supposed to be cycled to 300 cycles but failed during the cycling process 
after reaching 229 cycles and it was not possible to charge or discharge it any more. The cells in 
test 13 and 14 were initially fully charged and stored in 60 °C for 10 months and after this time 
the voltage had dropped to less than 1 V. The thickness of these cells had increased from 18.5 
mm to 21.3 mm (about 15%), however the cell weights were not changed, indicating that the 
cells had not leaked or vented. The other cells in this investigation had all a thickness of 18.5 
mm before and after the cycle ageing. 
Capacity data prior to and after ageing are presented in Table 2. The SOH is the relative 
remaining capacity, calculated by the present C/5-discharge capacity divided by the initial C/5-
discharge capacity. After the cycling, the cells had reached the following SOH, about 94% (100 
cycles), 91% (200 cycles) and 89% (300 cycles). The cells in test 1 and 4 had lower initial 
discharge capacity, as shown in Table 2, because they were cycled 3 times prior to the capacity 
measurements. However, even though the cells in test 1 and 4 were cycled 3 times (for details, 
see note in Table 2), they are here referred to as 0 cycle cells. Fig. S1 shows the C/2 discharge 
capacity degradation during cycling for the cycled cells. 
Fig. 2 shows the impedance measurements for cells with different cycling ageing. The  
impedance plot, Fig. 2A, has the typical appearance for lithium-ion batteries, including high 
frequency inductance, depressed overlapping semicircles at intermediate frequencies and a low 
frequency spike, each corresponding to cell and connector impedance, SEI and charge transfer 
effects, and mass transport, respectively [48]. The average series resistance determined from 
the intersection with the real axis in the complex impedance plot in Fig. 2A for this cell type was 
originally 13.2 mΩ and increased after 300 cycles to 14.4 mΩ (a 9% increase). In Fig. 2B the 
results are plotted as phase angle versus the logarithm of frequency.  Two peaks are found in 
this plot, one at frequencies just above 0.1 Hz and one at about 2 Hz. While the low frequency 
peak increases in size with increasing cycle aging the second peak more or less disappears 
already after a few cycles.  Anyhow, already after 3 cycles distinct differences are detected and 
the plot of phase angle thus offers another perspective to illustrate the influence of ageing. 
9 
 
Similar plots have been published earlier for lithium-ion cell but without a more detailed 
discussion [49,50]. For aged batteries with same electrode chemistry (graphite/LCO) the low 
frequency semicircle in the impedance plot has been assigned to electrolyte oxidation at the 
cathode [45] and it might therefore be suggested that the growth of the peak in phase angle 
above 0.1 Hz in this this case is also due to oxidation at the cathode. This may be likely since the 
cells were charged to a relatively high upper cut-off voltage of 4.20 V, yet within the cell 
manufacturer’s specifications.  
 
Table 2  Cell data for cycled and none-cycled cells, capacities measured as discharge 
capacities with 1.4 A (a C-rate of about C/5). 
Test 
No. 
Cycle ageing and cell 
status 
Initial 
discharge 
capacity 
(Ah) 
Capacity after 
ageing 
(Ah)** 
Calculated 
capacity 
loss (Ah) 
Calculated 
SOH 
(%) 
1 0 6.50 *** N/A N/A N/A 
2 0 6.63 ** N/A N/A N/A 
3 0 6.56 ** N/A N/A N/A 
4 0 6.47 *** N/A N/A N/A 
5 100 6.72 * 6.26 0.46 93.2 
6 100 6.64 * 6.23 0.41 93.8 
7 100 6.62 * 6.25 0.37 94.4 
8 200 6.60 * 6.04 0.56 91.5 
9 200 6.73 * 6.05 0.68 89.9 
10 300 6.53 * 5.84 0.69 89.4 
11 300 6.68 * 5.95 0.73 89.1 
12 
Dead cell, sudden death 
after 229 cycles 
6.63 * N/A N/A N/A 
13 
Dead cell, 0 cycles, stored 
in 60C during 10 months 
6.71** N/A N/A N/A 
14 
Dead cell, 0 cycles, stored 
in 60C during 10 months 
6.69** N/A N/A N/A 
* Using Digatron battery tester 
** Using Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT 302N 
*** Using Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT 302N, lower value because the cell was prior charge-
discharged three times using 3.4 A (C/2) with 0.34 A cutoff charge current. The impact of these 
three additional cycles in terms of cycling ageing is regarded as negligible. 
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Fig. 2.  (A) Complex Impedance, between 100 kHz and 5 mHz for different number of 
battery cycles at 100% SOC, real vs imagine parts with insets around the origin, 
and (B) phase vs frequency. Average values, calculated for each cycle number 
from all available cells, except for “3 cycles” where only one cell was measured. 
 
3.2 External heating abuse 
In tests 1-11, the cells were fully charged (100 % SOC), but had different cycling ageing, ranging 
from 0 to 300 cycles.  The cells in test 12-14 were dead (non-functional) cells, thus the SOC was 
not possible to determine. The cell in test 12 suffered “sudden death” during cycling after 229 
cycles. The cells used in test 13-14 had been stored for 10 months at 60 °C and had self-
discharged or failed during that time and therefore had an OCV less than 1 V, that is below 0% 
SOC-level. 
3.2.1 Overview results 
Results from the external abuse tests of the fourteen cells of various ageing and status, working 
cells as well as dead cells are presented in Table 3. In all tests, the temperature rate increased 
rapidly when the temperature reached the thermal runaway temperature, and all cells 
underwent a thermal runaway. For test 1-11, there were short (less than a second) and typical 
smaller flares, sparks and jet flames coming out of the cell after the thermal runaway, see 
examples in Fig. 3. In some cases the cell was on fire for longer time and with larger flames, 
referring to the term “fire” in Table 3. The fire was typically followed by a smaller flame fire, see 
Table 3, which indicate the presence of one or several flames over an extended period of time. 
Furthermore, the terms “non-fire” or “without fire” are used when there was no ignition of the 
battery or its gases, this does not take into account the initial short flares/sparks/jet flames. The 
term “gas explosion” refers to a delayed ignition of the accumulated flammable gases released 
11 
 
from the battery mixed with air inside the oven, which in the present case resulted in a pressure 
wave forcing the oven door to open. Gas explosions are common phenomena in fire science 
[51] however not often discussed with regard to Li-ion battery fires. In this study, as seen in 
Table 3, the tests for all working cells was either resulting in non-fire or in a gas explosion 
followed by fire. Furthermore, for about half of the working cells and for all levels of cycle 
ageing a gas explosion occurred followed by a fire during about 30 seconds and a subsequent 
small flame fire for about 20-50 seconds thereafter. For the dead cells, test 12-14, the results 
were significantly different, the video analysis did not show any flares/sparks/jet flames, nor fire 
or gas explosion occurred. 
 
Table 3   Overview results from external heating abuse tests. 
Test 
No. 
Cycle 
ageing 
and cell 
status 
FTIR 
gas 
meas
urem
ent 
Total 
test 
time 
(min) 
Thermal 
runaway 
and major 
venting* 
(min:sec) 
Thermal runaway outcome 
Time as min:sec 
Weig
ht 
loss 
(%) 
Thickne
ss after 
test 
(mm) 
1 0 - 105 68:39 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 No fire or explosion  
22.3 25.5 
2 0 - 127 
64:24 
 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 No fire or explosion  
22.9 26.0 
3 0 YES 84 
68:16 
 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 Gas explosion @ 68:30 
(oven door fully opened, camera 
still attached and observes the 
accompanied fire) 
 32 sec Fire 
 14 sec small flame fire (above cell 
vent) 
22.4 27.1 
4 0 - 84 62:55 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 Gas explosion @ 63:08 
(oven door opened about 10 cm, 
camera still  attached and observes 
the accompanied fire) 
 32 sec Fire 
 38 sec small flame fire (above cell 
vent). 
22.1 28.0 
5 100 YES 84 61:54 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames  
 No fire or explosion  
23.1 27.0 
6 100 - 75 59:22 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 Gas explosion @ 59:33 
(oven door fully opened, camera 
still attached and observes the 
accompanied fire) 
 32 sec fire 
24.0 27.2 
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* The major venting happened at the very same time as the thermal runaway temperature is 
reached, rapidly increasing the temperature rate. The “major venting” is also in this paper 
referred to as the “3rd vent”. 
** Power blackout at the test facility, data logging, oven camera and external heating switched 
 40 sec small flame fire (above cell 
vent) 
7 100 - 84 
61:43 
 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 No fire or explosion 
22.7 25.9 
8 200 YES 94 60:39 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 Lighter Gas explosion @ 61:05 
( door not opened, minor pressure 
wave on oven backside,  camera 
still attached and observes the 
accompanied fire) 
 81 sec Fire 
22.2 27.8 
9 200 - 86 62:26 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 No fire or explosion  
22.8 27.2 
10 300 YES 94 63:30 
 Flares/sparks/jet flames 
 Gas explosion @ 63:46 
(oven door opened a few cm (door 
reclosed after about 1 min), 
camera blown off) 
 No camera to observe any fire 
21.9 28.0 
11 300 - 87** 61:21*** 
Power blackout* @ 61:17 
(unfortunately just before TR) 
 No camera to observe any 
possible fire 
 No explosion heard, oven door 
not opened. 
22.7 29.0 
12 
Dead cell, 
sudden 
death 
after 229 
cycles 
- 84 68:36 
 No flares/sparks/jet flames  
 No fire or explosion 
 14.8 23.9 
13 
Dead cell, 
0 cycles, 
stored in 
60C 
during 10 
months 
- 86 73:36 
 No flares/sparks/jet flames  
 No fire or explosion  
 
17.9 23.5 
14 
Dead cell, 
0 cycles, 
stored in 
60C 
during 10 
months 
- 87 72:04 
 No flares/sparks/jet flames  
 No fire or explosion  
18.2 23.9 
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off during about 9 minutes (no data logging during 9 min 39 seconds). Secondary video camera 
outside still functional (laptop-battery pack-powered) and was uses to observe time for major 
venting and assumed to be time for TR.  
*** Determined by secondary video camera outside oven. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Two video pictures at thermal runway @ time 59:22 in test 6, showing a relative 
large jet flame (A) and smaller flares next after in time (B), neither of them 
ignited the cell or the gas mixture in the oven. 
For all tests, the video analysis showed that the cell safety vent, located on the top of the cell, 
opened at the same time as the thermal runaway temperature was reached, releasing large 
amounts of smoke that rapidly filled up the oven volume. The color of the released smoke was 
typically white or light grey. In case the cell safety vent would not open, e.g. due to malfunction 
or bad design, a cell case explosion can occur, a dangerous situation including the risk for 
ejection of ballistic projectiles. There are thus two types of battery explosions, the single cell 
case explosion (due to internal pressure build-up) and the gas explosion, a delayed ignition of 
gas emission released from battery cell(s) mixed with air, that can be more severe.  
The working cells lost more weight and were more swollen (thicker) than the dead cells. The 
weight losses were in average 22.6 % for the working cells and 17.0 % for the dead cells. The 
working cells increased their thickness from 18.5 mm to an average to 27.2 mm (an increase of 
47 %) while the dead cells in average were 23.8 mm thick after the external abuse. 
The total test times varied somewhat as seen in Table 3, resulting in different heating exposure 
times. There was occasionally an accidental variation in the test times due to gas explosion, e.g. 
when the gas explosion slammed the oven door open, the test was considered finished. The 
variation of the total test time was also due to varying ambient conditions and few intendent 
longer to study its influence. The weight loss and cell thickness increase was not significantly 
affected by the varied test run time, suggesting that all major effects regarding cell material loss 
and cell case occurred within the time frame of the shortest test time (75 min in test 6).  
3.2.2 Temperature results 
The temperature results from the external heating abuse tests are presented in Table 4. The 
thermal runaway temperature values in Table 4 are determined as the temperature when the 
rapid increase in temperature occurs. For active cells the thermal runaway temperature was 
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easily determined while for the dead cells, and in particular for test 12, it was less distinct. The 
dead cells have a significantly higher thermal runaway temperature, lower temperature rise rate 
and lower peak temperatures. The results for the dead cells with 0 cycles and stored for a part 
of its lifetime at 60 °C for 10 months, tests 13-14, show high reproducibility. 
 
Table 4   Temperature results from the external heating abuse tests. 
Test 
No. 
Cycle ageing and 
cell status 
Thermal 
runaway 
tempera
ture 
(°C) 
Max 
single 
sensor 
(°C) 
Max 
Tavg
2 
(°C) 
T 
(°C) 
t 
(sec) 
Max 
dTavg2 
(°C sec-
1) 
Tavg2 sensors 
used 
1 0 195 636 600 405 65 30 T1, T4 
2 0 195 646 582 387 94 22 T1, T3, T5, T6 
3 0 192 530  450 258  16 72  
T1, T2, T3, T4, 
T5, T6 
4 0 192 663 562 369 40 31 T2, T3, T5, T6 
5 100 190 579 523 333 73 25 T1, T3, T4, T5 
6 100 191 647 580 389 74 37 T3, T5 
7 100 187 567 524 337 84 23 
T1, T2, T3, T4, 
T5, T6 
8 200 189 605 570 382 49 25 
T1, T2, T3, T4, 
T5, T6 
9 200 188 529 490 302 87 17 T1, T4, T5, T6 
10 300 191 604 534 343 29 39 T1, T4, T5, T6 
11 300 >188* N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A, Power 
blackout 
12 
Dead cell. sudden 
death after 229 
cycles 
205 361 339 134 129 4 
T1, T2, T3, T4, 
T5 
13 
Dead cell. 0 
cycles. stored in 
60C during 10 
months 
201** 540 460 260 76 10 
T3, T4, T5, T6 
 
14 
Dead cell. 0 
cycles. stored in 
60C during 10 
months 
203 547 463 260 75 9 T1, T2, T4, T5  
* The average cell surface temperature was 188 °C when power blackout occurred. The thermal 
runaway happened about 5 seconds later. 
** T1 thermocouple failed at the beginning of the test, so instead of calculated the average as 
T1 and T3, the average value was calculated using the five temperature sensors T2-T6. 
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The cell surface temperature sensors, T1-T6, are in general reliable at temperatures up to the 
thermal runaway. The thermal runaway temperature values were calculated as an average of 
sensors T1 and T3 for all tests expect for test 13 (see note in Table 4). Above the thermal 
runaway temperature, the sensors record quite different temperatures and occasionally detach 
from the cell due to the high temperature, cell expansion and eventual gas explosions. 
Therefore another average value, Tavg2, was used to find the maximum average cell surface 
temperature, the corresponding rate of temperature increase and the time duration (step time) 
for that increase. Tavg2 was calculated using all usable sensors of T1-T6, specified in Table 4. 
Usable sensors were defined as sensors that had not lost cell surface contact. Since the number 
and positions of the usable cell temperature sensors varied the results presented in Table 4 
naturally varies. The thermal runaway temperature values are thus rather well-defined while 
the maximum temperature values spread more. 
The cell surface temperature sensors show relatively similar temperature values before thermal 
runaway, in contrast to the large temperature variations between the sensors after the thermal 
runaway. Fig. 4 shows cell voltage, average temperature rate and temperature measurements 
for test 7, which was one of few tests having all six temperature sensors usable during the 
complete test. The cell surface temperatures in Fig. 4 vary up to approximately 100 °C. In other 
tests, local cell surface temperature variations were up to about 300 °C at the most. For this 
type of measurements, it is important to use multiple cell surface temperature sensors 
combined with proper validation methods to obtain reliable temperature measurements. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Results from test 7, (A) showing the derivate of the average cell surface 
temperature, dTavg2, and (B) showing the cell voltage, the temperature values 
from the battery surface temperature sensors, T1-T6, and from the two 
temperature sensors in the oven, Toven mid and Toven top. 
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Fig. 5A shows the average cell surface temperature prior to and during the early stage of the 
thermal runaway and all tests are time synchronized to the thermal runaway temperature, 
which is also marked in the figure. The temperature drops some minutes before the thermal 
runaway, seen for some of the curves, in particular clearly seen for the blue lines (100 cycles) 
and identified as due to gas release, in this paper referred to as the 2nd vent. Fig. 5B shows the 
thermal runaway temperature values vs the number of ageing cycles, the latter showing a 
shallow minimum between 100 and 200 cycles. In one of the tests, test 11, a total power 
blackout occurred at the test site seconds before the thermal runaway. The time for major 
venting in test 11 could anyway be determined using a battery operated outside camera. The 
time between the last logged data point at 188 °C and the observed gas release and its 
corresponding thermal runaway was about 5 seconds, although a short time the temperature 
rate increase is relative rapid. The temperature heating curve for test 10 and 11 followed each 
other very well up to the blackout. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  The average cell surface temperature calculated as average of the sensors T1 and 
T3, (A) showing temperature vs time, the time-scales have been synchronized to 
the thermal runaway temperature, (B) showing the thermal runaway 
temperature vs cycle ageing (number of cycles). The test results shown in the 
figure A are time-temperature synchronized to the rapid temperature rise at the 
thermal runaway temperature, using the time in test 1 as reference time. 
 
The thermal runaway temperature values for the same type of cell depend on the test method 
and on its definition, as well as the location, number and measurement quality of the 
temperature sensor(s) used. It is crucial to be aware of this when comparing thermal runaway 
temperatures and onset temperature values from different studies. The value of thermal 
runaway temperature presented in this paper is the very last temperature point before the start 
of the rapid temperature increase, seen in Fig. 5A. The thermal runaway temperature values 
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presented here are about 190 °C for the working cells, and range between 201 and 205 °C for 
the dead cells. Similar temperature values have been reported [8,25,43,52].  
If the external heating had stopped at some time before the thermal runaway temperature, the 
cells could still go to thermal runaway depending on the cell temperature, cell’s own heat-
generation rate and ambient conditions such as cell cooling rate. However, the experimental 
method used in this work did not use a heating step increase method with pauses. Another 
common method used in the Li-ion battery safety field is the ARC test, according to a Heat-Wait-
Search (HWS) procedure, where the battery cell is heated up with high sensitivity and the 
heating is halted if exothermic heat is detected from the battery cell, monitoring the exothermic 
cell reactions under adiabatic conditions. For ARC-measurements the onset temperature of 
thermal runaway can be defined as the temperature when the self-heating rate (SHR) is > 0.2 °C 
min-1 and the thermal runaway temperature when SHR > 10 °C min-1 [5,43]. The temperature 
where the exothermic reactions and the self-heating starts is test equipment specific and 
typically occurs when SHR > 0.02 °C min-1 [43]. 
The heating time in ARC is typically long, which allows time for boiling/venting and potential 
side-reactions at high temperatures to occur, e.g. electrolyte degradation and breakdown of SEI 
and electrode materials, which may affect the test results compared to if the cell is heated up 
more rapidly. In a hypothetical case, if the electrolyte would have enough time to boil/vent at 
lower temperatures, no thermal runaway can occur at higher temperatures since no electrolyte-
electrode reactions can occur creating the thermal runaway. The heating test time of about 60 
minutes used in the present paper, also gives time for side reactions and electrolyte 
boiling/venting, however less time compared to the ARC test method. As a comparison, a cell 
from the same batch at 100% SOC was externally abused in an accelerated rate calorimetry 
(ARC) test chamber by the National University of Singapore. If a thermal runaway temperature 
is determined from the ARC measurement in a similar principle way as used in the oven 
experiment, the result is approximately 140 °C, the temperature vs time curve can be seen in 
Fig. S2. The results for the two measurements thus differ by about 50 °C. 
 
3.2.3 Results combined with gas measurements 
Fig. 6 shows the measurements of temperature, cell voltage and gas emissions for test 5, a cell 
which was aged by 100 deep cycles. Three vents were detected. The first vent, releasing 
dimethyl carbonate (DMC) and ethyl acetate (EA) vapours, occurred at the same time as the cell 
voltage went down to about 0 V. The cell voltage drop started when the surface temperature 
was about 130 °C. This temperature is very close to the first melting temperature of the cell’s 
shutdown separator, as can be seen in Fig. S3. Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) 
measurements on two commercial separators, one PP monolayer and one trilayer shutdown 
separator PP/PE/PP, as well as the separator extracted from a non-abused battery cell, are 
shown in Figure S3. Due to the melting of the separator the temperature is expected to show 
some decrease since the process is endothermic, instead the cell surface temperature 
measurement clearly shows a temperature increase during 12 seconds. A possible explanation 
for the observed temperature increase could be that the cell undergoes an internal cell short 
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circuit generating heat, however it should only be possible in case the shutdown separator 
would have a failure/melting of both separator material layers. The second vent also releases 
ethylene carbonate (EC), 3.5 min before the thermal runaway, and the cell temperature clearly 
decreased during this venting due to the cooling effect of the outflowing gas. The first and the 
second vents were not seen or heard on the video, and were determined only from the FTIR gas 
measurement. The boiling temperature for DMC and EA is significantly lower than for EC, as 
seen in Table 5. The third vent, also referred to as the major venting in Table 3, occurred when 
the cell safety vent opened completely, the cell went into thermal runaway and the gas 
emissions also contained HF besides DMC, EA and EC. HF and POF3 (not shown in Fig. 6) were 
simultaneously detected for the first time in the third vent/major vent that is clearly visible and 
audible on the video. Fig. 7  shows the gas emission, temperature and cell voltage results for 
test 10, a cell aged with 300 cycles which is similar to test 5, however undergoes a gas 
explosion. The video of the thermal runaway and gas explosion from test 10 can be seen in the 
supplementary materials, Video S1. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Measurements of temperature, cell voltage and gas emissions for test 5 with 100 
cycles. The three separate vents and thermal runaway are marked with arrows. 
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Table 5   Flammability data for the electrolyte solvents in the cell. 
Electrolyte solvent Molecule 
weight 
(g mol-1) 
Boiling 
temperature 
(°C) 
[53] 
Autoignition 
temperature 
(°C) 
[53] 
Flash 
point 
(°C) 
[53] 
Flammable 
limits lower / 
upper  
(%) 
[54] 
Ethyl acetate (EA) 88 77 427 -3 2.2  / 9 
Dimethyl carbonate (DMC) 90 91 458 16 4.22 / 12.87 
Ethylene carbonate (EC) 88 248 465 143 3.6 / 16.1 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Measurements of temperature, cell voltage and gas emissions for test 10 with 
300 cycles. The video camera went off due to explosion so there was no camera 
to observe the occurrence of fire. Due to the explosion the oven door was 
opened and the gas emission amounts rapidly decreased. 
 
3.2.4 Gas explosions 
For the working cells, gas explosions were relatively common, i.e. an explosion happened in 5 
out of 11 cases, and happened for all levels of cycle ageing in the investigated range (0-300 
cycles). In test 3, 4, 6 and 10 the oven door flung open, the camera was blown off/moved and a 
bang was heard when the gases in the oven ignited. For the gas explosion in test 8, the gases 
ignited, but the development was different, less powerful. The time between thermal 
runaway/major venting until ignition was 26 seconds in test 8 while in the other four cases the 
gas explosion occurred 11-16 seconds (with an average of 13.5 seconds) after the thermal 
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runaway. If the oven had been perfectly sealed and without the pressure release 
counteractions, the gas explosions had probably been more severe. The tests involving gas 
explosions, i.e. test 3, 4, 6, 8 and 10, all showed a higher rate of temperature increase, dTavg2, 
see Table 4, with maximum values ranging between 25 to 72 °C sec-1. Test 1 had a maximum 
value of 30 °C sec-1, hence the cell might have been close to a gas explosion, however, it did not 
happen and neither the gases nor the cell did catch fire. 
From the video analysis it was seen that all working cells, test 1-11, generated visible flames and 
sparks, however even though the oven was filled with released smoke and emitted gas no 
ignition occurred until at a later stage. For an explosion to occur, the mixture of gases and air 
must be within certain limits and an ignition source must be present. In the first about 10 
seconds of battery gas emissions from the 3rd vent, these criteria might not have been fulfilled. 
The smoke and gas in 3rd vent filled the oven in about 2-3 seconds and thereafter it was not 
possible to clearly determine the presence of flames or sparks from the video due to the low 
visibility in the smoke. Before the third vent/thermal runaway, the oven was filled with gas 
emissions originating from the 1st vent as well as the significantly larger release of the 2nd vent 
detected by FTIR, so the jet flames and sparks observed just after the safety vent opened in the 
third vent did not ignite these gases, in none of the tests. 
For all cells with 0, 100 and 200 cycles the cell thickness expansion was larger if the cells had 
gone through a gas explosion, for the 300 cycle cells, it was the opposite. The fact that cells 
involved in a gas explosion were thicker might indicate that those cells did build up a higher 
pressure inside the cell before the safety vent completely opened, even though the cell was 
already partially opened (proven by the 1st and 2nd vents).  
It is not possible to exactly determine the ignition source when the gas mixture finally ignited. 
The ignition could have started inside or outside the cell. The ignition source of the gas 
explosion could be due to sparks or flames originating from the thermal runaway or an internal 
cell short circuit due to separator melting, or simply from autoignition of the hot gas mixture. 
The cell surface temperature was at least for some time higher than 465 °C for all working cells, 
thus above the auto ignition temperature for EA, DMC and EC, see Table 5. Furthermore, the 
cell internal temperature was probably higher than the measured surface temperature. The cell 
might possibly contain flame retardants in the electrolyte, which could be the reason for the 
unidentified bands found at 1466 cm-1 and 1319 cm-1 by Bertilsson et al. [46]. This might explain 
why none of the cells had an instant ignition and not all tests had a delayed gas ignition/gas 
explosion. 
Table 5 shows flammability data for DMC, EA and EC. The autoignition temperature is the 
lowest temperature at which a flammable mixture of the solvent can spontaneously ignite. The 
flashpoint is the lowest temperature at which the liquid can be ignited with an ignition source. 
The flammability range within which limits a gas mixture can be ignited and cause what is called 
a gas explosion. When a flammable mixture is ignited it will typically expand 5-8 times due to 
the temperature increase, i.e. it will cause an overpressure of 5-8 bars if confined. Note that 
many building structures such as doors and windows can withstand a pressure difference of less 
than 100 mbar. A rather small amount of electrolyte is needed in order to create a flammable 
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mixture. In one cubic meter about 30 liters (3 % of 1 m3) of solvent in the gas phase is needed. 
Using the ideal gas law one obtains that 30 litres corresponds to about 100 g of solvent. This 
means that evaporating 1 kg of electrolyte solvent can result in a flammable mixture of 10 m3. 
However, as the 5-8 bar over pressure that is created upon ignition of a flammable mixture in a 
confined space is far above what most structures can withstand. 
For the oven volume of 115 liter 100 g m-3 means that about 12 g (corresponding to 8 % of the 
cell weight) of released electrolyte will result in reaching the lower flammability limit (LFL) in the 
oven. The working cells lost between 31-34 g in weight, while the dead cells lost 21-26 g, and 
consist of several cell parts, e.g. electrolyte, separator, etc, and indicating that LFL would 
probably be reached relative easily in all the tests, yet not all did ignite/explode. It is important 
to consider that due to the non-ideal behavior gases and gas mixtures the LFL might vary from 
the one stated for each gas and also the gas concentration will have some variations within the 
oven volume.  
 
3.2.5 Toxic gas emissions 
Gas emissions of HF and POF3 were measured in all four tests where the FTIR gas measurement 
was employed, regardless if there was a fire or not. HF is very toxic while POF3 can be seen as a 
precursor of HF by hydrolysis and therefore may be considered toxic. The sources of fluorine 
can be several as discussed in the introduction, however a major fluorine source is typically the 
Li-salt LiPF6 producing HF and POF3 according to Yang et al. [55], 
LiPF6  LiF + PF5   (1) 
PF5 + H2O  POF3 + 2HF   (2) 
POF3 + 3H2O  H3PO4 + 3HF (3) 
As seen from eqs. 2-3, water/humidity is needed in order to produce HF. The cell interior, e.g. 
the electrolyte, might contain very small traces of water but they generally disappear in the first 
cycles of the battery by contributing to the formation of the SEI layer. In normal conditions and 
at moderate temperature increase, the cell is still fully sealed. When the cell sealing breaks, at 
the 1st vent, gas emissions are let out in oven air which contains humidity. There is thus a 
potential for humid air to react with cell materials in the 1st and 2nd vents, however HF and POF3 
are not yet detected. The large cell opening of the cell safety vent occurs in the third vent, and 
this is the only vent phase where HF as well as POF3 are detected. 
It is an interesting question why HF and POF3 are detected only in the 3
rd vent and not during 
the 1st and 2nd vents where the cell is open. Possibly, in the first and second vents the 
electrolyte solvents are boiling off and emitted as single compounds without the Li salt. In the 
third vent, the gas release is so strong, as is clearly observed from video, that it can release not 
only the most volatile part of the electrolyte but the remaining electrolyte including part of the 
LiPF6. Thereafter the LiPF6 containing electrolytes can react with the humidity in the oven and 
produce HF and POF3. 
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The temperature also influence the HF formation, however the temperature differences in the 
three vents are relative low. For the four tests having gas measurement, the temperature of the 
gas sampled at the gas outlet, was 174-185 °C in the first vent and 193-197 °C in the second 
vent. In the third vent, where HF and POF3 were detected, the temperature ranged between 
203 and 240 °C and the air temperature rose to more than 300 °C in the cases when a gas 
explosion occured. The gas temperature was however recorded in the oven and not in the 
measured FTIR gas cell. However, during the external heating, warm oven air is continuously 
sucked into the gas sampling tubes and gas cell thus warming them. For the higher flow rate 
used in test 5 and 8, the gas volume of the sampling system (hose and gas cell) was about 13 mL 
while the flow rate was about 28 mL sec-1, so ambient cooling effect was probably relative low. 
For the lower flow rate used in test 3 and 10, about 2.8 mL sec-1, the refilling time was anyway 
less than 5 seconds. It should also be noted that the gas sampling flow rates correspond to 
about one or less volume change of the oven volume, which is 115 L, per hour. The oven is not 
perfectly air tight so a relatively small yet essential air inflow that facilitate more time-accurate 
FTIR measures. Conversely, when the oven door opened due to gas explosions, the FTIR gas 
emission data did not show accurate data. 
Fig. 8A shows a FTIR vibrorotational spectrum of HF vapor originating in the oven, and Fig. 8B 
shows detection of POF3 at an earlier time in test 5. POF3 is detected by its characteristic band 
at 1416 cm-1, which is assigned to the prohibited Q-branch of the ∆J=0 P=O stretching mode 
[55]. The bands at 1456 cm-1 and 1375 cm-1 correspond to residual evaporation of DMC [56] and 
EA [57], respectively. Simultaneously the P-F asymmetric stretching mode of POF3 is also 
detected at 989 cm-1 [55]. The time sample at 79.6 min of the test 5 in Fig. 8A shows that HF is 
still present at 79.6 min, that is 17.7 min after the thermal runaway temperature. The FTIR 
measurement shows that HF is present during a longer time than POF3 which can be explained 
by that POF3 is a less chemically stable and intermediate compound, decomposing according to 
eq. (3). 
 
Fig. 8.  FTIR measurement in test 5, (A) showing HF emission at time 79.6 min and (B) 
showing POF3 emission at time 61.8 min. 
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3.2.6 Gas detection  
The gas emissions released from a Li-ion battery are both toxic and flammable. If the gas is not 
immediately ignited there is a risk for a delayed ignition when the flammable gas-air mixture 
reaches the flammability range in case there is an ignition source, e.g. the hot battery cell itself. 
If the gases are confined by e.g. the battery system box itself or in the outer installation 
box/room, this will result in a potentially severe gas explosion. 
In particular for large Li-ion battery systems, it can be an essential strategy to have the ability to 
collect gas emissions and ventilate them out in a safe way. If gas sensors are used, they could 
possibly detect the level of hydrocarbons and the gas explosion risks. Gas sensors could also be 
used to detect toxic gases, e.g. HF sensing. There might therefore be a need of having multiple 
and dynamic gas sensors to detect early cell venting. The first and second vents detected in the 
present tests are not visually observed or audible and thus not easily detected without gas 
sensors. However, the cell equipped with six cell surface temperature sensors, shows a 
temperature drop when the gases are released in the second step. The first vent is not clearly 
seen in the temperature data, but it indicated by the voltage drop to 0 V. A voltage drop to 0 V 
can indicate other types of events with and without gas release. 
The second vents are quite clearly seen in Fig. 5A, when the average cell surface temperature 
suddenly drops, just a few minutes before the thermal runaway. The change in temperature 
rate in the second vent is also clearly seen in Fig. 4, where the dTavg2 rapidly drops before its 
very rapid increase at thermal runaway temperature. Adequate cell surface temperature 
sensor(s) in a battery pack could therefore potentially predict and detect a large release of gas. 
Battery packs of today typically do not have one temperature sensor per cell, instead e.g. 1-2 
temperature sensors per battery module (e.g. 20 cells) are used. Anyhow, there is no universal 
standard and this type of sensing can vary a lot, making presumed gas detection warnings  from 
battery cell surface temperature measurements not functional, except in case of a gas release in 
cell(s) in direct contact with the installed temperature sensor. The major venting during cell 
safety vent opening that releases large amounts of smoke and gas, is rather easily seen visually. 
Battery systems typically have a high tightness class, e.g. IP67, which hinder gas release and 
potentially increase risks of gas explosion if gases are finally released. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Hard prismatic LiCoO2-graphite cells with a nominal capacity of 6.8 Ah were abused by external 
heating in an oven. The study included cycle aged cells, non-cycled cells stored at 60 °C as well 
as non-cycled cells stored in room temperature. Both working and non-working cells were 
investigated. Upon the external heating, all cells underwent thermal runaway releasing smoke 
and gas. For about half of the working cells, the gases accumulated in the oven ignited causing a 
gas explosion about 15 seconds after the thermal runaway and the major smoke and gas 
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release. Whether the cells had or had not been the subject of cycling did not influence the 
occurrence of the gas explosions, they occurred at all cycle ageing levels from 0 to 300 full deep 
cycles. The gases were analyzed using FTIR. Gas emission of toxic hydrogen fluoride was 
detected both with and without fire. Another emitted potentially toxic gas and a HF precursor, 
POF3, was also detected simultaneously with HF. The thermal runaway temperature was about 
190 °C and was shown to have a weak correlation with the number of cycles in the ageing 
process, having a minimum value between 100 and 200 cycles, within the tested cycle range of 
0-300 cycles. 
Three dead cells were tested, one that experienced sudden death during cycling after 229 cycles 
and two cells that had not been cycled but instead stored at 60 °C for 10 months. The dead cells 
also went into thermal runaway; however, they were significantly less reactive with increased 
thermal runaway temperatures and a lower rate of temperature increase. These cells did not 
emit any sparks or flames and there was no resulting fire or gas explosion. The work presented 
here shows the importance of a full assessment of the gases released, their toxicity, 
flammability and conditions for explosion, in order to be able to design appropriate safety 
measures in the application and also to be able to select what cells to use in different 
applications. The monitoring of the temperature and of gas release is shown as a method of an 
early detection of gas threat and an imminent thermal runaway. 
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Video S1.    For test 10 showing the third vent and thermal runaway and the gas explosion 
from the delayed ignition. 
 
 
Fig. S1.  The C/2 discharged capacity degradation during C/2-rate cycling for the cycled 
cells later external abused in test 5-12. 
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Fig. S2. The temperature development vs time for the cell at 100% SOC undergoing 
external heating abuse by ES-Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ES-ARC) test 
chamber from Thermal Hazard Technology (THT, UK), using heat-wait-seek 
procedure with the following ARC settings: self-heating rate sensitivity of 0.02 °C 
min-1, start temperature of 60 °C with heating steps of 5 °C increments and wait 
time of 15 minutes after each heating step, end temperature of 305 °C. 
 
Fig. S3. Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) measurement of the extracted separator 
from the battery cell and for two other reference separators. The samples were 
purged with N2 and heated between 25 °C and 185 °C using a heating rate of 5 °C 
min-1 in a liquid N2 cooled Mettler DSC-30. 
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Commercial lithium-ion battery cells are exposed to a controlled propane ﬁre in order to evaluate
heat release rate (HRR), emission of toxic gases as well as cell temperature and voltage under this type
of abuse. The study includes six abuse tests on cells having lithiumeiron phosphate (LFP) cathodes
and, as a comparison, one test on conventional laptop battery packs with cobalt based cathode. The
inﬂuence of different state of charge (SOC) is investigated and a limited study of the effect of water
mist application is also performed. The total heat release (THR) per battery energy capacity are
determined to be 28e75 kJ Wh1 and the maximum HRR values to 110e490 W Wh1. Hydrogen
ﬂuoride (HF) is found in the released gases for all tests but no traceable amounts of phosphorous
oxyﬂuoride (POF3) or phosphorus pentaﬂuoride (PF5) are detected. An extrapolation of expected HF
emissions for a typical automotive 10 kWh battery pack exposed to ﬁre gives a release of 400e1200 g
HF. If released in a conﬁned environment such emissions of HF may results in unacceptable exposure
levels.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Lithium-ion batteries are widely used since they offer great
beneﬁts compared to many other battery technologies. Advantages
such as high energy and power density, long life time and the
possibility of fast charging make them attractive for consumer
products and electriﬁed vehicles. Nevertheless Li-ion batteries
contain reactive and ﬂammable materials, therefore safety issues
are a concern and a number of incidents involving Li-ion batteries
have been reported over the last couple of years [1e4]. Overheating
of the batteries may result in exothermal reactions and lead to a
thermal runaway with excessive amounts of heat, gas emissions,ysics, Chalmers University of
0 5165928;
almers.se (F. Larsson).ﬁre and potentially explosion/rapid dissembling [1,5e6]. Even in
case there is no thermal runaway, a heated battery can still vent
ﬂammable and toxic gases. Examples of toxic gases that may
originate from such events are hydrogen ﬂuoride, HF, and phos-
phorous oxyﬂuoride, POF3. The toxicity of HF is quite well known
[7] since it is formed during several chemical decomposition pro-
cesses and ﬁres but the toxicity of the POF3 is currently unknown.
Actually, the toxicity of POF3 might act with other poisoning
mechanisms than just by formation of three equivalents of HF.
Therefore, critical limits of exposure might be lower for POF3 than
for HF as in the chlorine analog POCl3/HCl [8]. The origin of the
ﬂuorine compounds is primarily the battery electrolyte but emis-
sions can also come from the binder (e.g. PVdF) of the active elec-
trode materials. The electrolyte usually contains ﬂammable organic
solvents some of which are volatile at modest temperatures (below
100 C) and the commonly used Li-salt, lithium hexa-
ﬂuorophosphate, LiPF6, has a limited thermal stability upon
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration over experimental setup.
Fig. 2. The 5-cells pack of EiG cells placed on a wire grating.
F. Larsson et al. / Journal of Power Sources 271 (2014) 414e420 415heating. The decomposition of LiPF6 can be described, according to
Yang et al. [9] and Kawamura et al. [10], by:
LiPF6/ LiF þ PF5 (1)
PF5 þ H2O/ POF3 þ 2HF (2)
LiPF6 þ H2O/ LiF þ POF3 þ 2HF (3)
POF3 þ H2O/ POF2(OH) þ HF (4)
When LiPF6 is heated in a dry and inert atmosphere it de-
composes to lithium ﬂuoride, LiF, which is a solid compound at
temperatures below 845 C and phosphorus pentaﬂuoride, PF5,
which is a gas and a strong Lewis acid, see Eq. (1). In the presence of
water/moisture PF5 produces POF3, and HF (Eq. (2)). LiPF6 can also
react directly with water/moisture to form LiF, POF3 and HF ac-
cording to Eq. (3). In fact, LiPF6 is highly susceptible to hydrolysis by
even trace amounts of moisture [11]. Furthermore, Kawamura et al.
[10] suggested that POF3 could react with water and form POF2(OH)
and HF according to Eq. (4).
The decomposition of electrolytes containing LiPF6 forming HF
is complex and has mainly been studied at ambient temperature
and during heating (but not in situations where there is a ﬁre)
[12e19]. Besides emissions containing ﬂuorine and vaporized sol-
vents, a Li-ion cell can also emit other gases, e.g. H2, CO, CO2, CH4,
C2H6 and C2H4 [20e22]. Gases can actually be emitted from bat-
teries under several types of abuse conditions such as overheating,
overcharge [23], short circuit, ﬁres etc. A few studies are published
on heat release rate (HRR) and emissions of toxic gases from Li-ion
batteries in ﬁre conditions. Ribiere et al. [24] used a Tewarson ﬁre
calorimeter to study the HRR and toxic gases from commercial
2.9 Wh pouch cells with LiMn2O4 (LMO) cathode and graphite
anode and found e.g. that the total HF release was higher for lower
state of charge (SOC) values. Eshetu et al. [25] studied ﬁre proper-
ties and toxicity for commonly used Li-ion battery electrolytes but
without Li-salt and thus without the possibility to produce HF.
This paper presents results from ﬁre tests of commercially
available Li-ion battery cells. Parameters such as heat release rate,
cell voltage and surface temperature are measured as well as HF
and POF3 emissions. The inﬂuence of application of water is
examined to a limited extent by introducing water mist into the
ﬂames.
2. Experimental
The tests were conducted using the measurement and gas
collection system of a Single Burning Item (SBI) apparatus, that is
normally used for classiﬁcation of building materials according to
the European Classiﬁcation scheme EN13823 [26]. The experi-
mental setup is shown in Fig 1. The cells/batteries were placed on a
wire grating (large gratings about 4 cm  10 cm) as seen in Fig 2. A
propane burner was placed underneath the cells/batteries and was
ignited two minutes after the start of the test. The HRR of the
burner alone was approximately 15 kW. Abuse tests were per-
formed on 7 Ah EiG LFP pouch cells, 3.2 Ah K2 LFP cylindrical cells,
and on 16.8 Ah Lenovo laptop battery packs, see Table 1.
Test 1e5 used commercially available pouch cells with lith-
iumeiron phosphate (LFP), LiFePO4, cathode and carbon based
anode. Each test consisted of ﬁve cells that were mechanically
fastened together with steel wire (0.8 mm diameter). The terminal
tabs of the cells were cut for all cells but the mid one (the third cell),
for which the cell voltage was measured. On both sides of the third
cell type K thermocouples were centrally attached measuring the
cell surface temperature. Temperature values presented in thispaper are the average of these thermocouple readings. The tem-
perature and cell voltage was measured with a sample rate of 1 Hz
using a data logger, Pico Technology ADC-24. In test 3, water mist
was manually applied as a spray into the ﬂames above the battery
to study any inﬂuence from additional water on the composition of
the gas emissions. In test 6, nine K2 26650-cells, i.e. cylindrical cells
26 mm in diameter and 65 mm long, were placed standing up next
to each other inside a box. The box had side walls made of non-
combustible silica board and steel net at the bottom and top. It
was used as a safety precaution to avoid possible projectiles. In test
7, two identical laptop battery packs were used and placed inside a
steel net and fastened on the wire grating.
The cells in test 1e6 were set to the selected SOC-level, ac-
cording to Table 1, by a charge/discharge procedure using an ordi-
nary laboratory power aggregate and a Digatron battery test
equipment. The two laptop battery packs in test 7 were fully
charged using a laptop computer. All batteries were unused but had
different calendar aging. The EiG cells were approximate 2e3 years
old, the K2 cells were approximate 1e2 years old and the laptop
battery pack was less than 6 months old.
The laptop battery packs in test 7 differ from the other test
objects. First, they consist of not only the cells but also electrical
connectors, plastic housing and electronic circuits. Secondly, they
Table 1
Test objects.
Test
no.
Battery type No. of
cells
Nominal
capacity (Ah)
Weight
(g)
Test condition
1 EiG ePLB-F007A 5 35 1227.9 100% SOC
2 EiG ePLB-F007A 5 35 1229.7 100% SOC
3 EiG ePLB-F007A 5 35 1229.3 100% SOC þ water mist
4 EiG ePLB-F007A 5 35 1228.6 0% SOC
5 EiG ePLB-F007A 5 35 1227.6 50% SOC
6 K2 LFP26650EV 9 28.8 734.8 100% SOC
7 Lenovo laptop
battery packs
12a 33.6 639.0 100% SOC
a Two laptop battery packs were used at the same time, each with 6 cells.
Table 2
The spectral bands used for HF and POF3.
Spectral bands (cm1) Type of band
HF
4203e4202 HF R-branch stretching mode [29]
4175e4172 HF R-branch stretching mode [29]
POF3
1418e1413 PeO stretching mode [9]
874e868 PeF symmetric stretching mode [9]
Fig. 3. Heat release rate for EiG cells with 0%, 50% and 100% SOC.
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3.2 V for the LFP-cells. Thirdly, in each battery pack, 3 cells are
electrically connected in series increasing the voltage to 11.1 V.
All tests were video recorded. The tests were performed during
two days and in the beginning of each day a blank test was con-
ducted in order to be able to subtract the burner inﬂuence on the
HRR values and tomake a blank for the gas analysis. The burner was
active for a varying duration in the different tests, between 17 and
32 min, i.e. as long as a heat release contribution from the battery
was still present. The ﬁre emissions from the test object were
collected in a ventilation duct. In test 1e2 a duct ﬂow of 0.6 m3 s1
was used but in order to increase emission concentrations in the
ventilation the duct ﬂow was decreased to 0.4 m3 s1 in test 3e7.
A Servomex 4100 Gas purity analyser was used to measure the
oxygen content of the ﬂow by a paramagnetic analyzer and CO and
CO2 were determined by a non-dispersive infrared (NDIR) sensor.
The HRR was calculated using the method of oxygen consumption
and was corrected for CO2 [26]. A part of the ﬂow in the ventilation
duct was extracted for on-line FTIR analysis. This sub-ﬂow was
extracted through an 8.5 m sampling PTFE hose, heated to 180 C,
using a pump (3.5 Lmin1) located after the FTIRmeasurement cell.
The sampled gas is passed through a primary ﬁlter (M&C ceramic
ﬁlter, heated to 180 C) before the heated hose and thought a
second ﬁlter (M&C sintered steel ﬁlter, heated to 180 C) before the
FTIR. After each test the primary ﬁlter was chemically analyzed for
ﬂuoride content since it is known that HF may be partly adsorbed
by this type of ﬁlter [27]. The ﬂuoride adsorbed by the ﬁlter was
determined by method B.1 (b) of the SS-ISO 19702:2006 Annex B
standard, where the ﬁlter is leached in water in an ultrasonic bath
for at least 10 min. Thereafter the ﬂuoride content in the water is
measured by ion chromatography with a conductive detector. The
amount of HF is calculated by assuming that all ﬂuoride ions pre-
sent in the ﬁlter derives from HF. The concentration of the emitted
gas was measured by Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy
(FTIR) using a Thermo Scientiﬁc Antaris IGS analyzer (Nicolet) with a
gas cell. The spectral resolution of the FTIR was 0.5 cm1. The gas
cell was of 0.2 L, had a path length of 2.0 m, a cell pressure of
86.7 kPa was maintained and the cell was heated to 180 C. Each
spectrum used 10 scans which gave a new spectrum every 12 s.
There is a natural time delay between the gas measurement of the
SBI and the FTIR in the measurement setup. The HRR and FTIR re-
sults presented in this paper were therefore time synchronized by
overlaying of CO2 measurements from the FTIR and the NDIR.
FTIR is a suitable technique to measure the concentrations of HF
and POF3 in the emitted ﬁre gases. The FTIR was calibrated for a
number of compounds, e.g. HF, when delivered from the supplier.
However, it was found that the HF calibration was not accurate
enough so it was recalibrated, see Andersson et al. [28] for a
detailed description of the calibration procedure. The FTIR was also
calibrated for POF3. PF5 could only be qualitatively determined by
its spectral signature [28] but no traces of PF5 could be found in theﬁre tests probably due to that the PF5 is highly reactive. The
detection limits were 2 ppm for HF and 6 ppm for POF3. The spectral
bands used for Classical Least Square (CLS) type quantiﬁcation of HF
and POF3 are stated in Table 2.
3. Results and discussion
The HRR results for the EiG battery cells with 0%, 50% and 100%
SOC are shown in Fig. 3. High SOC values give high HRR peaks and
the temperature and voltage measurements in Fig. 4 conﬁrm that
cells with high SOC value give a more reactive response, with rapid
temperature increase and earlier voltage breakdown. Studies using
other techniques conﬁrm our results that battery cells with higher
SOC are more thermally reactive, using e.g.; ﬁre calorimeter [24],
accelerating-rate calorimetry (ARC) [5] and VSP2 adiabatic calo-
rimeter [30]. The HRR from the nine K2 cells in test 6 and the two
complete laptop battery packs in test 7 can be seen in Fig. 5. The
laptop pack includes the plastic box and have Li-ion cells with the
more reactive cobalt based cathode, while the K2 cells (as well as
the EiG cells) have LFP cathodes which are known to be signiﬁ-
cantly more stable [5,31e34]. The higher HRR values for the laptop
cells are thus expected.
Outbursts from fully charged cells (100% SOC) of EiG, K2 and
laptop packs were visually observed, see Fig. 6 for a typical
example. The outbursts originate from ignition of the rapid gas
release from a cell upon opening due to excessive cell pressure and
correspond to the sharp spikes in the HRR curves, see Figs. 3 and 5.
In most cases, one HRR-spike could be detected for each individual
cell. For EiG cells with 50% and 0% SOC no spikes were observed in
the HRR curves, instead two broad maxima were found. The
orientation of the cells on the wire grating varied due the different
packaging types (pouch, cylindrical, complete battery pack) which
might have inﬂuenced the results. However, tests 1e5 used the
same cell type and setup. The results of tests 6e7 can be seen as
examples of possible events for these types of cells.
Fig. 4. Mid cell temperature and voltage for EiG with 0%, 50% and 100% SOC.
Fig. 6. Outbursts from EiG 100% SOC (test 1).
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(tests 1e2) without water mist application and one time (test 3)
with water mist applied approximately 6.5 min after burner start.
Fig. 7 shows HRR, HF emission rate, voltage and temperature for the
mid cell, in test 2. Rapidly propagating ﬂames released from the
battery cells were visually observed ﬁve times during the test and
denoted outbursts, marked in Fig. 7, and coincided with the ﬁve
spikes in the HRR curve. The hydrogen ﬂuoride concentration
showed a rapid increase at the end of the HRR peak and the HF
maximum plateau was reached just after the HRR spikes. The delay
between HF production and HRR is not due to gas transport time
since it is compensated by CO2 synchronization, the reason is due to
delay times in the sampling system. As expected, the temperature
of themid cell showed a steep increase connected to the HRR peaks,
the outbursts and the voltage breakdown. The maximum temper-
ature reached in this measurement was 521 C. Test 1 and test 2
show similar values and behavior, the variation between the tests is
due to the nature of the ﬁre characteristics.
Fig. 8 shows test 3 where 100% SOC EiG cells were tested with
water mist application. Most of the results of the tests with and
without water mist are similar, but the maximumHF concentration
recorded at the time of applying the water mist into the ﬂames is
approximately twice as high as that in tests 1e2. However, the total
amount of measured HF from FTIR and absorbed by the primary
ﬁlter is of the same order for all tests 1e3. The water mist was
certainly not the only source of water in this experiment, in addi-
tion to water existing in the atmosphere water is produced by theFig. 5. Heat release rate for K2 cells (test 6) and laptop battery packs (test 7).combustion process. In the general case of combustion of hydro-
carbons water is produced:
CnHm þ (m/4 þ n)O2/ nCO2 þ (m/2)H2O (5)
and in the oxidation of ethylene carbonate (EC), C3H4O3, a
commonly used Li-ion solvent, water is thus produced according
to:
2C3H4O3 þ 5O2/ 6CO2 þ 4H2O (6)
When propane, C3H8, is combusted, 1 mol of propane produces
4 mol of water according to Eq. (5). In test 1e3 the 15 kW propane
burner was active during 17 min and given the heat of combustion
of propane, 2044 kJ mol1, the amount of water produced from the
burner can be calculated to be approximately 550 g.
The water concentration in the exhaust duct was measured by
the FTIR, see Fig. 9 for the results of test 1e3. The water concen-
tration shown for test 3 is scaled (factor 0.4/0.6) due to the lower
duct ﬂow in order to allow a comparison with the measured values
of test 1e2. The outbursts result in an increased water concentra-
tion and the effects on the measured water concentration from the
applied water mist is also clearly seen. Calculated from the
measured data, the mass of the added water mist was around 400 gFig. 7. Resultsf EiG 100% SOC (test 2).
Fig. 8. Results for EiG 100% SOC with water mist (test 3). Fig. 10. HF mass ﬂow and water concentration for test 3.
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battery materials. The water in the duct ﬂow from ambient air was
around 1500 g for test 3 and 2300 g in test 1e2 (due to higher duct
ﬂow rate). The time of the water mist application was relatively
short and the water mist was applied in the reaction zone, thus the
impact from this source of water was potentially high which is also
seen in Fig. 9. The amounts of water from ambient air were large
but the impact should have been low since only part of the air ﬂow
passed the reaction zone above the battery and no effect on the HF
concentration was observed due to the higher ambient water
content in the duct ﬂow in test 1e2 compared to test 3. Fig. 10
shows the correlation between HF production and water concen-
tration for test 3. No HF production directly associated with the
outbursts can be seen but the application of water mist seems to
inﬂuence the HF production. However, the added water mist only
temporarily increased the emission of HF but did not change the
total amount of HF produced. Anyhow, only one test with water
mist application was performed and the correlation between the
water mist application and the increased HF peak production could
possibly depend on other factors than the additional water intro-
duced by the water mist.
Fig. 11 shows the measured production rate of HF for all EiG
tests. For 0e50% SOC the peaks are broadened compared to the
peaks for the 100% SOC cells and the total amount of measured HF is
about double that of the 100% SOC cells. Detailed results from all
the tests can be found in Table 3. Total yields in mg g1 are calcu-
lated as total amount of HF divided per weight loss of the batteries.Fig. 9. Water concentrations measured in test 1e3. The increased water level in test 3
due to water mist application is clearly seen.In test 7 theweight loss also included the burning of packmaterials,
e.g. plastic housing. Total yields in mg Wh1 are calculated as total
amount HF in mg divided by total energy capacity, Wh, of the
batteries for each test. Whichever of these yield values that are
used, the EiG cells with 0% or 50% SOC showed the highest HF
values. The measured data indicate a relationship between SOC and
the total released HF emissions, with increased total amounts of HF
emission for lower SOC. Ribiere et al. [24] found somewhat similar
results by studying single cells with 100%, 50% and 0% SOC, showing
an increasing total amount of HF emissions for decreasing SOC
value. The reason for this is unknown and an investigation of the
relationship would require further studies. The HF concentrations
measured were in all cases well above the detection limit but no
signiﬁcant amounts of POF3 could be detected in any of the tests.
FTIR measurements on samples of similar electrolytes with LiPF6 in
a cone calorimeter have shown the production of POF3 to be in the
order of 1/20 of the HF production [28]. The detection limit of POF3
in the FTIR measurements is 3 times higher than for HF, thus there
could have been POF3 present during the measurements which has
not been detectable.
The HRR values presented in this paper are calculated using the
oxygen consumption method. This technique is well accepted and
used in ﬁre calorimetry measurements. For the case of battery ﬁres,
the technique might however have some limitations since it will
not account for energy liberated by Joule heating through electricalFig. 11. HF mass ﬂow for EiG cells with different SOC (indicated by % in ﬁgure legend)
in tests 1e5.
Table 3
Detailed results of heat release rate, energy release, hydrogen ﬂuoride emissions for test 1e7.
Test no. Weight
loss (g)
Max heat
release (kW)
Total heat
release (kJ)
Hydrogen ﬂuoride
Max production
rate (g s1)
Total amounts
from FTIR (g)
Total amounts
from ﬁlter (g)
Total
amounts (g)
Total yields
(mg g1)
Total yields
(mg Wh1)
1 346 55 7731 0.0088 3.2 1.7 4.9 14 44
2 342 51 7526 0.0077 3.9 2.4 6.3 18 56
3 341 49 8095 0.0154 4.2 1.5 5.7 17 51
4 353 13 8314 0.0102 9.7 1.6 11.3 32 100
5 354 17 8452 0.0164 12.0 1.9 13.9 39 120
6 145 29 2766 0.0029 1.2 1.0 2.2 15 24
7 258 57 3470 0.0011 Not detected 1.9 1.9 7.3 15
F. Larsson et al. / Journal of Power Sources 271 (2014) 414e420 419discharge, e.g. internal short circuits in a cell due to melted sepa-
rator. Ribiere et al. [24] estimates the error to be max 10% and
thereby claim the oxygen consumption method to the usable. Be-
sides the issue with Joule heating, the Li-ion battery can release its
own oxygen [5]. The oxygen release varies with different Li-ion cell
chemistries, and is typically lowest for LFP. In this test method a
large amount of air is passed in the duct ﬂow and the effect of
released oxygen is regarded as negligible.
In order to simplify an estimation of the heat and gas emission
hazards for this type of lithium-ion batteries the values have been
normalized to the energy capacity of the batteries. Table 4 shows
such values from our study as well as calculated values using data
from Ribiere et al. [24]. Again, note that the values for the laptop
battery pack also accounts for the plastic housing. The EiG cells
have about the double total heat release, 67e75 kJWh1, compared
to the other batteries in Table 4. Also, the inﬂuence of SOC levels is
small compared to the differences between the battery types. The
maximum HRR per Wh calculated from our experimental data,
110e490 W Wh1, is, however, lower than the values reported by
Ribiere et al. [24], 300e1900 W Wh1, who used a different test
procedure. Normalized values for the total HF release vary in our
study between 15 and 124 mgWh1, a wider range than that found
by Ribiere et al. [24].
In general, themeasured values of the amount of HF produced in
ﬁre tests are comparatively high and could pose a serious hazard if
released in an enclosed environment. For example, the 7 Ah EiG
battery cell can typically be used in a plug-in electric vehicle (PHEV)
and a 10 kWh battery pack of a PHEV could consist of 448 such cells
(a battery system of 112 cells in series and 4 cells in parallel; cell
voltage 3.2 V nominal, pack voltage 358.4 V nominal). If we
extrapolate our results for the 5-cell packs by multiplying by a
factor of 448/5¼ 89.6, it may represent a scenario of a complete ﬁre
of a PHEV battery pack. The extrapolation gives 400e1200 g HF
depending on the state of charge for the EiG cells where high SOC
gives lower HF. Even though the extrapolation is extensive and
therefore can be questionable the result is in the same order of
magnitude as that reported by Lecocq et al. [35] who conductedTable 4
Total heat release, maximum HRR value and total HF release, normalized values for
energy capacity.
Battery Nominal
energy
capacity
(Wh)
Normalized
total heat
release
(kJ Wh1)
Normalized
maximum
HRR
(W Wh1)
Normalized
total HF
release
(mg Wh1)
Five EiG cells 112 67e75 110e490 44e124
Nine K2 cells 92 30 310 24
Two laptop
battery packs
124 28 460 15
Single cell, calculated
from Ribiere et al. [24]
11 28e35 300e1900 37e69complete vehicle ﬁre tests including HF measurements of two
electric vehicles (EV) with fully charged batteries (100% SOC) and
on two similar gasoline powered combustion engine passenger cars
(none-EV). Lecocq et al. [35] measured signiﬁcant HF emissions
from all four vehicles, both EV and similar none-EV, and suspected
that the HF emissions from all vehicles could in part originate from
air conditioner system. Using the values in Lecocq et al. [35], and
calculating the difference in total HF release between the EV and
the similar none-EV an estimate of the contribution to the HF
release from the Li-ion battery can be found to be 919 g for a
16.5 kWh Li-ion battery and 657 g for a 23.5 kWh Li-ion battery.
Scaling these values for a 10 kWh battery results in 280e557 g of
released HF.
If we assume that all the emitted HF is released within a closed
passenger compartment of 5 m3 of an electriﬁed vehicle we obtain
HF concentrations between 80 and 240 g m3. NOISH (The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) in USA stated the IDLH
(Immediately Dangerous To Life or Health) value for HF to 30 ppm
corresponding to a concentration of HF in air of 0.025 gm3 [7]. Our
values which are similar to those of Lecocq et al. [35] exceed the
IDLH by about four orders of magnitude. The reported HF values
from Ribiere et al. [24] also by far exceed the IDLH value. However,
the experimental data reported here comes from a limited study
and the calculation assumes a somewhat extreme theoretical sit-
uation which differs from real ﬁre situations, i.e. all HF is emitted
and trapped in the compartment and that the passenger stays in
the compartment. Anyhow, even if the emission occurs in a much
larger volume, e.g. in a garage, the HF levels can still be very high.
The reported HF values thus indicate that a critical situation might
occur in the case of a thermal event in a Li-ion battery pack.
Although we could not directly detect the presence of POF3, it may
also be present in considerable amounts since indications are that
HF and POF3 is produced with a ratio of about 1:20 [28].4. Conclusions
The tests show that lithium-ion battery cells exposed to ﬁre are
signiﬁcantly more reactive at 100% SOC than at lower SOC values
and energetic outbursts were observed. The HRR peak values thus
varied in a rather wide range, between 13 and 57 kW for batteries
with approximately 100 Wh energy capacity. The normalized total
heat release per energy capacity was 28e75 kJ Wh1 and the
normalized maximum HRR values were 110e490 W Wh1.
The amount of HF released varied between 15 and 124mgWh1.
Lower SOC values gave higher amounts of HF. Extrapolation of data
shows that the potential HF release from a 10 kWh PHEV battery is
in the range 400e1200 g HF. If this amount of HF would be released
inside a passenger compartment of 5 m3 the HF concentration
would be 80e240 g m3, that is magnitudes higher than acceptable
short time exposure levels. Besides HF, there may also be signiﬁcant
emissions of POF3, a compoundwhichmight be more toxic than HF.
F. Larsson et al. / Journal of Power Sources 271 (2014) 414e420420Although these estimates are based on an extrapolation and can be
regarded as a hypothetical case it highlights the risks associated
with toxic emissions at battery ﬁres and the need to ﬁnd re-
placements for the ﬂuorine content in the Li-salt and binder used in
Li-ion battery cells. The inﬂuence of additional water in form of
water mist seemed to increase the HF emissions momentarily,
however the total HF release was the same. Further studies of the
relationship betweenwater and HF emissions in ﬁres are needed in
order to thoroughly evaluate potential risks related to the use of
water as ﬁreﬁghting medium in electric vehicle ﬁres.Acknowledgments
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Abstract 
Lithium-ion battery fires generate intense heat and considerable amounts of gas and smoke. 
Although the emission of toxic gases can be a larger threat than the heat, the knowledge of such 
emissions is limited. This paper presents quantitative measurements of heat release and fluoride 
gas emissions during battery fires for seven different types of commercial lithium-ion batteries. 
The results have been validated using two independent measurement techniques and show that 
large amounts of hydrogen fluoride (HF) may be generated, ranging between 20 and 200 mg/Wh 
of nominal battery energy capacity. In addition, 15-22 mg/Wh of another potentially toxic gas, 
phosphoryl fluoride (POF3), was measured in some of the fire tests. Gas emissions when using 
water mist as extinguishing agent were also investigated. Fluoride gas emission can pose a 
serious toxic threat and the results are crucial findings for risk assessment and management, 
especially for large Li-ion battery packs. 
 
Lithium-ion batteries are a technical and a commercial success enabling a number of 
applications from cellular phones to electric vehicles and large scale electrical energy storage 
plants. The occasional occurrences of battery fires have, however, caused some concern 
especially regarding the risk for spontaneous fires and the intense heat generated by such 
fires1,2,3,4,5. While the fire itself and the heat it generates may be a serious threat in many 
situations, the risks associated with gas and smoke emissions from malfunctioning lithium-ion 
batteries may in some circumstances be a larger threat, especially in confined environments 
where people are present, such as in an aircraft, a submarine, a mine shaft, a spacecraft or in a 
home equipped with a battery energy storage system. The gas emissions has however only been 
studied to a very limited extent. 
An irreversible thermal event in a lithium-ion battery can be initiated in several ways, by 
spontaneous internal or external short-circuit, overcharging, external heating or fire, mechanical 
abuse etc. This may result in a thermal runaway caused by the exothermal reactions in the 
battery6,7,8,9,10, eventually resulting in a fire and/or explosion . The consequences of such an 
event in a large Li-ion battery pack can be severe due to the risk for failure propagation11,12,13. 
The electrolyte in a lithium-ion battery is flammable and generally contains lithium 
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hexafluorophosphate (LiPF6) or other Li-salts containing fluorine. In the event of overheating the 
electrolyte will evaporate and eventually be vented out from the battery cells. The gases may or 
may not be ignited immediately. In case the emitted gas is not immediately ignited the risk for a 
gas explosion at a later stage may be imminent. Li-ion batteries release a various number of 
toxic substances14,15,16 as well as e.g. CO (an asphyxiant gas) and CO2 (induces anoxia) during 
heating and fire. At elevated temperature the fluorine content of the electrolyte and, to some 
extent, other parts of the battery such as the polyvinylidene fluoride (PVdF) binder in the 
electrodes, may form gases such as hydrogen fluoride (HF), phosphorus pentafluoride (PF5) and 
phosphoryl fluoride (POF3). Compounds containing fluorine can also be present as e.g. flame 
retardants in electrolyte and/or separator17, in additives and in the electrode materials, e.g. 
fluorophosphates18,19, adding additional sources of fluorine.  
The decomposition of LiPF6 is promoted by the presence of water/humidity according to the 
following reactions20,21;  
LiPF6  LiF + PF5          (1) 
PF5 + H2O  POF3 + 2HF        (2) 
LiPF6 + H2O  LiF + POF3 + 2HF       (3) 
Of these PF5 is rather short lived. The toxicity of HF and the derivate hydrofluoric acid is well 
known22,23,24 while there is no toxicity data available for POF3, which is a reactive intermediate
25 
that will either react with other organic materials or with water finally generating HF. Judging 
from its chlorine analogy POCl3/HCl
24, POF3 may even be more toxic than HF. The decomposition 
of fluorine containing compounds is complex and many other toxic fluoride gases might also be 
emitted in these situations, however, this study focuses on analysis of HF and POF3. 
Although a number of qualitative and semi-quantitative attempts have been made in order to 
measure HF from Li-ion batteries under abuse conditions, most studies do not report time 
dependent rates or total amounts of HF and other fluorine containing gases for different battery 
types, battery chemistries and state-of-charge (SOC). In some measurements reported, HF has 
been found, within limited SOC-variations, during the abuse of Li-ion battery cells15,16,26 , as well 
as detected during the abuse of battery packs27. However, time-resolved quantitative HF gas 
emission measurements from complete Li-ion battery cells undergoing an abusive situation 
have until now only been studied to a limited extend; for a few SOC-values, including larger 
commercial cells28,29, a smaller-size commercial cell30 and a research cell (i.e. non-commercial 
cell)31. Time-resolved quantitative HF measurements on the gas release from complete electric 
vehicles  including their Li-ion battery packs during an external fire have also been performed32. 
Other types of gas emissions from Li-ion cells during abuse have been the subject of a 
somewhat larger number of investigations33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41. Since the electrolyte typically is 
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the primary source of fluorine, measurements of fluorine emissions from battery type 
electrolytes have been studied. For example, fire or external heating abuse tests have been 
performed on electrolytes42,43,44,45,46 and the quantitative amounts of HF and POF3 have been 
measured in some cases45,46. Other studies of electrolytes exposed to moderate temperatures, 
50-85 °C, show the generation of various fluorine compounds20,21,47,48,49 and some studies 
include both electrolyte and electrode material50,51. 
Our quantitative study of the emission gases from Li-ion battery fires covers a wide range of 
battery types. We found that commercial lithium-ion batteries can emit considerable amounts 
of HF during a fire and that the emission rates vary for different types of batteries and SOC 
levels. POF3, on the other hand, was found only in one of the cell types and only at 0% SOC. The 
use of water mist as an extinguishing agent may promote the formation of unwanted gases as in 
eqs. (2)–(3) and our limited measurements show an increase of HF production rate during the 
application of water mist, however, no significant difference in the total amount of HF formed 
with or without the use of water mist. 
 
Lithium-ion battery fire tests 
The experiments were performed using an external propane burner for the purpose of heating 
and igniting the battery cells as described in the Methods section. Seven different types of 
batteries, type A-G, were investigated, from seven manufacturers and with different capacity, 
packaging type, design and cell chemistry, as specified in Table 1. Type A had a lithium cobalt 
oxide (LCO) cathode and carbon anode, types B to E had lithium-iron phosphate (LFP) cathode 
and carbon anode, type F had nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium aluminum 
titanium phosphate (LATP) electrodes while type G was a laptop battery pack with unspecified 
battery chemistry. All electrolytes contained LiPF6. Most of the cells were tested for different 
SOC levels, from fully charged, 100% SOC, to fully discharged, 0% SOC. The study included large-
sized automotive-classed cells, i.e. series production cells of high industry quality, with long life 
time etc. 
The heat release rate (HRR) and the emitted HF for B-type cells with different SOC values are 
shown in Figure 1. Only the 100 % SOC cells show several distinct peaks, corresponding to 
intense flares, when the cells vented and the emitted gas burn, for all other cells the heat 
release as a function of time is more smooth. These behaviors are reproducible also for the 
other tested cell types, e.g., only the 100% SOC cells show the more violent heat release peaks 
with intense flares. 
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Table 1 Details of the tested Li-ion battery cells. 
Battery Numbers of 
batteries per 
test 
Type Nominal 
capacity per 
battery 
(Ah) 
Nominal 
voltage per 
battery 
(V) 
Cell 
packaging 
A 5-10 LCO (LiCoO2) 6.8 3.75 Prismatic hard Al-can 
B 2 LFP (LiFePO4) 20 3.2 Pouch 
C 5 LFP (LiFePO4) 7 3.2 Pouch 
D 9 LFP (LiFePO4) 3.2 3.2 Cylindrical 
E 5 LFP (LiFePO4) 8 3.3 Cylindrical 
F 2 NCA-LATP 
(LiNiCoAlO2-LiAlTiPO4) 
30 2.3 Pouch 
G 2 Laptop pack* 5.6 11.1 Cylindrical 
* Each laptop battery pack has 6 cells of type 18650; arranged 2 in parallel and 3 in series. 
 
 
Figure 1 Results for type B cells, for 0-100% SOC with intermediate SOC-steps of 25 %, 
exposed to an external propane fire; (a) showing the heat release rate (burner 
HRR contribution is subtracted), the inset photo shows burning battery cells 
during the test; (b) showing the HF release both as the measured concentrations 
as well as the calculated HF production rates. The HF production rates are 
calculated from the measured HF concentration by the Ideal gas law taking into 
account the ventilation flow, see Methods. The starting time of the heating 
process is marked on the time axis. 
The measurements of the gas emissions during the fire tests show that the production of HF is 
correlated to the increase in HRR although somewhat delayed. From Figure 1b it is evident that 
the higher SOC value, the higher values for the peak HF release rate. The total amount of HF 
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varies considerably for the different battery types, see Figure 2a. The amount of HF produced, 
expressed in mg/Wh, where Wh is the nominal battery energy capacity, is approximately 10 
times higher for the cell with the highest values compared to the cells with the lowest values. 
The different relative amount of electrolyte and filler materials in the cells could be the simple 
explanation of this variation but information on those amounts are difficult to access for 
commercial batteries. The highest HF values are found for the pouch cells, a possible 
explanation would be that hard prismatic and cylindrical cells can build a higher pressure before 
bursting, rapidly releasing a high amount of gases/vapors from the electrolyte. Due to the high 
velocity of the release and thus the short reaction time, combustion reactions might be 
incomplete and less reaction products might be produced. In the test involving type G the 
cylindrical cells were layered horizontally, thus having a different venting direction and possibly 
increased wall losses, which combined with a very energetic response, might suggest why HF 
was detected only from the filter analysis and not detected by FTIR-analysis. The tested pouch 
cells of type B and C burned for longer time and with less intensity. The pouch cell of type F, 
however, burned faster, possibly due to its different electrode materials. The SOC influence on 
the HF release was less significant and the trend in Figure 2a shows higher HF values for 0% than 
for 100% SOC, however with clear peaks at 50% SOC. Although these results are reproducible, 
they are difficult to explain. In other studies30,31, significantly narrower in test scope, involving 
smaller-sized cells and using a somewhat different abuse method, it was found that the total 
amount of HF measured by real-time FTIR was higher for decreasing SOC (tests conducted at 
100%, 50% and 0% SOC). 
The HRR curve is used to calculate the total heat release (THR) which corresponds to the energy 
released from the burning battery. THR is obtained by integrating the measured HRR (with the 
burner contribution subtracted) over the complete test time. Figure 2b shows the energy ratio, 
that is how much energy is produced by the burning battery, compared to the amount of 
nominal electrical energy capacity a fully charged battery can deliver to an external circuit. The 
energy ratio is therefore a comparison between the chemical and the electrical energy of the Li-
ion battery cell. The energy ratio varies considerably for the different cell types but is 
approximately constant for each cell, independent of SOC level. There are some similarities in 
Figures 2a and 2b for the pouch cells, type B and C, which give the highest values in both cases, 
although in reverse order. This might indicate a higher amount of combustibles, e.g. electrolyte, 
in these cells compared to the other cells. It is also interesting to see that the energy ratio varies 
significantly between the tested cells, ranging from 5 to 21. This is important knowledge for fire 
protection and fire fighting. The energy ratio thus refers to a nominal fully charged battery while 
in normal use only a part of the SOC-window is used, for example half (50%) of the SOC-window 
(corresponding to cycling the battery between e.g. 30% and 80% SOC). If instead, the total heat 
release divided by the used electric battery capacity in the specific application is considered, 
higher energy ratio values are obtained. A summary of the results is shown in Table 2. 
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Figure 2 Total amount of HF measured by FTIR, normalized to nominal electrical energy 
capacity (a) and the energy ratio (b), for seven types of Li-ion battery cells and 
with various state of charge levels. Non-filled symbols indicate a repetition 
variant, e.g. applying water mist. The lines are intended as a guide for the eye. 
The energy ratio is a dimensionless value calculated by taking the total heat 
release from the battery fire divided by the nominal electrical energy capacity. 
Note that for 100% SOC the values are overlapping for type C, E and F as well as 
for type A, D and G in (a) and type B, E and F in (b).  
* Low value for type C at 50% and 100% SOC and type D at 50% SOC due to that a 
pre HF-saturation was not applied, therefore a part of the HF release was likely to 
be saturated in the gas sampling system, see Methods. 
 
Table 2 Main test results normalized to nominal energy capacity, when applicable 
including various SOC-levels. 
Battery Nominal energy 
capacity 
(Wh) 
Normalized total HF 
detected with FTIR 
(mg/Wh) 
Normalized 
maximum HRR 
 (W/Wh) 
Normalized 
THR 
 (kJ/Wh) 
A 128 15-25 243 - 729 17 - 19 
B 128 150 – 198 78 - 633 45 - 50 
C 112 43 – 160 116 - 491 66 - 75 
D 92 12 – 24 207 - 315 27 - 30 
E 132 52 235 50 
F 138 55 384 50 
G 124 15 460 28 
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The measured heat release from an overheated battery may include several aspects, e.g. the 
battery temperature increase and the combustion of released gases. Variations due to the type 
of battery cell, the initiation method, e.g. if the test is done as an external fire test, an external 
heating or an overcharge test, and the test method, e.g. access to ambient oxygen (inert, under-
ventilated or well-ventilated fire), and the presence of an external igniter, can greatly affect the 
amount of measured heat release. Energy release from a internal cell event in a confined 
environment can, for example, be lower than the energy release from the same cell in case of 
external fire. Thus energy ratios published using other methods and other types of Li-ion cells 
can be significantly different7,52, 53. 
For all tested battert types and selected SOC-levels, POF3 could only be measured quantitatively 
for type A battery cells at 0% SOC. Repeated measurements confirmed the presence of POF3 
only for type A and only for 0% SOC. No POF3 could thus be detected in any of the other tests. 
POF3 is an intermediate compound and the local combustion conditions in every test, will 
influence the amounts of POF3 generated. This shows the importance of investigating many 
different set-ups when evaluating emitted gases.  
In Figure 3 the HRR, the average surface temperature of the five cells as well as the HF and POF3 
production rates are shown for type A cells at 0% SOC. The POF3 curve is less noisy than the HF 
curve due to different signal-to-noise ratios of the FTIR instrumentation at the different 
wavenumbers. There is a secondary peak in HRR approximately 5 minutes after the main heat 
event, this peak does not correspond to any peaks in the mass flow of HF or POF3. The 
explanation for this could be that the second peak in the heat release rate involves burning of 
mainly non-fluorine containing compounds. The temperature curve shows a rapid increase 
above the melting temperature of the alumina cell case at about 660 °C. At these temperatures 
the alumina is  molten and has formed a puddle on the burner bed beneath the battery cells. 
The thermal conditions in and around the thermocouples and the remains of the batteries have 
therefore changed considerably causing the apparent temperature increase. 
In addition to the time resolved measurements with the FTIR, gas-washing bottles were used to 
determine the total fluorine content in the gas emissions during the tests. A comparison 
between the different measurement methods used can be seen in Figure 4 for type A cells. Note 
that the FTIR measurements are performed only to detect HF and POF3, other fluoride 
compounds are not included. It is interesting to note that for 0% SOC the total amount of 
fluoride measured by the gas-washing bottle technique matches rather well with the FTIR and 
primary filter analysis. For other SOC values the fluoride content is higher from the gas-washing 
bottle measurements. Still, the general trend observed in the FTIR measurements for different 
SOC values is more or less confirmed by the gas-washing bottle measurements. 
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Figure 3  Results for a test with 5 type A cells at 0% SOC showing HF and POF3, HRR and 
average surface temperature of the battery cells.  
 
 
Figure 4 Total amount of measured fluoride, F-, for type A, for 0-100 % SOC with 
intermediate steps of 25 %. The amount of F- from the FTIR is calculated from the 
measurement results for POF3 and HF, while the amount of fluoride from gas-
washing bottles and primary filter analyses is measured as water soluble fluoride. 
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Gas-washing bottles were also used for some of the tests involving battery types B and C. These 
batteries showed higher amounts of released HF compared to type A. The ratio between the 
total values of released flouride from FTIR plus filter analysis and from the gas-washing bottles 
for type B and C was between 0.89 and 1.02, indicating a better correlation between FTIR and 
gas-washing bottles measurement when HF gas emissions are higher. 
The total amount of POF3 measured by FTIR for type A at 0% SOC was 2.8 g (for 5-cells) and 3.9 g 
(for 10 cells). Hence, the normalized total POF3 production was 15-22 mg/Wh of nominal 
battery energy capacity. Abuse studies measuring POF3 are few, Andersson et al.
46 found both 
HF and POF3 when burning mixtures of propane and Li-ion battery electrolytes with a HF:POF3 
production ratio between 8:1 and 53:1. Besides HF and POF3 measurements, several distinct 
non-assigned peaks were found in the FTIR measurements, e.g. at 1027 cm-1 and 1034 cm-1, 
which have also been seen in other studies46. They are compatible with the typical C-O 
stretching energies of low molecular weight alcohols in gas phase but also with in-plane 
stretching of aromatic compounds. This indicates the complexity and the limited knowledge in 
this area. 
 
Water mist measurements 
In order to study the effects of water on gas emissions, fire tests have also been performed 
where a water mist was applied during the fire. The reason for this experiment is that water is 
the preferred extinguishing agent for a lithium-ion battery fire. The intention in this study was 
however not to extinguish the fire completely. One potential problem regarding the use of 
water mist is that the addition of water may, in principle, increase the rate of formation of HF, 
see eqs. (2) and (3). 
Figure 5 shows the results for type B cells with and without exposure to water mist, note that 
both the HRR and HF production are delayed when water mist is used. In this limited study, the 
peak of the HF production rate increased by 35% when using water, however no significant 
change in the total amounts of the HF release could be seen. A similar result has been reported 
in a previous study28. The water mist was applied during two different periods of time, as 
marked in Figure 5, adding a total of 851 g of water in the reaction zone, however, several other 
large sources of water were also present in the experiment, i.e. water production from the 
propane combustion and from humidity in the air. The water mist is cooling the fire and the top 
surface of the pouch cell was for some time partly covered with liquid water; this is the reason 
that the battery fire is delayed as seen in Figure 5. The water mist might actually also clean the 
air by collecting fume particles and HF can be bound to water droplets, thus possibly lowering 
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the amount of HF in the smoke duct and increasing the non-measured amount of very toxic 
hydrofluoric acid on the test area surfaces (e.g. walls, floor, smoke duct walls). 
 
 
Figure 5  Results for type B cells at 100% SOC with and without the use of water mist. 
 
Repeatability 
Repeated tests were performed for battery types A-C for selected SOC-levels. Some of the 
repetitions included a variant, e.g. including water mist; see Methods. In Figure 2 all available 
test data are presented. Since the test repetitions are not clearly observable in Figure 2 the 
results are also presented in Table 3 showing the mean values and standard deviations and the 
number of performed tests. While the ranges in Table 2 include data for all tested SOC-values, 
Table 3 shows test data for repeated measurements including repetition variants. 
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Table 3 Detailed results for all available repetitions. Values presented as mean values 
followed by the standard deviation, in case the data parameter was not 
measured in all tests the value in bracket declares the number of available tests 
used for the specific data parameter value. 
Battery SOC 
(%) 
Number 
of tests 
Normalized total HF detected 
(mg/Wh) 
Normalized 
maximum 
HRR (W/Wh) 
Normalized 
THR 
(kJ/Wh) From FTIR From gas-
washing bottles 
A 
100 6 19.8 ± 1.2 [3] 29.1 ± 3.1 [5] 612 ± 102 18.1 ± 0.46 
50 7 18.5 ± 3.9 [6] 36.7 ± 3.3 [6] 416 ± 39 [6] 18.0 ± 0.61 [6] 
0 2 21.6 ± 1.5 38.3 ± 1.6 214 ± 53 16.8 ± 0.66 
B 100 4 166.8 ± 11.5 191.3 ± 11.3 [2] 538 ± 77 46.9 ± 1.9 
C 
100 3 53.9 ± 2.0 [2]* N/A 461 ± 27 69.5 ± 2.6 
50 3 141.3 ± 26.3 [2]* N/A 149 ± 5 70.5 ± 4.9 
* For FTIR data for battery type C, one data point of 50% and one data point at 100% SOC are 
excluded as outliers since they were low due to that a pre HF-saturation was not applied in the 
test, see Methods. 
 
Figure 6 shows the repeatability results for four tests of battery type B for 100% SOC. The time 
evolution of HRR varies in the fire tests as seen in Figure 6a. In fire tests there are always natural 
variations, however comparing the tests with 100% SOC, in Figure 6a, with those with lower 
SOC-values presented in Figure 1a, the repeatability of the 100% SOC tests is significant. The 
third repetition (black line) in Figure 6a is delayed due to that it included an application of water 
mist, as discussed above. Although the appearance of the HRR plots of the four tests differs in 
Figure 6a the THR (the integrated HRR) values are rather similar. Figure 6b shows the HF release 
for the same four tests of type B at 100% SOC. Repetition 2 and 3 were performed in the third 
test period, without secondary FTIR filter, and therefore Repetition 2 occurs earlier while 
Repetition 3 is delayed due to the applied water mist, as discussed above. For the four tests of 
type B at 100% SOC the mean value of the total FTIR detected HF release is 166.8 mg/Wh with a 
standard deviation of 11.5 mg/Wh, as seen in Table 3. Comparing Figure 1b and Figure 6b, 
shows that for 100% SOC the HF release is faster and reaches a higher value. Repetition 1 in 
Figure 6b shows lower HF release peak values, however, the total HF release value from the 
FTIR measurement of 168 mg/Wh is close to the average value (166.8 mg/Wh, as seen in Table 
3). 
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Figure 6  Repeatability for four tests of type B cells at 100% SOC, (a) shows the heat 
release rate (burner HRR contribution is subtracted) and (b) shows the HF 
release, both as the measured concentrations as well as the calculated HF 
production rates. 
 
Conclusions 
This study covered a broad range of commercial Li-ion battery cells with different chemistry, cell 
design and size and included large-sized automotive-classed cells, undergoing fire tests. The 
method was successful in evaluating fluoride gas emissions for a large variety of battery types 
and for various test setups.  
Significant amounts of HF, ranging between 20 and 200 mg/Wh of nominal battery energy 
capacity, were detected from the burning Li-ion batteries. The measured HF levels, verified 
using two independent measurement methods, indicate that HF can pose a serious toxic threat, 
especially for large Li-ion batteries and in confined environments. The amounts of HF released 
from burning Li-ion batteries are presented as mg/Wh. If extrapolated for large battery packs 
the amounts would be 2-20 kg for a 100 kWh battery system, e.g. an electric vehicle and 20-200 
kg for a 1000 kWh battery system, e.g. a small stationary energy storage. The immediate 
dangerous to life or health (IDLH) level for HF is 0.025 g/m3 22 (30 ppm) and the lethal 10 
minutes HF toxicity value (AEGL-3) is 0.139 g/m3 23 (170 ppm). The release of hydrogen fluoride 
from a Li-ion battery fire can therefore be a severe risk and an even greater risk in confined or 
semi-confined spaces. 
This is the first paper to report measurements of POF3, 15-22 mg/Wh, from commercial Li-ion 
battery cells undergoing abuse. However, we could only detect POF3 for one of the battery 
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types and only at 0% SOC, showing the complexity of the parameters influencing the gas 
emission. No POF3 could be detected in any of the other tests.  
Using water mist resulted in a temporarily increased production rate of HF but the application 
of water mist had no significant effect on the total amount of released HF. 
The research area of Li-ion battery toxic gas emissions needs considerable more attention. 
Results as those presented here are crucial to be able to conduct a risk assessment that takes 
toxic HF gas into account. The results also enable strategies to be investigated for 
counteractions and safety handling, in order to achieve a high safety level for Li-ion battery 
applications. Today we have a rapid technology and market introduction of large Li-ion batteries 
but the risks associated with gas emissions have this far not been possible to take into 
consideration due to the lack of data. 
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Methods 
Seven types of Li-ion batteries were exposed to an external propane fire. Fire characteristics, 
gas emissions, battery temperatures and cell voltages were measured. In total 39 fire tests were 
conducted of which 20 were within the base test matrix, 19 were repeated measurements of 
selected battery types and SOC-levels of which 10 included a variant, e.g. water mist for fire-
fighting. The amounts of emitted fluoride gases were measured with two parallel and 
independent techniques, FTIR (time resolved concentration measurements and total values 
achieved by integration of the time resolved curve) and gas-washing bottles (total values). The 
experimental setup is schematically shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7  Schematic illustration of the experimental setup. 
The gas collecting system and measurement system of the Single Burning Item (SBI) method (EN 
1382354), which is normally used for reaction-to-fire classification of construction products 
according to EN 13501-155 was used in the tests. The tests were performed in three different 
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test periods; the second test period was conducted about 1 year after the first and the third test 
period was conducted about 2.5 years after the first. Each test period involved several days of 
testing. The measurement equipment, as specified in the text below, was somewhat varying 
between the three test periods. 
Batteries 
Six different types of Li-ion battery cells, type A-F, and one Li-ion battery pack, type G, were 
tested as seen in Table 1. The number of cells used in each test was varied in order to achieve 
similar electrical energy capacity per test. The batteries were placed on wire gratings just above 
a 16 kW propane burner.  The wire grating was made of steel wire about 2 mm thick over a 
surface of about 300 x 300 mm. The quadrants of the grating were 40 x 100 mm. The cells were 
not electrically connected to each other (except the laptop packs of type G, see note in Table 1). 
Type A-F was pure battery cells while type G was a complete laptop battery pack which included 
plastics box, electronics and cables. The chemical content of the polymer materials in the 
auxiliary components of the battery pack of battery type G is not known. It is possible, however 
not likely, that fluorine was included in some of the components, which in that case could have 
resulted in the production of HF. For battery type A, 5 cells/test was used except in two variant 
tests in which 10 cells/test were used. 
The influence of different state of charge was investigated, for some battery types the complete 
SOC-window ranging from 0% to 100%, with intermediate steps of 25%, was investigated. The 
SOC levels included for each battery type and the numbers of repetitions per test type, i.e. the 
fire test matrix, is seen in Table 4. All parameters were not measured in all of the tests. 
Measurement of HRR and corresponding THR was conducted in 38 tests, FTIR in 35 tests and 
gas-washing bottles were used in 19 tests. 
The selected SOC level in each test was set using a charge/discharge procedure using ordinary 
laboratory equipment as well as dedicated battery test equipment, i.e. a Digatron battery tester 
and Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT302N with 20 A booster module. The cells were first fully charged 
by constant current followed by constant voltage (CC-CV) according to the manufacturer’s 
instructions. For cells intended for tests with less than 100% SOC, the cell was discharged to the 
selected SOC level, using constant discharge current (CC). A relative low current rate, about C/5, 
was used and voltage and current rates were within the manufacturer limits. In most cases each 
battery type was tested during the same test period. However, the tests for type C and D were 
split in several test periods, for type C repetitions on 50% SOC were conducted in all three test 
periods, and for type B repetitions at 100% SOC were made in two test periods, the latter one 
included a water mist test. 
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All batteries were unused and the calendar life time of the cells before the tests were 
approximately 6-12 months for type A, F and G and between approximately 2-3 years for type B-
E. The pouch cells; type B, C and F was mechanically tied together with steel wires (0.8 mm 
diameter). The type A hard prismatic cells were tight together in packs of five cells, “5-cell-
pack”, using steel straps (1 x 13 mm). The hard prismatic and cylindrical cells were placed in 
boxes to protect test personnel from potential projectile hazards in case of cell explosions due 
to excessive pressure. The 5-cell-pack of type A was placed standing up, with the cell safety 
vents releasing straight upright in direction to the hood and smoke duct, inside a custom-made 
steel-net-box, see Figure 8. Additionally, the 5-cell-pack of type A was fastened to the bottom of 
the steel-net-box with steel wire (0.8 mm diameter) in the corners to avoid it moving around 
due to e.g. explosion/rupture/venting. Type D and E cells were placed standing up in custom-
made boxes made of non-combustible silica board and steel net at the top and bottom. Type G 
was placed in a steel net. The protective boxes and steel net were fastened in the wire gratings 
with steel wire and steel straps to avoid movement due to response to the fire. Care was taken 
to avoid external short circuiting when placing the battery on the wire gratings as well as 
avoiding accidental external electrical inter-cell-connections, e.g. for pouch cells the electrical 
tab terminals were cut. Still the battery test setup allowed that the separators and electrical 
insulation in the cells could melt due to the heat exposure which could cause various internal 
and external electrical contacts. 
The battery surface temperature was measured with several type K thermocouples; the number 
of sensors varied for the different battery types. Battery cell surface temperature values 
presented in this paper are average values over the cell. Cell voltages were measured for type A, 
B, C and F battery tests. Cell voltage and thermocouple readings was sampled with 1 Hz using 
two types of data loggers, Agilent 34972A using an Agilent 34902A reed multiplexer module (for 
the third test period) and Pico Technology ADC-24 (for the first and second test period).  
Table 4 Detailed test matrix of the fire tests. 
Battery 
Number of tests per SOC-level Number of 
tests 0 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 100 % 
A 1 + 1* 1 3 + 4* 1 3 + 3* 17 
B 1 1 1 1 3 + 1* 8 
C 1 1 3 1 2 + 1* 9 
D   1  1 2 
E     1 1 
F     1 1 
G     1 1 
Total number of tests  39 
* repetition includes a variant, e.g. water mist or 2x5-cell-pack (for battery type A). 
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Figure 8  Photo of test type A, showing the 5-cell-pack inside a steel-net-box placed on the 
wire gratings. The sand bed for the propane burner is underneath the wire 
grating, a pilot flame (seen in front left corner of the burner) is used to ignite the 
propane gas. 
 
Test procedure 
The propane burner was started 2 minutes into each test, as indicated with arrows in the result 
figures in the paper. The burner was active as long as there was a heat contribution from the 
burning batteries; therefore, the burner was active for different durations of time for different 
batteries and SOC-levels. When the heat release from the batteries was no longer detectable, 
the power of the propane burner was doubled, i.e. to 32 kW, in order to be sure to fully burn 
out any residues of the batteries, for increased personnel safety. The fire emissions were 
collected in the hood and transferred in the smoke duct having a ventilation flow of 0.4 m3/s, 
with the exception that 0.6 m3/s was used in two tests with 100 % SOC for type C. For these 
cases the values were scaled down to the lower flow values making the results from the two 
flow rates comparable. The SBI-room, see Figure 7, had a ventilation inlet from an adjacent 
indoor laboratory hall (which had fresh air inlet from the ventilation system in the building), 
supplying ambient air with temperature about 20 °C entering beneath the propane burner. We 
consider the amount of ambient air to be sufficient to provide an oxygen-rich environment and 
thereby consider the battery fire as well-ventilated. However for some tests, during the rapid 
and energetic gas outbursts, a full combustion might not have occurred in these short time 
periods. 
All tests were video recorded and for the majority of the tests an additional camera was used 
set at 90 degree angle from the other video camera, allowing simultaneous recording from two 
sides of the battery fire. 
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A part of the smoke duct flow was sampled to a Servomex 4100 Gas purity analyser where the 
oxygen content was measured by a paramagnetic analyser and CO and CO2 were measured by a 
non-dispersive infrared sensor (NDIR). By combing these two measurements, the heat release 
rate (HRR) is calculated using the oxygen consumption method corrected by CO2
54. Each test day 
started with a blank test, i.e. using only the propane burner, to measure the HRR of the burner 
alone and measure blanks for FTIR and gas-washing bottles. In the presented HRR values of the 
battery tests the burner contribution to the HRR (about 16 kW, with slight daily variations, 
established by the blank tests) has been subtracted. The combined expanded uncertainty is +/-5 
kW for the HRR-values. By integrating the HRR values over the entire test, subtracting the HRR 
from the burner, the total heat release (THR) from the battery cells could be established. The 
oxygen consumption method is common in fire calorimetry, however when using it with 
batteries, the joule heating from electrical discharge within the cells is not accounted for, 
therefore the values of HRR and THR do not include the Joule heating. During the external fire 
tests, it is difficult to measure how much a battery cell is electrically discharged when the 
separator is melting. The energy ratios presented in Figure 2b do not include any Joule heating 
as clearly stated by its definition. For 0% SOC the influence from Joule heating is in principle 
zero, however small amounts of joule heating might possibly be liberated when going to zero 
voltage even though other processes might occur. Li-ion cells can also release oxygen during 
thermal runaway and this could affect the measured O2 levels. The amount of oxygen release 
varies for different electrode materials, e.g. LFP typically releases less oxygen than LCO. 
However, the ventilation flow is large and the O2 released from the battery cells is regarded as 
negligible. 
Gas measurements 
Besides the gas measurements in the SBI apparatus, measurements of gases were also 
conducted by online Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR). The FTIR offers broad and 
diverse spectra of gases, the focus was however on fluoride gas emissions. The FTIR used was a 
Thermo Scientific Antaris IGS analyzer (Nicolet) with a gas cell. The gas cell was heated to 180 °C 
and had a volume of 0.2 L, 2.0 m path length and a cell pressure of 86.7 kPa which was 
maintained during the tests. The spectral resolution of the FTIR was 0.5 cm-1 (accuracy 0.01 cm-
1) and 10 scans where used to collect a spectrum every 12 s, giving both accurate intensity, as 
well as relatively rapid measurements with its five spectrum per minute rate. A part of the duct 
flow, taken along the full duct pipe width (in the mid height of the pipe) from around 15 
sampling holes (about 2 mm diameter, directed opposite to flow, pipe end was closed), was 
taken to online FTIR measurement. This sub-flow was extracted through a primary filter inside a 
heated filter house (180 °C) and then extracted through an 8.5 m sampling PTFE hose, heated to 
180 °C, and then through a secondary filter and finally through the gas cell of the FTIR. The sub-
flow was selected to be 3.5 L/min using a pump located after the FTIR gas cell. Between each 
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test the FTIR sampling system was flushed with N2 gas and a new background spectrum was 
measured. There is a natural delay time between the FTIR and the heat release measurement. 
In order to time synchronize them, the CO2 measurements from both the FTIR and the NDIR 
(part of the heat release rate measurement) were overlayed. 
One primary filter (M&C ceramic filter, type “F-2K”) was used per test and was chemically 
analysed for fluoride content after the test. It is known that HF may be partly adsorbed by this 
type of filter56. The fluoride amount absorbed by the filter was determined by leaching the filter 
in an ultrasonic water bath for at least 10 min and thereafter the fluoride content in the water 
was measured by ion chromatography with a conductive detector, according to the method B.1 
(b) of the SS-ISO 19702:2006 Annex B standard. The amount of HF is calculated by assuming that 
all fluoride ions present in the filter derives from HF.  The secondary filter (M&C sintered steel 
filter), heated to 180 °C, was the same in all tests in the first and second test period. In the third 
test period the secondary filter was removed in order to decrease delay time and losses. The 
third test period started with burning 10 cells of type A in order to saturate the FTIR sampling 
system with HF and it was conducted because in the first and the second test period the first 
tests had indicated low HF values, HF was potentially lost during saturation of the gas collecting 
system. 
The FTIR was calibrated29,57 for HF and POF3. The minimum detection limit (MDL) for HF was 1.7 
ppm and the limit of quantification (LOQ) was established to 5.7 ppm. The detection limit for 
POF3 was 6 ppm
29. PF5 was also qualitatively detectable by the FTIR
29 but not quantitatively 
calibrated. A classical least square (CLS) method was used for the quantification of HF and POF3 
using the spectral bands specified in Table 5. The relative error of the HF prediction is lower 
than 10 rel-%.  
For all measurements, except type G, the measured ppm levels of HF were above the detection 
level. For POF3, the maximum concentration was 11 ppm (5-cells) and 19 ppm (10-cells). 
When the FTIR measurement stopped, HF levels were, in some of the tests, still somewhat 
above the detection limit, even though no HRR contribution was measured from the batteries. It 
is also possible that the HF was temporarily clogged in the sampling system. Some HF might not 
have been collected in the measurements and the effect of this error is largest for the batteries 
that give the lowest values. Thus the reported values might underestimate the released gas 
emissions. 
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Table 5 FTIR spectral band used for measurements of POF3 and HF. 
Spectral bands (cm-1) Type of band 
POF3 
   868 - 874 
   1413 - 1418 
 
P-F symmetric stretching mode20 
P-O stretching mode20 
HF 
   4172 - 4175 
   4202 - 4203 
 
HF R-branch stretching mode58 
HF R-branch stretching mode58 
 
In order to further improve the accuracy of the FTIR measurements, a data offset determination 
and a subsequent adjustment of the HF values was performed. The improvement was greatest 
for tests with lower concentrations, closer to the MDL value, e.g. type A with 5 cells with low 
values during relatively short periods of time. With 10 cells per test, the type A batteries gave 
higher signal-to-noise levels. The FTIR measurements started around 8 minutes before the 
burner was started. The calculated average HF ppm noise level was treated as an offset that had 
both negative and positive values, ranging from extreme values of about -2 to 3.5 ppm. This 
offset was compensated for by assuming a constant offset value and adding positive or negative 
offset values to the total HF release value. Note that the reported concentration values in ppm 
are only valid for the measurements in the smoke duct of our specific test equipment and 
method. The HF and POF3 concentration values (in ppm) were used for calculating the 
corresponding production rates (in mg/s) using the ideal gas law and taking into account the 
measured ventilation flow rate in the smoke duct. 
In the third test period the total amounts of water soluble fluorides were determined using gas-
washing bottle technique. This was made in order to validate the results from the FTIR 
measurements with a separate measurement technique. The water soluble fluorides were 
collected in the bottles and the amount of HF was calculated by assuming that all fluoride ions 
present derives from HF. The sample gas was extracted from the center of the smoke duct using 
a non-heated 6 mm (o.d.) diameter PTFE sampling tube with a length of about 1.5 m. The 
sampling was made using two gas-washing bottles connected in series each containing 40 mL of 
an alkaline buffer solution (20 mM Na2CO3/20 mM NaHCO3). The second bottle was used to 
capture any losses from the first bottle. The sampling flow was 1.0 normal-L/min and the total 
sampled volume during a test was measured by a calibrated gas volume meter. The sampling 
flow rate was checked before the start of each test using a Gilian Gilibrator-2 NIOSH Primary 
Standard Air Flow Calibrator gas flow meter. The procedure during a test was to continuously 
sample during the full test time. When the test was completed, the sampling tube was 
disconnected from the exhaust duct to allow rinsing of the tube with buffer solution, about 30 
mL in the first gas-washing bottle, to collect any fluoride deposited on the inner walls of the 
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tubing, in order to minimize losses in the tube. Since the tube was rinsed, heating of the tube 
was not necessary (any condensation in tube was collected anyhow). Analysis of fluorine 
content of the absorption solutions was made using High Performance Ion Chromatography 
(HPIC). The contents of the two gas-washing bottles were analyzed separately. The bottles were 
rinsed with distilled water between each test in order to minimize any interference between 
tests. 
Water mist test 
In the water mist tests, a custom-made equipment was constructed, including a 12 V 
automotive pump and water container which was placed on a scale measuring the weight of the 
water. The scale readings and the on/off manual switching (of the 12V) was recorded with 1 Hz 
using Pico Technology ADC-24 with a custom-made LabVIEW program. The water mist was 
sprayed on or above the batteries using a metal nozzle. In order for precise time 
synchronization, the on/off 12V signal was recorded by both data loggers (data logger 1 and 
data logger 2). A blank test, i.e. using only the propane burner and without batteries, was 
performed in order to calibrate the setup. The water flow was around 190 g water per min and 
consisted of deionized water. 
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Thermal Modelling of Cell-to-Cell Fire Propagation and Cascading
Thermal Runaway Failure Effects for Lithium-Ion Battery Cells
and Modules Using Fire Walls
Fredrik Larsson,a,b,z Johan Anderson,b Petra Andersson,b and Bengt-Erik Mellandera
aDepartment of Physics, Chalmers University of Technology, SE-412 96 Goteborg, Sweden
bSP Technical Research Institute of Sweden, SE-501 15 Boras, Sweden
A model is presented for predicting the cell-to-cell propagation of a thermal runaway/fire in a lithium-ion battery cell to neighboring
cells by simulating the temperature development in neighboring cells. The modelling work comprises of two major steps; setting
up a model of the cells including the thermal properties of the cells, and then validating the model through experiments where
the boundary conditions in the validation test must be determined carefully. The model is developed to allow a fast evaluation of
several different preventive means of thermal insulation, it is not modelling the pack and cells to a great detail. Still the experimental
validation indicates that the model is good enough to fulfil its purpose of the model. A feasibility study using the model is conducted
assessing two different types of fire walls between battery modules of 10 cells. The results show that there is a substantial risk for a
cascading of thermal events in a battery pack, although cooling systems and fire walls may mitigate these risks.
© 2016 The Electrochemical Society. [DOI: 10.1149/2.0131614jes] All rights reserved.
Manuscript submitted July 1, 2016; revised manuscript received September 23, 2016. Published October 22, 2016.
Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries offer great performance in terms of
energy and power densities. Today millions of Li-ion batteries are
used in various consumer products (e.g. mobile phones and laptop
computers) and growing numbers of Li-ion batteries are also used in
electrified vehicles and other applications (e.g. stationary grid power).
However, compared to many other battery technologies Li-ion is less
thermally stable. If the cell temperature is increased beyond a certain
threshold, a thermal runaway can occur, resulting in a rapid tempera-
ture increase and possibly other related adverse effects such as release
of gas and smoke, fire, and rupture/explosion. There are numerous
types of abuse situations that can result in an overtemperature induc-
ing a thermal runaway, such as mechanical, electrical and thermal
abuse. On cell level, the thermal runaway response during abuse con-
ditions depends e.g. on cell chemistry, cell design, size of battery and
abuse type.1–10 In order to avoid large consequences it is important
that a thermal runaway in a single Li-ion cell does not propagate to
involve several modules or a complete battery pack.
In order to prevent the Li-ion battery cell from going into thermal
runaway, different safety measures are necessary. The design of the
battery pack and its application integration plays an important role in
preventing cell failure propagation. For example, an adequate design
of the battery pack and the electrified vehicle for protection against
battery deformation in case of a crash11 is of key importance as a
mechanically damaged battery could result in both external and in-
ternal short circuits of the battery cells, which could lead to thermal
runaway. In order to protect from electrical abuse, passive and active
safety actions should be taken. Monitoring of individual cells by a
Battery Management System (BMS) is necessary to protect each cell
from e.g. overvoltage, undervoltage, overtemperature and overcurrent.
The BMS should be designed to give high safety also in case of failure
of e.g. a sensor. However, for some abuse scenarios the BMS cannot
protect the battery. A first example is in case a spontaneous internal
short circuit develops in a cell, external systems like the BMS are in
this case unable to prevent the development. A second example is for
thermal abuse situations in case of an external heating by e.g. fire or
extreme sunlight. For electrified vehicles, the fire source could be the
vehicle itself, an adjacent building or another vehicle involved in a
fire or crash etc. The consequences of such a situation may, however,
be controlled on the system level by an appropriate system design.
In case of a thermal runaway in a single Li-ion cell it is important
to stop or at least delay its spreading to adjacent cells, since the effects
from a cascading thermal runaway scenario of a complete battery pack
could be devastating. Battery packs in electrified vehicles can consist
of thousands of battery cells. In general, the design of a battery pack
zE-mail: vegan@chalmers.se; fredrik.larsson@sp.se
plays an important role for fire propagation; e.g. thermal management
system, mechanical support structure cell-to-cell respective module-
to-module, potential use of fire walls, and division of a battery pack
into different sub-packs are important design aspects. Understanding
fire propagation between Li-ion cells in a battery pack consisting of
multiple cells is therefore important in order to minimize large-scale
effects.
There are relatively many simulation studies available about
general heat generation and cooling of Li-ion batteries dur-
ing normal cycling (battery charge/discharge) within the battery
specifications.12–20 Furthermore, Li-ion cells and battery packs with
multiple cells have been simulated during abusive conditions; by
external heating in oven,21–24 external heating by cell heating
element,25 short circuiting,23,26–28 overcharging23 and mechanical de-
formation/crash/nail penetration.23,29–32 Spotnitz et al.33 performed a
numerical study on the influence of various heat transfer modes for
the thermal runaway propagation cell-to-cell for a battery pack with
8 cylindrical cells of type 18650. Maloney34 studied fire propagation
and extinguishment experimentally on 5 cylindrical cells in which the
fire was initiated in one cell using an external heater. Lamb et al.35
studied thermal runaway propagation initiated by a single cell thermal
runaway using nail penetration. Their work covered series and parallel
connected modules with 10 cylindrical 18650 cells and with 5 pouch
cells and it was found that the thermal contact between the cells was
a dominating factor for the propagation characteristics.
Lopez et al.36 experimentally initiated a thermal runaway in one
cell with external heating and studied the cell-to-cell propagation for
18650 cells as well as for small prismatic cells. By investigating dif-
ferent cell inter-spacing and electrical tab connections they concluded
that for the prismatic cells, which had two vents on the cell side, fire
protection materials between the cells were required in order to hin-
der fire propagation. Further experimental studies of thermal runaway
propagation have been performed for 18650 cells by Spinner et al.37
and for a prismatic cell module by Feng et al.38,39 and Huang et al.40
A review covering safety focused modelling has also been pub-
lished recently by Abada et al.41 However, simulations of lithium-ion
battery fire abuse situations have rarely been studied. Anderson et al.42
used CFD simulations with subsequent thermal modelling to study the
fire resistance of a battery pack in a gasoline pool fire test according
to United Nations Regulation No. 10043 and a heat propagation sim-
ulation of cell-to-cell fire propagation for five Li-ion pouch cells has
recently been performed by Anderson et al.44,45,and Andersson et al.46
An electrified vehicle could have an energy capacity ranging be-
tween e.g. 10 and 100 kWh containing hundreds of cells in order to
achieve a high enough energy capacity and battery pack voltage. Even
larger battery packs can be found in e.g. stationary grid applications
and onboard ships. Cell-to-cell fire propagation in a large battery pack
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Figure 1. X-ray photos of the battery cell, a 3D photo (left) and a 2D cross-
section (right) where the blue line indicate the cross-section area.
could result in severe consequences. Therefore a model to predict
cell-to-cell propagation is important in order to design and validate
safe Li-ion battery systems.
This paper presents a thermal model for cell fire propagation,
intended for studying the cell-to-cell propagation on a battery system
level. It is desired to have a conservative model that will result in
somewhat higher temperatures than in the experimental study, in order
to be on the safe side when evaluating cell-to-cell propagation effects.
The paper first describes the battery cell and the numerical model
and tool. Secondly, a validation of the model is conducted using
experimental data. Finally, the model is applied to a fictive part of a
battery pack, where cell and module fire propagation is studied with
and without firewalls.
Thermal Model
Battery cell model.—The starting point for the modelling work is a
commercial Li-ion battery cell, EiG ePLB-F007A, a pouch prismatic
cell with a nominal capacity of 7 Ah and a nominal energy capacity
of 22.4 Wh. The cell’s physical size is about 220 × 145 × 4.5 mm.
The Li-ion cell has a lithium-iron phosphate (LFP), LiFePO4, cathode
and a carbon anode. The physical structure of the cell is a multilay-
ered repeatable structure; negative current collector of copper, anode,
separator, cathode, positive current collector of aluminum. Figure 1
shows X-ray photos of the pouch cell where the multilayered structure
is clearly seen. The total number of layers is of the order of 150 layers.
The cell was modelled in 3D as a square block with the same
dimensions as the pouch cell. Modelling the detailed structure of
the cells would result in far too long simulation times and the cell
was thus modelled as a homogenous material but with anisotropic
thermal conductivity in the plane (in the two planar directions parallel
to the multilayered cell, x- and y-directions) and across the cells
(perpendicular to the multilayerad cell stack structure, z-direction)
due to the layered structure.44 The thermal property values used for the
battery cell are shown in Table I. The density was simply established by
measuring the physical cell volume and the cell weight. Specific heat
and thermal conductivity values used in the simulation were estimated
from literature values by Wu et al.47 Ideally, careful measurements of
these quantities at elevated temperatures would be needed but are
generally difficult to obtain. The effects of varying thermal properties
were studied previously44–46 and thus this study was conducted using
one particular set of values only.
When modelling more than one cell in this work, the cells were
assumed to be in perfect contact with each other at all times with a
Table I. Values of the thermal properties of the Li-ion battery cell
used for the simulations.
Density Specific heat Thermal conductivity
Type ρ [kg/m3] cp [J/(kg K)] k [W/(m K)]
Cell interior 1965 1243 kx = ky = 21
and kz = 0.48
Cell packaging N/A N/A 0.22
layer
Table II. The numerical characteristics for three sizes of grid
resolutions for 5 battery cells tightly packed.
Grid Numbers of Degrees of Solution Accuracy [Max
resolution elements freedom time [Minutes] relative errror]
Coarse 8000 17000 1.1 <3.5%
Normal 18000 27000 2.5 <1.8%
Fine 38000 50000 9.0 N/A
thin, thermally resistive layer in between cells to represent the pouch
packaging material. Cell swelling was thus not included in the model.
The packaging material was modelled as a lumped heat capacity ma-
terial i.e. the temperature change in the material depends only on the
thickness and thermal conductivity, i.e. thermal inertia is ignored. The
thermally resistive layer was assumed to have a thickness of 160 μm
per cell (320 μm between two cells) and a thermal conductivity k =
0.22 W/(mK) for the overall pouch packaging materials, these data
are calculated based on data from Svens et al.48 with three layers
consisting of 88 μm polypropylene, 45 μm aluminum and 27 μm
polyamide.
Heat transfer model and boundary conditions.—The thermal
model solves the heat conduction equation determining the local tem-
perature in the cell. The heat diffusion is governed by,
ρcp
∂T
∂t
= ∇ · (k∇T) + ˙Q [1]
where ˙Q is the total power generated within the battery cell, repre-
senting in the present case the energy generated in a thermal runaway.
Note that to be able to compute the temperature, T, with good accuracy
according to Eq. 1 the temperature dependent density, ρ, specific heat
capacity, cp , and thermal conductivity, k, are needed. In addition, the
thermal conductivity can be anisotropic for inhomogeneous materials,
e.g. layered materials inside battery cells.
Furthermore, boundary conditions are needed to solve the equa-
tion, i.e. the radiative heat flux expressed as,
˙Qr = εσ
(
T 4gas − T 4
) [2]
and the convective heat flux,
˙Qc = hc
(
Tgas − T
) [3]
where ε is the emissivity, σ the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.67 ×
10−8 W/(m2K4)), hc the convective heat transfer coefficient and Tgas
the gas temperature. T in Eqs. 2 and 3 is the temperature on the
boundary of the cell. Note that the radiation and gas temperature are
assumed to be the same, denoted Tgas .
Simulation tool.—The battery cell(s) were modeled in 3D with
the Finite-Element Method (FEM) utilizing the heat transfer module
in COMSOL Multiphysics program version 5.1. The heat transfer
module in Comsol solves Eq. 1 with the boundary conditions in Eqs.
2–3 by standard Finite-Element (FE) analysis.
The accuracy of the FE solution in Comsol was first evaluated
using a grid sensitivity study. To be able to perform many repeated
simulations, the total simulation time has to be acceptable and with
only a limited loss of accuracy. The numerical characteristics using
three different grid resolutions; course, normal and fine, for 5 battery
cells tightly packed (a “5-cell-pack”) are shown in Table II. The “de-
grees of freedom” for the model are the lengths of the temperature
state vector that are the unknowns in the finite element analysis. The
“solution time” is the runtime for the model of the 5-cell-pack to fin-
ish. The “accuracy” means the maximum error relative to the solution
obtained by the fine grid. As seen in Table II the solution converges
at the level of fine where the solution does not change with increasing
resolution, however small deviations as well as good computational
performance are found already for the normal resolution. The grid
resolution normal was chosen for the rest of the studies here resulting
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Figure 2. Photo of 5-cell-pack placed on wire-gratings.
Table III. Test overview of 5-cell-packs.
Test No. SOC (%) Thermocouples used Burner HRR (kW)
A 100 T1, T2 16.4
B 75 T1, T2, T3, T4 16.9
C 0 T1, T2 16.4
in a maximum error from the numerical solution due to the limit in
grid size of 1.8%, as seen in Table II.
Model Validation - Experimental
As an experimental validation of the model a scenario using five
commercial Li-ion cells tied together using steel wires (0.8 mm diam-
eter) was chosen. These cells were exposed to the heat from a 16 kW
propane burner with physical dimensions of about 300 × 300 mm. The
5-cell-pack was placed on wire gratings with propane burner beneath
as seen in Figure 2. The gas and measurement collection system of the
Single Burning Item (SBI) method (EN1382349) was used for these
tests. Battery cells with different state of charge (SOC) were used
in the tests, varying from 100% to 0% SOC, denoted Test A, B and
C, see Table III. The tests were conducted both to measure the heat
release rate (HRR) of a cell undergoing a thermal runaway and also to
measure the temperatures between the cells to provide validation data
for the thermal model and the cells. The propane burner was started at
time 0 in each test. The concentrations of O2, CO and CO2 in the duct
flow were measured utilizing a Servomex 4100 Gas purity analyzer,
more specifically by using a paramagnetic analyzer for O2 and a non-
dispersive infrared (NDIR) sensor for CO and CO2. The HRR was
calculated using the method of oxygen consumption and corrected
for CO2 according to EN13823.49 The oxygen consumption method
is well-established in fire calorimetry. However, there might be some
limitations for its use for Li-ion batteries, e.g. since it does not include
heat generated from Joule heating in case of separator meltdown and
the following internal cell short circuit, electrically discharging the
cell. However, this deviation is likely to be relatively small.50,51
Figure 3. Schematic illustration of the test setup showing the placement of
the four thermocouples between the five cells; T1, T2, T3 and T4, and cell
voltage measured of the third (mid) cell.
The temperatures between the cells were measured using type K
thermocouples. Figure 3 schematically shows the placement of the
four thermocouples, T1-T4. In some tests only T1 and T2 were mea-
sured as shown in Table III. Temperatures and the cell voltage of the
middle (third) cell were measured at 1 Hz using a data logger, Pico
Technology ADC-24. The cell voltage of the mid (third) cell was
measured. The terminal tabs of the other cells were cutoff in order
to avoid short circuiting of the cells during the tests. Figure 4 shows
some photos from test A. The HRR from the propane burner alone
was measured each test day prior the battery pack tests, as a blank test,
in order to accurately measure the HRR from the burner. The HRR
from the burner for the different tests is presented in Table III. The
HRR contribution from the burner has been subtracted in all figures
presenting HRR from battery cells in this paper. Figure 5 shows the
HRR for various SOC for the 5-cell-packs. For the experiment with
100% SOC, distinct outbursts of released energy were detected, while
for the other SOC levels no such peaks were detected. The heat release
rate of fires is naturally varying even when all controllable parameters
are the same. It is thus impossible to exactly reproduce the results
of an experiment but as shown in Figure 6, where test A is repeated,
a very similar behavior is observed in repeated experiments. Figure
7 shows the measured temperatures and HRR for test A and test B.
All measured temperatures show a two step process, with a lower
heat increase rate up to a certain temperature, around a cell surface
temperature of 100–150◦C and then the second step is initiated with a
significantly more rapid temperature increase rate, up to a temperature
platau at around 400–500◦C. For test B, the measured temperatures
T4 start to rise before temperature T1 and in fact follow temperature
T2 rather close, as seen in Figure 7. This seems to be due to that the
top cell starts to burn before the cell underneath which is indicated
by the videos taken during the test. The two stage temperature de-
velopment could be due to that when a cell starts to burn underneath
another cell, the temperature recording point between the cells will
heat more rapidly. Also the thermal properties of the cell will change
as the electrolyte and separator material disappears from the cell and
thus the thermal conductivity will likely increase, since separator and
electrolyte have lower heat conductivity values then the metal parts.
Figure 4. Test A, (a) photo during fire test, photos after the test are taken from above (b) and from the longer side of the cell (c).
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Figure 5. Experimentally measured HRR for Test A (100% SOC), Test B
(75% SOC) and Test C (0% SOC).
Figure 6. Experimentally measured HRR for 100% SOC, Test A and a repe-
tition, to show repeatability.
However, possible loss of physical contacts between the parts of the
cell may also lead to a decreased thermal heat conductivity.
The generated heat release in the five battery cells, ˙Q in Eq. 1,
can be determined by the measured HRR while subtracting the burner
contribution to the HRR. For the numerical simulation, finding the
total heat release for a single cell is necessary. The bottom cell, closest
to the propane burner, will be the first of the five battery cells to catch
fire/go into thermal runaway. It is therefore important to distinguish
the heat release of the initiating bottom cell from that of the other
four cells in the tests. For the 100% SOC case, the HRR from the
Table IV. Total heat release from the 5-cell-packs.
Test SOC Total heat 1/5 of Test time when 1/5
No. (%) release, THR (kJ) THR (kJ) of THR is reached (min)
A 100 7526 1505 4.2
B 75 8132 1626 4.5
C 0 8314 1663 5.3
bottom cell can be relatively well determined by observing the HRR
data, including the first outburst peak but not the second outburst peak
in the HRR graph, seen in Figure 5. For lower SOC, which does not
show these outbursts, it is more difficult to establish the HRR release
of the bottom cell. It was therefore assumed for all SOC-levels that the
HRR curve for the initiating cell (the cell in the bottom of the set-up)
is the HRR-curve until 1/5 of the total heat release (THR, integrated
HRR) is reached as indicated in Table IV.
The 5-cell-pack used for the experimental validation did not have
any inter-cell material. In should be noted that using pouch cells in a
real battery pack would typically require use of an inter-cell support
structure, e.g. aluminum plates, for mechanical support and thermal
management of the pouch cell. Such a rigid structure could also de-
crease/hinder cell swelling in case of overtemperatures. Inter-cell ma-
terials also play an important role for cell-to-cell thermal propagation.
The experiment was set up to provide validation data for the simula-
tion model, for that purpose no inter-cell materials were used neither
desired.
Boundary Conditions for Model Validation
In order to predict the time evolution of the temperatures in an
object subject to fire, a well-defined fire source is needed, see e.g.
Anderson et al.42 For modelling purposes, a test with a mock-up was
performed under otherwise similar conditions as the 5-cell-pack fire
tests, in order to characterize the burner accurately. The mock-up had
the dimensions 222 × 147 × 40 mm, see Figure 8, and was con-
structed of Promatect clad with custom made plate thermometers.52
The dimensions of the mock-up were determined by estimations of
relative swelling, by post video analysis, of the Li-ion pouch cells
during real test conditions and the thickness of the mock-up was thus
larger than that of the initial five cells, but lower than the final height
of the swelled 5-cell-pack. Although the moisture level is very low
in Promatect it was dried for around 48 h in order to further reduce
moisture content.
The objective of the mock-up test is to estimate the impact of the
fire source on each side of the mock-up by measuring the adiabatic
surface temperature (AST) on each side using plate thermometers
and by that comparing the numerical model with the experimental
set-up. The mock-up was instrumented with type K Inconel plate
thermometers that were approximately 40 mm x 100 mm in size to fit
Figure 7. Experimentally measured temperatures and HRR, for Test A 100% SOC (left) and for Test B 75% SOC (right).
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Figure 8. The mock-up with applied instrumentation before the test.
on four sides of the mock-up. The AST is defined as the temperature
on the surface of an object that cannot absorb any heat. AST is an
artificial temperature that describe the local conditions around the
test object and replaces the radiation and convection temperature, in
Eqs. 2 and 3. Since it is adiabatic conditions ˙QT ot = 0 which gives,
0 = ˙QT ot = ˙Qr + ˙Qc = εσ
(
T 4gas − TAST 4
) + hc (Tgas − TAST )
[4]
where TAST is the adiabatic surface temperature.
Typically AST is described as,
˙Q AST = h (TAST − T ) [5]
The heat flow, ˙Q AST , is determined per unit of time and area where
h is the heat transfer coefficient. However, due to the limitations of
the physical extension of the object’s height, the size of the plate ther-
mometers were smaller than the normal 100 mm x 100 mm, indicat-
ing that the smaller sized thermometers may experience a somewhat
different convection radiation equilibrium than normal sized plate
thermometers.
The impact of the propane fire source was modelled using the Fire
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) program version 6.1.153 to determine the
gas temperatures, Tgas in Eqs. 2 and 3, around the cells and the heat
transfer coefficient, hc in Eq. 3. The impact is limited to be represented
as a set of heat transfer coefficient and temperature on the upper, lower
and side boundaries, respectively. FDS uses a computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) model solving the Navier-Stokes equations in the
limit of low-speed, thermally-driven flow with an emphasis on smoke
and heat transport from fires. The propane fire source was modelled in
a 1 × 1 × 1 cm3 grid in FDS using default values for propane with 30
× 30 grid cells over the burner surface. A grid sensitivity study was
Table V. The gas temperature and heat transfer coefficient for the
mock-up from FDS simulations, mean values for the time period 5
to 15 minutes.
Parameter Lower Upper Side
Gas temperature, Tgas [◦C] 555 119 649
Heat transfer coefficient, hc [W/(m2K)] 9.96 4.65 9.48
performed according to the FDS user’s guide53 for 5 × 5 × 5 cm3 and
1 × 1 × 1 cm3 grids and the finer grid was deemed to have enough
resolution for the present purposes. Note that for a pre-simulation
estimation of grid resolution by calculating the characteristic fire size,
D∗ =
(
˙Q
ρ∞cpT∞
√g
)2/5
[6]
results in 3.68 for the coarse mesh and 18.4 for the fine mesh for D∗/δx ,
of which the latter is appropriate for this kind of analysis according
to McGrattan el al.53 The characteristic fire size divided by the grid
cell size (D∗/δx) is a relevant quantity to determine mesh resolution
and should be in the range 10 – 20, where D∗ is determined by
the Eq. 6. Here, ρ∞ is the ambient density of air, T∞ is the ambient
temperature of air, cp is the specific heat of air and g is the gravitational
acceleration. Time slices of the simulation are shown in Figure 9 where
the representation of the flames can be seen in the left figure and the
temperature field surrounding the mock-up can be seen on the right.
The fire source was modelled using the HRRPUA option in FDS, i.e.
the HRR per unit area over the burner surface was defined using the
measured HRR from the mock-up test to determine this value. The
HRR of the propane burner was measured to 16.5 kW in a blank test
prior the mock-up test. In the FDS software, the gas temperatures
on each side of the mock-up were monitored together with the heat
transfer coefficient. The results are presented in Table V, the gas
temperatures and heat transfer coefficients are mean values calculated
for the period 5 to 15 minutes after the burner start.
The gas temperatures and heat transfer coefficients found in the
modelling using the FDS were then used in a COMSOL Multiphysics
model of the mock-up in order to make sure that the boundary con-
ditions found in the FDS simulation resulted in appropriate levels
of temperature increase for the mock-up. By comparing the simula-
tion results from COMSOL with experimental data a validation of
the complete numerical method could be achieved. The heat trans-
fer to the mock-up was modelled in COMSOL assuming radiation
from the surrounding gas on all sides, i.e. for promatec and inconcel
plate thermometers, with emissivity ε = 0.8. The thermal conductivity
k = 0.099 W/(mK), density ρ = 280 kg/m3 and specific heat capacity
cp = 2200 J/(kgK) of Promatect were taken from Ha¨ggkvist’s54 mea-
sured data at 100◦C. The model includes thin Inconel plates on the side
to simulate the conditions of the experiment, however to have reliable
results at the plates an increased number of grid cells are needed at
these locations. In total the model consists of approximately 70000
grid cells. Temperatures from the simulation and the experimental
Figure 9. Time slices of the FDS simulation of the
mock-up, showing the flames (left) and the temperature
in the vicinity of the mock-up (right).
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Figure 10. Comparison of simulated (solid lines) and measured values
(dashed lines) of the surface temperature for three sides of the mock-up.
data of the mock-up are shown in Figure 10. As seen from the figure
the agreement is reasonably good for the top and bottom surfaces
although a bit on the non-conservative side, while the temperature on
the sides is underestimated in the simulation. This is probably due
to that in the experimental test there was a small distance between
the steel plates and the Promatect on the sides which allowed much
higher heat transfer to the steel plates on the sides where the plate was
exposed to gas on both sides. Using an emissivity ε = 1.0 would result
in somewhat higher simulated temperatures, however it is expected54
that the emissivity of the object is closer to ε = 0.8 and it was therefore
chosen.
The thermal properties of Promatec and of the battery cell are very
different. Therefore, analogous FDS simulations were performed for a
Li-ion 5-cell-pack in order to obtain gas temperatures and heat transfer
coefficients also for this case, the results of which are shown in Table
VI. In the FDS model, the 5-cell-pack was modelled as a rectangular
box with the dimensions before test and thermal properties adopted
from Table I. As in the previous case of the mock-up, reported values
are mean values over the period 5 to 15 minutes after burner start. The
impact from the natural variations of the propane burner is studied by
comparing 16.4 and 16.9 kW HRR in Table VI and Table VII. As seen
from the tables, the variation in the values of Tgas and hc is maximum
4% but typically lower.
Model Validation Results
In order to validate the model results for the 5-cell-pack from the
FEM simulation are compared with experimental measurements for
Table VI. The gas temperature and heat transfer coefficient for the
5-cell-pack from FDS simulations for Test A with 16.4 kW HRR
from the propane burner.
Parameter Lower Upper Side
Gas temperature, Tgas [◦C] 537 111 610
Heat transfer coefficient, hc [W/(m2K)] 11.00 3.42 10.60
Table VII. The gas temperature and heat transfer coefficient for
the 5-cell-pack from FDS simulations for Test B with 16.9 kW HRR
from the propane burner.
Parameter Lower Upper Side
Gas temperature, Tgas [◦C] 538 116 615
Heat transfer coefficient, hc [W/(m2K)] 11.10 3.48 10.50
75% and 100% SOC. For each SOC level, the heat transfer boundary
conditions from the FDS simulation as presented in Table VI and Table
VII were used as input to the FEM simulations, with the emissivity
of ε = 0.8 on all sides. The measured HRR presented in Figure 5
was used as input for each SOC-level of the 5-cell-pack and was
deposited homogenously into the bottom cell. The HRR curve from
Figure 5, was deposited only into the bottom cell during the complete
simulation, even though the measured HRR curve also comes from
additional cells. The reason for this is that detailed information of the
HRR and the precise time for the start reactions from individual cells
are difficult to obtain. For 100% SOC level, five peaks are visible
in the HRR graph, however it is unclear which peak correspond to
which cell. For 75% SOC and lower there are no visible peaks and
the HRR is smoother making it difficult to validate without ending up
in curve fitting. Most of the HRR development has occurred during
the first 8 minutes of the test, as seen in Figure 7, and the simulation
time is thus chosen to be 8 minutes for the validation. There is of
course an error due to that all HRR is distributed only into the bottom
cell. After a certain time, the first (bottom) cell is considered to be
fully burned, and the time for this is presented in Table IV, showing
that after around 4.5 minutes the fire for the first cell is completed,
suggesting that simulation times beyond 4.5 minutes have increased
errors. This modelling choice is done in order to reduce the number
of degrees of freedom keeping in mind that the model is intended for
cell-to-cell propagation and not for a detailed cell level analysis.
Figure 11 shows both the measured and simulated results for the
four temperatures in the 75% SOC case. In Figure 11a the simulated
temperatures are derived with a model including both the HRR from
the burner and the HRR from the battery cells. In Figure 11b only the
HRR from the burner is used in order to investigate the impact for
the burner alone. The simulated temperatures are therefore naturally
Figure 11. The temperature increase for simulated (solid lines) and measured (dashed lines) values as a function of time at positions T1 – T4, for test B 75%
SOC. In the simulation both HRR from battery cells and from the fire source is applied (left) but only the HRR from the fire source (right).
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Figure 12. A magnification of Figure 11a for temperatures scale 15–145◦C.
higher in Figure 11a than in Figure 11b, simply because more heat is
present in Figure 11a. The contributions to the temperature increase
from the burner and the burning battery cells, in Figure 11a and Figure
11b, are of the same magnitude. The temperatures predicted by the
simulation are higher than the measured temperatures up to around 6
minutes after burner start. In Figure 11b, the simulation of the temper-
ature closest to the burner (T3) shows the largest discrepancy between
predicted and measured temperature which is natural since the heat
contributed by the bottom cell is not included. The heat release in the
bottom cell started already after one minute as seen in Figure 5. In the
simulation there is a large deviation between the temperature T2 and
T4, whereas the measured temperatures T2 and T4 are unexpectedly
similar. The reason for this is believed to be due to the construction
of the thermal model where the heat originates from the bottom cell
in contrast to the experimental measurements where all cells are con-
tributing to the heating. Figure 12 shows a magnification of Figure
11a up to 145◦C. The simulated values differs from the experimental
values and Figure 12 shows the limitations of the model. As discussed
below, the model was deemed as good enough to continue with a
feasibility study. In Figure 13, the temperature (T1-T2) as a func-
tion of time is shown for the test with 100% SOC. In this test, no
temperature measurements were performed for positions T3-T4. The
two step process is clearly seen in the experimental measurements.
First the cell surface temperature increases relatively slowly up to a
breaking point at around a cell surface temperature of 120◦C, and then
it increases rapidly until reaching a plateau at around 450◦C. In the
initial phase the simulations overpredict the temperature increase. The
simulations do not capture the second phase where the temperature
increases more rapidly. The simulated heat release in only the bottom
Figure 13. The simulated (solid lines) and measured (dashed lines) tempera-
tures as a function of time at position T1 and T2, for test A 100% SOC.
cell and the heat transfer coefficient change when the electrolyte and
separator have disappeared, which is expected to occur in the experi-
ment but not included in the model, is believed to explain the major
difference. However, the heat conductivity in the bottom cell is be-
lieved to increase first of the five cells, due to decrease of electrolyte
and separator, resulting in higher heat conduction to the second cell,
thereby somewhat decreasing the discrepancy between the simulation
and the measurements. The model does not cover the battery chemical
reactions and the unpredictable nature of fire and flame propagation
also prohibits an exact prediction of the temperatures. Also, the as-
sumptions and the parameters for the materials involved where kept
as general as possible to provide a rather straight-forward model for a
general purpose use. Curve fitting in order to obtain a better agreement
between experimental and simulated data was not performed. For a
more detailed discussion, the overprediction of the temperature in the
first phase could be due to that the evaporation of the electrolyte is
not considered, also the cells are assumed to be in perfect thermal
contact with each other. The simulated temperatures, shown in Figure
11 and Figure 13, are higher than the experimental values for time up
to around 6 minutes. This is in contrast to the results for the mock-up
where the simulated temperatures, shown in Figure 10, were lower
than the experimentally found values. No further investigation of this
discrepany was conducted, however the reason for the difference in
the mock-up case was probably due to the plate thermometers not
being in good contact with the promatec cladding allowing exposure
to the hot gases on both sides.
A sensitivity analysis was performed where the following param-
eters were varied; HRR (Table VI and Table VII), distance from the
propane burner (within ± 1.5 cm) and material properties of the bat-
tery pack, yielding new sets of boundary conditions. Two different
material properties were evaluated, one with the battery data (Table I)
and the other to be Promatect material (insulated material). However,
it was found that taking all these variations into account the variation
in the final temperatures between the cells were less than ±7.5◦C at
150◦C and ±26◦C at 500◦C.
The fire/thermal runaway process is complex including both evap-
oration/melting (phase transition) and combustion of e.g. electrolyte
and polymer materials, and at the same time internal short circuits
and electrolyte-electrode reactions may take place. It is difficult to
accurately capture the full depth of these processes and at the same
time have a simple enough model to be able to simulate a large num-
ber of battery cells on a battery system level. For the purpose of this
work, the model results were considered good enough and also on
the safe side (an overestimation of the temperatures), especially up
to 6 minutes, to allow a study of cell-to-cell propagation on a battery
system level. A conservative result is desirable since the methodology
is to be used in simulating propagation events in systems and modules
consisting of many cells. The validation tests, involving the external
propane burner, were used to validate the model. The thermal model
can be used without external heating. Thereby, simulation of thermal
propagation without external heat and with only heat originating from
the internal battery cell. The heat from the cell is considered fully
combusted and established by THR measurements from external fire
abuse. However, in case of another abuse situation, e.g. a spontaneous
internal cell short circuit, the released heat could differ since the cell
might not be fully combusted. In principle, for the same battery cell
type and status (same ageing etc.), any abuse type which results in
thermal runaway and total combustion of the cell materials, the THR
should be equal to the measured THR in Table IV. Total combustion
is typically difficult to obtain and in case this is not fulfilled, the mea-
sured THR in Table IV offer a conservative input as the most severe
case.
The thermal properties used as presented in Table I, were care-
fully selected from available literature values with anisotropic ther-
mal conductivity due the layer structure. However, the temperature
dependence of these parameters has not been taken into account as
no such information could be found in the literature. In addition the
overall properties will change also due to consumption of material.
In the extreme case of a completely burnt out battery cell, there will
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be no electrolyte or separator left while current collectors (aluminum
sheets and copper sheets) and parts of the original electrode layers
(e.g. carbon and LFP) may remain relatively intact, with properties
that differ significantly from the original cell. During the thermal event
the cell density is changed due to loss of material by combustion and
cell venting, however, also cell volume is changed due to swelling.
The weight of the 5-cell-pack after the complete test has decreased by
approximately 28% (350 g for 5 cells) of the original weight for all
tests and SOC levels. Our model uses a constant density and effects
of changing density are thus neglected. Also the thermal conductiv-
ity is kept constant. Especially during a thermal runaway the cell
pouch is prone to swelling, as observed during the tests although the
steel wires binding the cells together partly inhibit the swelling. The
swelling changes the area of direct contact to the neighboring pouch
cell while in the model the cells are assumed to be in direct contact
with each-other during the entire test. It should also be noted that due
to the swelling of the cells, the heat transfer to the thermocouples
will change, therefore the measured temperatures might not entirely
represent only the cell surface temperature. The error originating from
the assumed surrounding gas temperatures as well as the heat trans-
fer coefficients to the battery cells are however small as seen in the
performed sensitivity study.
A simple but useful condition determining a thermal runaway is to
set a critical onset temperature. Typically thermal runaway onset tem-
peratures found in the literature are of the order of 120–150◦C,5 since
at about 120◦C the solid electrolyte interphase (SEI) layer typically
starts to breakdown. The SEI layer protects the carbon anode from
direct contact with the electrolyte. Without the SEI layer exothermal
reactions between the anode and electrolyte can start, initiating a po-
tential thermal runaway phase and cathode-electrolyte reactions. The
cathode-electrolyte reactions have a relatively strong dependence on
the cathode material used. Electrolyte composition and additives can
also play a large role in thermal runaway characteristics. However
also the boiling temperature of the electrolyte is important. Dimethyl
carbonate (DMC) is a common organic solvent used in Li-ion elec-
trolyte mixtures. DMC has a boiling temperature of 90◦C and thus
the cell will release content before the actual thermal runaway starts.
The physical processes determining the thermal runaway onset tem-
perature are rather complex and can vary greatly for different Li-ion
battery cells. The time from an abuse situation until a thermal run-
away occurs can also be extended, e.g. three weeks, as in the case
of a Chevrolet Volt post crash test fire event.55 One should also be
aware of the difference between the temperature where self-heating
processes start which later may lead to a thermal runaway, and the
very distinct “point of no return” onset temperature that is instantly
followed by a thermal runaway. Larsson and Mellander7 studied the
onset thermal runaway temperatures for some different commercial
Li-ion chemistries by external heating and found the latter type of on-
set temperature to be about 200◦C ± 20◦C. The “point of no return”
is typically associated with the breakdown of the cathode, resulting in
high-rate exothermic reactions between the electrolyte and the cath-
ode. The melting temperature of a typcial Li-ion polymer separator
made of polyethylene (PE) or polypropylene (PP) is typically about
130◦C and 160◦C,9 respectively, and if the separator is melted an in-
ternal cell short-circuit can start between the anode and the cathode,
increasing the cell temperature further, which can lead to a thermal
runaway. Note that there are also ceramically reinforced separators on
the market with increased melting temperature, typically above 200◦C.
Model Application to a Battery Module with Fire Walls
In order to assess events on a battery system level the model
described above was extended to model a part of a battery pack. For
this purpose a 3D model was constructed in Comsol Multiphysics
comprising 20 battery cells, 2 fire walls and 11 aluminum cooling
plates seen in Figure 14. In this design, a battery module consists of
10 cells. In Figure 14, one complete battery module (with 10 cells, cell
number 6–15) and two half-battery modules (with 5 cells, cell number
1–5 and respectivily cell number 16–20) are presented. Each battery
Figure 14. Schematic 3D drawing of the simulated part of a battery system,
consisting of 20 cells (gray) with 1 mm aluminum cooling plates between
every second cell (orange) and module separation from the neighbor module
by fire walls (red) on each module side. The cells are counted as 1 to 20 with
start in the leftmost battery cell, as seen in the drawing. The dimensions and
the thermal property data of the battery cells are the same as in the previous
model, the latter can be found in Table I. The boundary conditions of each side
are shown (green text).
cell has a 1 mm thick aluminum cooling plate on one side of the cell.
On each side of the middle module there are fire walls, as illustrated in
Figure 14. The inter-cell aluminum cooling plates play an important
role for thermal management; supporting cooling, and heating in case
of cold weather, of the cells during normal use (discharge/charge) and
are thus critical in order to achieve a long battery life time. The plate
also provides mechanical support. During usage and aging a Li-ion
pouch cell is prone to swelling, of the order of a few percent, and
therefore an additional inter-cell material, e.g. a thin and soft foam,
could be used between the cells to absorb this swelling, however, in
this model this type of material is not included. The boundaries of
the model are treated as adiabatic on four sides simulating a worst
case scenario where additional battery modules are present. The top
side has a natural convection with a heat transfer coefficient of 5
W/(m2K). This condition was selected in order to simulate a situation
with cell electrical interconnections, electronics and circuit-boards
(part of Battery Management System) on top surrounded by more
or less “trapped” air. The bottom side has either an ideal heat sink
kept at a constant temperature of 20◦C, to simulate liquid cooling,
or a forced convective condition to ambient air of 20◦C having a
heat transfer coefficient of 15 W/(m2K), representative of air cooling.
The numerical model of this system is represented by approximately
700000 grid cells compared to around 18000 grid cells for the 5-
cell-pack (see Table II) and takes approximately two hours to run
on a workstation. The model do not cover heat transport through
electrical battery cell interconnections. The heat transfer from battery
vent products and smoke is distributed through the HRR in the thermal
runaway cell only and not distributed over several cells. The exact path
the vent products will take is difficult to predict. Distributing the heat
produced in the cell it originates from, will provide a conservative
estimate.
Aluminum is a potential fire wall material in battery systems, due
to its relatively light weight and excellent properties for thermal man-
agement. The relatively low melting temperature of aluminum, 660◦C,
may however be a disadvantage since it can be less than typical Li-
ion battery fire temperatures. A second material as a fire wall was
evaluated, glass fiber (duct liner), was chosen since it has significantly
different thermal properties. The evaluation of glass fiber as a fire wall
material should rather be understood as a fire protection material to
compare with aluminum, rather than claiming that glass fiber would be
an appropriate material selection for a fire wall in a future real battery
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Table VIII. Thermal properties of the fire wall materials.
Density Specific heat Thermal conductivity
Fire wall material ρ [kg/m3] cp [J/(kg K)] k [W/(m K)]
Aluminum 2700 903 238
Glass fiber (duct liner)56 32 840 0.038
system. Glass fiber (duct liner) cannot support mechanical stability,
furthermore, the influence of environmental stress (temperature, hu-
midity, vibration in case of electric vehicle) using glass fiber is neither
known nor studied. To our knowledge, the use of aluminum is rather
common in battery systems, potentially even as “fire walls”, however,
no information has been found of battery packs using glass fiber. Alu-
minum and glass fiber firewalls were investigated in this study using
different wall thickness in order to investigate their mitigating effect,
see Table VIII for thermal properties of the materials.
A number of different simulations have been performed, where
placement of the thermal event was changed. The temperatures in
adjacent cells and cells directly on the opposite side of the fire wall
were assessed. Furthermore, the influence of fire wall thickness for a
scenario with a complete module fire was also investigated.
A delay of the heat propagation can significantly mitigate the ad-
verse effects of a thermal runaway event and is thus of high interest.
Here, a few different scenarios where the thermal runaway event oc-
curs in different locations such as in the middle of the module or in
the cell closest to the fire wall are considered. Two SOC levels are as-
sessed, 75% and 100% SOC, and their corresponding HRRs. However,
for most simulations, 100% SOC is used since it was the most rapid
energy release. A cell thermal runaway is run up to approximately
1/5th of the THR, according to Table IV, and then the simulation
continues to study the temperature development in the cooling phase.
The temperature inside a cell adjacent to a thermal runaway event
determines when and if a cascade process of thermal runaways may
happen in a battery pack. There is naturally a great interest to be able
to predict and mitigate effects of single cells experiencing a thermal
runaway. For evaluation of cell-to-cell propagation, a temperature in
the cell in excess of about 120–150◦C is needed for a thermal event to
start. In order to have a high safety margin, an even lower temperature
value could be chosen, e.g. 80–100◦C. In this study we have chosen
100◦C as the critical temperature when a cell goes into thermal run-
away. In Figure 15, the 100◦C critical temperature is marked with an
orange dashed line and labeled “Limit”. In case not stated otherwise,
the presented temperature for a specific cell number is the cell surface
temperature located on the side that is closest to the heat source.
In Figure 15 the different boundary conditions and different SOC
levels are investigated for the case of a thermal event in cell 10. The
Figure 16. The thermal runaway starts in cell 6, closest to the firewall, and
the temperature development is shown for the two neighboring cells, for both
100% and 75% SOC, with forced convection on the bottom side. Fire wall of
aluminum with a thickness of 5 mm.
HRR is deposited in the cell at time 0 and during 210 s (3.5 min)
in both SOC cases and the cell is then allowed to cool down. The
time 210 s is derived from the time when 1/5th of THR is reached,
according to Table IV, but the time value is decreased since the HRR
from the battery cells will start to generate heat after approximately 1
min, as seen in Figure 5. In Figure 15 the temperatures as a function
of time are shown where the temperatures (in mid y-axis) are shown
for the adjacent cells, cell 9 and cell 11. From the results it can be
seen that an ideal heat sink kept at 20◦C would efficiently delay or
even stop further propagation of an event, however this condition is
rarely fulfilled. Furthermore it is likely that a thermal event would
first propagate in cell 9 not protected by the 1 mm Al cooling plate.
Further away from the thermal event the temperatures are well on the
safe side.
Figure 16 displays the temperature as a function of time where the
thermal event is placed in cell 6, immediately on the right hand side
of the fire wall in Figure 14. In this simulation, forced convection is
exclusively assumed on the lower side. It is found that the fire wall
can delay the thermal event by significantly reducing the temperatures
however the event would propagate to the cell 7 on the right. Also in
this case, further away from the event the temperatures are well below
100◦C. Similar to the results in Figure 15 the temperature development
for the 75% SOC case starts somewhat lower than for 100% SOC but
after 2–3 minutes the 75% SOC case results in higher temperatures.
Figure 15. The thermal runaway starts in cell 10 and the temperature development is shown for the two neighboring cells; comparing 100% and 75% SOC with
forced convection on the bottom side (left), and comparing forced convection with 20◦C heat sink at the bottom for 100% SOC (right). Fire wall of aluminum with
a thickness of 5 mm.
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Figure 17. The thermal runaway (TR) starts in cell 10, then the heat propagates and after 3.5 minutes a second thermal runaway is initiated in cell 9, for 100%
SOC, with forced convection on the bottom side and with a fire wall of aluminum with a thickness of 5 mm. (a) shows the temperature development for 4 locations
(T1-T4) in the adjacents cells, (b) schematically shows the placement of T1-T4.
Considering the two cases above it seems quite plausible that a
thermal event would propagate to the adjacent cell and thus a model
to further simulate this case was implemented. Here it is assumed that
a thermal event occurs as in Figure 15, in cell 10, however after 3.5 min
a second thermal event is started in cell 9 increasing the temperatures
further. A forced convection boundary is assumed for the lower face
in the model. In Figure 17 the temperatures as a function of time
are shown for 4 locations. Here it is less likely that the event would
propagate to cell 8 and 11; however if it would go from cell to cell fire
walls could significantly delay the event. This indicates that a thermal
event may propagate from cell to cell and thus efficient fire walls need
to be implemented to delay or partly stop a catastrophic event.
In order to evaluate the fire walls in terms of being able to stop
or delay a module-to-module propagation, all 10 cells (cell 6–15)
within a module with 100% SOC had thermal runaway initiated at the
same time. Figure 18 shows the cell temperature on the other side of
the firewall for the two types of firewall materials and with different
thicknesses; 0, 5, 10 and 20 mm. A thickness of 0 mm corresponds to
that there is no fire wall present. The temperature reduction is higher
for aluminum than for glass fiber. Figure 19 shows the temperature
in the middle of the fire wall, for the thicknesses 5, 10 and 20 mm.
Aluminum has more than 6000 times higher thermal conductivity than
glass fiber, as seen in Table VIII, resulting in removal of significantly
more heat from the fire wall to adjacent cells and cooling system.
Spreading the heat to a neighboring cell may actually be beneficial
in case the temperature increase of the adjacent cell can be kept low,
thus the heat may be distributed to a large volume, i.e. many battery
cells.
The model does not consider heat transfer through the electrical
connections between the battery cells. External heating studies on
smaller sized Li-ion cells25 have shown that the heat transfer through
the cell tabs by electrical connectors can have an important impact
on the cell-to-cell propagation. The same study found that cell spac-
ing could have a significant influence on cell propagation. In another
study35 on smaller sized cells during nail penetration abuse differ-
ent propagation characteristics were found for series and parallel
connected cells. Even within the parallel connected cells, different
electrical cell routing showed significant effect on the cell-to-cell
propagation.25 In the present model all battery cell components are
combusted, however in an overheated Li-ion cell vent gas and smoke
as well as electrolyte leakage can occur which can influence the heat
generation. In addition, considering the smoke and fire complexity,
the results could vary considerably for different cell responses to the
heating. Also the design of the battery module and pack effects e.g.
the contributions of vent gases and electrolyte leakage. Cell propaga-
tion is thus a complex issue with many parameters and much is still
unknown. In this study relatively large cells were used, no cell spacing
(in x-direction, see Figure 14) is used and the cells are not electrically
connected to each other. Furthermore, the thermal runaway data is
derived from external abuse tests by fire.
Figure 18. Temperatures in the cell adjacent (cell 5 and cell 16, due to symmetry) to the fire wall, where a thermal event occurs at the same time in all ten cells
(cell 6–15) in a module; for aluminum (left) and for glass fiber (right) fire wall.
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Figure 19. Temperatures in the center of the fire wall, where a thermal event occurs at the same time in all ten cells (cell 6–15) in a module; for aluminum (left)
and for glass fiber (right) fire wall.
Conclusions
This paper presents an attempt to predict the propagation of a
thermal runaway/fire in a cell to neighboring cells by simulating the
temperature development in the cells. The modelling work comprises
of two major steps. In the first step, the model is setup of the cells in-
cluding their thermal properties and then validating the model through
experiments were the boundary conditions in the validation test need
to be determined carefully. The validation step include an external
heat source, however, the model can be used without any external
heat source. In the second step, the model is applied to assessing
fire walls of different material and thicknesses between modules in a
battery pack.
The model is developed to require moderate computer running time
in order to be used for a fast evaluation of several different means of
preventive insulation, it is thus not modelling the pack and cells in
great detail and it overpredicts the temperature increase in the adjacent
cell compared to the validation experiment at the early stages of the
test. The thermal inertia of the cell packaging material is neglected
and the cells are assumed to be in perfect thermal contact with each
other unless there is a fire wall or other materials in between the cells.
The thermal properties are taken from literature data, the temperature
dependence of the properties is not taken into consideration, however
anisotropic heat conduction is taken into account by different conduc-
tivities in the plane of the cell compared to across the cell which is due
to the layered structure of the cells. The thermal inertia induced by
its thermal properties can be of importance close to the temperature
where the electrolyte starts to evaporate. Joule heating by electrical
short circuit as well as electrode-electrolyte reactions are neglected.
In the validation experiment the cells are exposed to a fire from below
which gives the temperature rise in the cells and then the subsequent
fire of each cell. As the cells are consumed the thermal properties will
change radically. This results in a different slope of the temperature
rise in each cell as the different cells are consumed. In the model vali-
dation all heat is assumed to be developed in the bottom cell and since
the thermal properties are constant the temperature rise has about the
same slope throughout the simulation. However, as the purpose of the
model is to screen different means to prevent propagation of a thermal
runaway to neighboring cells, and the overprediction is a conservative
result, the model is considered good enough.
A feasibility study using the model is conducted assessing two
different types of fire walls between modules consisting of 10 cells.
Different thicknesses of the fire walls are used and the initiation point
of the thermal runaway is varied. In addition, other means to cool the
cells are investigated, like using a cooling liquid. The results show
that there is a substantial risk for the spreading of thermal events in a
battery pack, although cooling systems and fire walls may limit these
risks.
The tested 5-cell-pack has an energy capacity of 0.112 kWh while
a battery pack for an electrified vehicle typically could have between
10 and 100 kWh, equal to 450 to 4500 cells of the tested cell type.
Even if larger capacity cells are used, hundreds of cells are needed in
order to achieve a high enough battery pack voltage. There can be even
larger battery packs in e.g. stationary grid applications and on ships.
Cell-to-cell fire propagation in a large battery pack could result in
considerable damage. Therefore, using experiments and simulations
of cell-to-cell propagation is important in order to design and validate
safe Li-ion battery systems.
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Abstract: Overcurrent abuse has been performed on commercial 48 Ah primary prismatic zinc
(Zn)–Air battery cells with full air supply as well as with shut-off air supply. Compared to other
battery technologies, e.g., lithium-ion batteries, metal–air batteries offer the possibility to physically
stop the battery operation by stopping its air supply, thus offering an additional protection against
severe battery damage in the case of, e.g., an accidental short circuit. This method may also reduce
the electrical hazard in a larger battery system since, by stopping the air supply, the voltage can be
brought to zero while maintaining the energy capacity of the battery. Measurements of overdischarge
currents and current cut-off by suffocation have been performed to assess the safety of this type
of Zn–air battery. The time to get to zero battery voltage is shown to mainly be determined by the
volume of air trapped in the cell.
Keywords: abuse; air supply; metal–air; overcurrent; overdischarge; primary battery; safety; suffocation;
zinc (Zn)–air
1. Introduction
New battery technologies offer power and energy densities that make it possible to construct
applications with impressive performance. Lithium-ion batteries have, for example, made it possible
to produce electric vehicles with reasonable range and there are expectations that the next-generation
batteries such as zinc (Zn)–air, lithium–air and fuel flow batteries could provide further strides towards
even more competitive products, promoting, among other things, extended electromobility in the
future [1,2]. As for all new technologies, it is important to know and understand the potential risks
associated with their applications. Lithium-ion batteries have, in general, a good safety record; however,
the cells contain reactive materials as well as a volatile and flammable electrolyte. A so-called thermal
runaway can occur in Li-ion cells, resulting in excessive heat, emission of toxic gas and eventually
fire and/or explosion [3,4]. Safety aspects for lithium-ion batteries have been studied using various
types of abuse tests such as overcharge, overdischarge, short circuiting, external heating and fire [5,6].
Such tests are very important in order to evaluate and minimize risks, not only for the different
products using these batteries but also for the storage and transportation of the cells as well as for
recycling. The risks associated with transporting lithium-ion cells by air have, for example, been a
focus recently [7].
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Among new developing technologies, the lithium–air battery has attracted considerable attention
due to its prospected very high specific energy. The Li–air battery is still far from being commercialized
and certain safety concerns are challenging [8]. In contrast to lithium-ion batteries, metal–air batteries
in general may offer the possibility to limit battery reactions by stopping the air supply to the cell.
One such battery type, the Zn–air battery, is promising in that the energy density is good, typically
of the order of 200 Wh/kg or more, the materials used are abundant and the costs of production are
expected to be comparatively low [9,10]. The battery has a hydroxide electrolyte, a Zn anode and
atmospheric oxygen is reduced at the cathode. The cell is in many respects similar to a fuel cell, and
electricity is produced as long as fuel, in this case Zn, and oxygen are available. The cell reactions are:
Anode: Zn + 4OH− → Zn(OH)42− + 2e− (1)
Electrolyte: Zn(OH)42− → ZnO + H2O + 2OH− (2)
Cathode: 1/2O2 + H2O + 2e− → 2OH− (3)
Overall: Zn + 1/2O2 → ZnO (4)
Zn–air batteries are regarded to be very safe, and risks are commonly only associated with possible
leakage of the hydroxide electrolyte and the formation of hydrogen by Zn corrosion. Early types
of Zn–air batteries contained a mercury amalgam but the present generation of these batteries is
mercury-free. Short circuit currents are generally expected to be low, and this should minimize risks
associated with external short circuits, but traditional abuse tests on these types of cells are rare.
In this study, primary Zn–air batteries were investigated regarding overcurrent and controlled air
supply flow in order to evaluate risks and possibilities related to battery safety. Besides performing
an overcurrent abuse test study on Zn–air batteries, the study particularly addresses suffocation as a
means to stop battery reactions and thus to cause battery shutdown. For metal–air batteries this is a
principal additional safety function that is not available in other battery technologies such as lead-acid,
nickel–metal hydride (NiMH) and lithium-ion batteries.
2. Experimental
2.1. The Zn–Air Cell
Tests were conducted using primary (non-rechargeable) Zn–air cells as shown in Figure 1 and
specified in Table 1. The cell contained 33% potassium hydroxide (KOH) electrolyte and had a Zn
anode and an air cathode with nano-sized manganese (Mn) and graphite (C). The outer prismatic cell
packaging material was polyethylene. The cell had 40 air holes on one side, with a diameter of about
6 mm, the total air supply area was 1130 mm2. The cells were pre-commercial/commercial cells from
QuantumSphere of type MetAir® SC Series 4.8 (QuantumSphere Inc., Santa Ana, CA, USA). Grey duct
tape, shown in Figure 1, was placed between the battery pole tabs in order to avoid accidental short
circuits. In Table 1, the values for the dimensions are given for the complete cell including outer plastic
sealing parts; the battery pole tabs are not included. There is an air-space of about 3–4 mm beneath the
cell. The volume is simply calculated by multiplying the dimensions.
This study included a total of eight cells from the same manufacturer. Four of the eight cells were
of an early design version. Before this study the new design cells were stored for around 1.5 years,
unfortunately with the outer transport seal opened, exposing them to ambient air. The early cell design
was stored for around one additional year. However, the cells seem to still have adequate performance.
The cells with early design version were used to develop and verify the test method.
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Figure 1. (a) Front and (b) back photos of the Zn–Air cell. 
Table 1. Cell properties. 
Parameter Value Unit 
Nominal open circuit voltage (OCV) 1.4 V 
Nominal voltage 1.1 V 
Rated maximum continuous discharge current 4 A 
Rated capacity at 1 A discharge 
48 Ah 
53 Wh 
Dimensions Prismatic shape, 126 × 126 × 14 mm3 
Volume 0.22 L 
Weight 270 g 
Calculated energy density 196 Wh/kg 
2.2. Measurement Setup 
Two different experimental setups were used. One where the cell had full air supply from the 
surrounding air, and one where it was suffocated completely. Impedance measurements were 
performed in free air. 
2.2.1. Open Air Setup 
The cell was in this case placed inside a suffocation bag but the cell was not suffocated, see 
Figure 2. For open air measurements the bag was not needed but was used for consistency and to 
eliminate the presence of the bag as a variable. The bag itself had a square hole which fits over 
square air intake area of the cell. The four legs of the cell fit into four holes in the corners of the bags 
hole. This keeps the cell in place relative to the bag. Cable connections, using copper crocodile 
clamps, were placed close to the base of the cells tabs. Current wires (for discharge current) and 
sense wires (for cell voltage measurement) were well separated from each other. The zip lock of the 
bag was sealed as much as possible. The measurement cables were shielded and kept well separated 
to make it easy to keep an overview of the system. 
Figure 1. (a) Front and (b) back photos of the Zn–Air cell.
Table 1. Cell properties.
Parameter Value Unit
Nominal open circuit voltage (OCV) 1.4 V
No inal voltage 1.1 V
Rated maximum continuous discharge current 4 A
Rated capacity at 1 A discharge 48 Ah
53 Wh
Dimensions Prismatic shape, 126 × 126 × 14 mm3
Volume 0.22 L
Weight 270 g
Calculated energy density 196 Wh/kg
2.2. Measurement Setup
Two different experimental setups were used. One where the cell had full air supply from
the surrounding air, and one where it was suffocated completely. Impedance measurements were
performed in free air.
2.2.1. Open Air Setup
The cell was in this case placed inside a suffocation bag but the cell was not suffocated, see
Figure 2. For open air measurements the bag was not needed but was used for consistency and to
eliminate the presence of the bag as a variable. The bag itself had a square hole which fits over square
air intake area of the cell. The four legs of the cell fit into four holes in the corners of the bags hole.
This keeps the cell in place relative to the bag. Cable connections, using copper crocodile clamps, were
placed close to the base of the cells tabs. Current wires (for discharge current) and sense wires (for cell
voltage measurement) were well separated from each other. The zip lock of the bag was sealed as
much as possible. The measurement cables were shielded and kept well separated to make it easy to
keep an overview of the system.
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Figure 2. Open air setup, the back side of the cell with the air holes, shown in the figure, had free 
access to air. 
2.2.2. Suffocation Setup 
In addition to the steps for open air measurement, three more items were used for the 
suffocation setup. Figure 3a shows the suffocation plate (to the right) consisting of a square 
aluminum plate with a 1 cm layer of hard plastic foam followed by a layer of very soft foam, and 
covered in a plastic sheet (total 0.18 kg). When pressed against the air intake of the cell, the foam 
deformed and created a tight seal on the cell. A large aluminum heat sink (1.57 kg) and a 2.05 kg 
weight were placed on top of the suffocation plate so their weight made the seal tighter. When lifting 
the suffocation in a “first sealed, then open” experiment, all three items were lifted at once for 
accurate timing. 
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Figure 3. Suffocation setup. (a) All parts are separated from each other; (b) suffocation plate is placed 
over the cell; and (c) the aluminum heat sink and 2.05 kg weight is placed on top of the cell and 
suffocation plate. 
2.3. Impedance Measurement 
The impedance was measured using a Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT 302N (Metrohm Autolab 
B.V., Utrecht, The Netherlands) with Booster 20 A module (Metrohm Autolab B.V.) and Metrohm 
Nova 1.11 Software (Metrohm Autolab B.V.). Four-wire measurements were used, in ambient room 
temperature, about 20 °C, in free air, with galvanostatic mode and an amplitude of 10 mA, frequency 
range 10 mHz–100 kHz, with 50 points logarithmically distributed. 
Figure 2. Open air setup, the back side of the cell with the air holes, shown in the figure, had free access
to air.
2.2.2. Suffocation Setup
In addition to the steps for open air measurement, three more items were used for the suffocation
setup. Figure 3a shows the suffocation plate (to the right) consisting of a square aluminum plate with
a 1 cm layer of hard plastic foam followed by a layer of very soft foam, and covered in a plastic sheet
(total 0.18 kg). When pressed against the air intake of the cell, the foam deformed and created a tight
seal on the cell. A large aluminum heat sink (1.57 kg) and a 2.05 kg weight were placed on top of the
suffocation plate so their weight made the seal tighter. When lifting the suffocation in a “first sealed,
then open” experiment, all three items were lifted at once for accurate timing.
Batteries 2017, 3, 1 4 of 10 
 
Figure 2. Open air setup, the back side of the cell with the air holes, shown in the figure, had free 
access to air. 
2.2.2. Suffocation Setup 
In addition to the steps for open  asurement, three more items were us d for the 
suffocation setup. Figure 3a shows the ation plate (to the right) consisting of a square 
aluminum plate with a 1 cm layer of hard plastic foam followed by a layer of very soft foam, and 
covered in a plastic sheet (total 0.18 kg). When pressed against the air intake of the cell, the foam 
deformed and created a tight seal on the cell. A large aluminum heat sink (1.57 kg) and a 2.05 kg 
weight were placed on top of the suffocation plate so their weight made the seal tighter. When lifting 
the suffocation in a “first sealed, then open” experiment, all three items were lifted at once for 
accurate timing. 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3. Suffocation setup. (a) All parts are separated from each other; (b) suffocation plate is placed 
over the cell; and (c) the aluminum heat sink and 2.05 kg weight is placed on top of the cell and 
suffocation plate. 
2.3. Impedance Measurement 
The impedance was measured using a Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT 302N (Metrohm Autolab 
B.V., Utrecht, The Netherlands) with Booster 20 A module (Metrohm Autolab B.V.) and Metrohm 
Nova 1.11 Software (Metrohm Autolab B.V.). Four-wire measurements were used, in ambient room 
temperature, about 20 °C, in free air, with galvanostatic mode and an amplitude of 10 mA, frequency 
range 10 mHz–100 kHz, with 50 points logarithmically distributed. 
Figure 3. Suffocation setup. (a) All parts are separated from each other; (b) suffocation plate is placed
over the cell; and (c) the aluminum heat sink and 2.05 kg weight is placed on top of the cell and
suffocation plate.
2.3. Impedance Me surement
The impedance was me sured using a Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT 302N (Metrohm Autolab B.V.,
Utrecht, The Netherlands) with Booster 20 A module (Metrohm Autolab B.V.) and Metrohm Nova 1.11
Softwar (Metrohm Autolab B.V.). Four-wire measure ents were used, in ambient room te perature,
about 20 ◦C, in free air, with galvanostatic mode and an amplitude of 10 mA, frequency range
10 mHz– 00 kHz, with 50 points logarithmically distr buted.
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2.4. Discharging Measurement
The discharging measurements were also performed using the Metrohm Autolab PGSTAT 302N
with a Booster 20 A module. Current and voltage were recorded at a rate of one measurement per
second. The cell was orientated airside up, in order to easily control the air supply to the cell surface.
The cell was placed in ambient room temperature (around 20 ◦C). The cell tabs were further separated
by a large piece of duct tape (seen in Figures 1 and 2) attached to the cell to avoid any risk of short
circuit. The bottom of the cell was sealed by the cell design; however, an additional seal composed
of a plastic bag and tape was used for all the experiment performed in this study. The suffocation
was applied according to the setup described in Section 2.2.2. A rest period of at least 2 h was used
between two sequential discharging experiments until the open circuit voltage (OCV) was stabilized.
3. Results and Discussion
In all tests, a 60-s rest phase prior the start of the discharging was used for monitoring, and
a longer rest phase of 900 s was used after discharging to record the recovery of the cell potential.
Note that the given times in the paper are referring to the time from the start of discharge, i.e., add 60 s
to the value, to correspond to the time scales in the figures.
The maximum allowed continuous discharge current of the cells is 4 A according to the
manufacturer. Two types of measurements were performed. For the first type, each cell was discharged
at 4 A both in open air and suffocated for 150 s or until the cell potential reached 0 V. A total of four
tests were conducted for each cell, two in open air and two suffocated. In Figure 4, the results for
one of the cells (cell 1) are shown. The time to reach 0 V during suffocation was 120 s. In the second
type of measurement, the sealing of the cell was lifted at a pre-determined time. Also, in this type of
experiment, an initial 60 s rest period was used followed by a 240 s, 4 A discharge phase where the
suffocation was lifted 75 s after discharge initiation (135 s from the test start), as shown in Figure 4.
These results were reproducible; repeated tests on two samples are shown in Figure 5. The experiments
show that the cell recovered rapidly to the original OCV after suffocation, provided air access was
granted. When the cell is open to air, the voltage recovers rapidly; when the cell is sealed during
the whole experiment (green curve/symbols in Figure 4), the recovery is slow. The small differences
shown in Figure 5 are due to minor differences regarding the voltage when the sealing was removed.
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Figure 4. Voltage (filled symbols) and current (open symbols) measurements for cell 1 for three different
tests using a discharge current of 4 A; in open air; sealed (suffocated) for 150 s or until the cell potential
reached 0 V; and first sealed (suffocated) then open in air.
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next in case 0.0 V was reached. One of the cells showed a voltage of 76 mV at the end of the 8 A step; 
when changing to 10 A, the voltage rapidly reached 0 V and the test stopped. The other cell shown in 
Figure 6 showed a larger initial voltage drop and had a lower potential profile during the complete 
tests. That cell also passed the 8 A step, but not the 10 A step. Therefore, the maximum continuous 
current is estimated to be 8 A. This current level was used for the additional tests. Since the cells are 
rated for 4 A, using currents above this value is, by definition, an overcurrent. The short circuit 
current, Isc, i.e., the current through an external conductor with negligible resistance connecting the 
battery pole tabs, depends on, e.g., the current path size through the battery tabs and the rate of the 
electrochemical reactions creating the short circuit current. Isc is, in general, time-dependent (as well 
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Figure 7 shows the results for the same type of measurements as in Figure 4 but with an 8 A 
discharge current. With suffocation, 0.0 V was reached 36 s after the start of the discharge in the first 
Figure 5. Voltage (filled symbols) and current (open symbols) measurements for sealed then open,
for two repetitions per cell and for two different cells, cells 1 and 2.
The tests ere also performed in order to find the maxi um current t at a cell can sustain for
2 min, as shown in Figure 6. This current was later used for maximum discharge tests. During the tests,
the cell was disch rged by a curr t of 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9 and 10 A for 2 mi each, in this order. A cutoff
triggered at 0. V cell potential was used, whic stopped the running step and jumped to the next
in cas 0.0 V was reached. One of the cells showed a voltag of 76 mV at t end of the 8 A step;
when changing to 10 A, the voltage rapidly reached 0 V and the test stopped. The other cell shown in
Figure 6 showed a larger initial voltage drop and had a lower potential profile during the complete
tests. That cell also passed the 8 A step, but not the 10 A step. Therefore, the maximum continuous
current is estimated to be 8 A. This current level was used for the additional tests. Since the cells
are rated for 4 A, using currents above this value is, by definition, an overcurrent. The short circuit
current, Isc, i.e., the current through an external conductor with negligible resistance connecting the
battery pole tabs, depends on, e.g., the current path size through the battery tabs and the rate of the
electrochemical reactions creating the short circuit current. Isc is, in general, time-dependent (as well
as dependent on various additional parameters, e.g., cell type and design, temperature, aging, state of
charge (SOC)) and was not investigated in this study since we needed a continuous current for our
measurements; the current used was therefore lower than Isc.
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Figure 7 shows the results for the same type of measurements as in Figure 4 but with an 8 A
discharge current. With suffocation, 0.0 V was reached 36 s after the start of the discharge in the first
run, and after 33 s in a second run (not shown). In open air, the cell delivered 8 A in 120 s; however,
by the end of the discharge the voltage was only 14 mV. For the second run of 8 A in open air, the cell
reached 0.0 V after 107 s, and did thus not reach the 120 s goal. In the sealed and open air run, the seal
was removed at around 0.23 V, 27 s after the start of the discharge. The 8 A current was maintained in
this case until 0.0 V was reached 135 s after the start of the discharge. A comparison between 4 A and
8 A is shown in Figure 8 for the three air supply cases.
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The suffocation experiments show that the potential of the cells rapidly goes to zero when the 
air supply is stopped. Starting from the cell reactions, Equations (1)–(4), our calculations show that 
the required air flow to the cell is 0.56 mL/s at a standard temperature and pressure, for a discharge 
current of 1.0 A. In the present case, for the 4 A discharge, the cell reached 0.0 V after approximately 
120 s, corresponding to an air volume of 269 mL trapped inside cell. This volume is very close to the 
actual volume of the prismatic cell. For the 8 A overcurrent case, the suffocation resulted in a zero 
potential value already after 36 s, corresponding to an air volume of 161 mL. Of course, in this case 
the cell potential was decreasing also in open air, so the lower value is not unexpected. It should also 
be noted that the cell potential recovered quickly when the cells were re-exposed to air. 
One of the important safety questions tested is: if the air supply at the cathode is stopped, is it 
possible to stop the battery operations efficiently in case of an emergency situation? The obtained 
results show that suffocation of the cell can indeed bring the cell potential to zero within a short 
period of time and stop further propagation of the internal reactions. The procedure is mainly 
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The suffocation experiments show that the potential of the cells rapidly goes to zero when the
air supply is stopped. Starting from the cell reactions, Equations (1)–(4), our calculations show that
the required air flow to the c ll is 0.56 mL/s at a standard temperature and pressure, for a discharge
current of 1.0 A. In the present case, for the 4 A discharge, the cell reached 0.0 V after approximately
120 s, corresponding to an air volume f 269 mL trapped i side cell. This volume i very close to the
actual volume of th prismatic cell. For the 8 A overcur ent cas , the suffocation resulted n a zero
potential value already after 36 s, corresp nding to an air volume of 161 mL. Of course, in this case the
cell potential was decreasing also in open air, so the lower value is not unexpected. It should also be
noted that the cell potential recovered quickly when the cells were re-exposed to air.
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One of the important safety questions tested is: if the air supply at the cathode is stopped, is it
possible to stop the battery operations efficiently in case of an emergency situation? The obtained
results show that suffocation of the cell can indeed bring the cell potential to zero within a short
period of time and stop further propagation of the internal reactions. The procedure is mainly limited
by the volume of the cell packaging. The shutdown time is a function of the available air volume
within the battery cell, and in the case of a battery pack also including the free air inside the battery
system. For example, for a battery module/pack using a stack of Zn–air cells electrically connected in
series and/or parallel, the amount of free air in the battery pack, arising from, e.g., interconnecting
cell spacing, should be minimized in order for suffocation to be efficient. However, free air volumes
are typically minimized anyway in order to achieve a compact battery pack size. Anyhow, some
additional free air volumes might be useful and required for thermal management (cooling/heating)
of the battery cells. The shutdown rate using suffocation may also be improved by lowering the
available air volume by removing air from the system. In case of an emergency shutdown, the need
of reducing the amount of oxygen in the free air volume can be supported by other methods, e.g.,
by a pump which could rapidly empty the free air volume; however, a too-fast pressure reduction
could potentially harm the battery cell. The evaluation and testing of removing air by pumping was,
however, not included in this study. In case of a battery pack with considerable free air space available,
a shut-off air supply may result in a safe shutdown only after a relatively long time (including possible
negative side-effects, e.g., additional pack heating due to ongoing cell discharging, etc.); nevertheless,
a shutdown will eventually occur. Suffocation might thus be valuable also in this case as a potential
passive safety shutdown method, as a complement to other shutdown techniques. There are faster
ways to reach voltage shutdown, e.g., using electrical current fuses, contactors switching off and
other circuit breakers. There are also internal cell safety devices for voltage shutdown, e.g., positive
temperature coefficient (PTC) devices in case of an overcurrent. Furthermore, the suffocation offers an
additional battery safety layer and an alternative means of battery shutdown which is not available in
other battery technologies, e.g., Li-ion, NiMH and lead-acid batteries.
An additional essential safety improvement using suffocation for metal–air batteries would be the
improved electrical hazard safety. The hazardous voltage in a large battery pack could, in principle,
be brought to zero by using suffocation and combining it with a battery management system (BMS)
controlled discharge circuit to empty the residual battery voltage. This way the battery would have
its energy capacity preserved but with no hazardous voltage present. That could offer significant
advantages for personal safety in manufacturing, transport, rescuing, service, maintenance etc. With an
engineering design it is probably possible to make the suffocation a passive technique with autonomous
safety, e.g., very valuable in a battery electric vehicle crash situation, in large battery packs used in
stationary energy storage systems, in vessels, etc. The demonstrated principle of suffocation could thus
be a useful safety device in future large battery packs of metal–air cells, e.g., in Li–air battery systems.
In the event of suffocation, a further complication may possibly arise due to hydrogen gas
production from the corrosion of Zn:
Zn + 2H2O→ Zn(OH)2 + H2 (5)
The safety instruction for Zn–air batteries thus advises to always have good ventilation around
the cell. Using suffocation for an emergency stop procedure is, however, not likely to cause safety
problems with hydrogen production, since the suffocation will also stop the supply of humid air.
The age and SOC of the cell did not seem to influence the results in any substantial way. One cell
(cell 1) was, after the previous discharge and overcurrent abuse, tested with 1 A discharge currents
in steps of 5 Ah until 0.0 V was reached. The potential dropped significantly only close to the end of
life and the internal impedance increased as the capacity was depleted. Figure 9 shows impedance
measurements of the same cell during its use, at 0, 3.9 and 25.6 Ah discharge. Impedance plots of
zinc–air batteries are complex but can often be described by a low-frequency part mainly related to
cathode reactions, possibly also including a Warburg diffusion element, a medium-frequency part
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mainly related to the anode; while the high-frequency region shows an inductive response that can be
due to electrode porosity, cell geometry and electrical leads [11,12]. The impedance plots in Figure 9
show similar behavior but data are too limited to make an in-depth analysis in this case. Nevertheless,
the results show that the series resistance (determined from the intersection with the real axis in the
complex impedance plot) increased from about 18.3 mΩ to 28.2 mΩ at end of life (a 54% increase),
and that the medium-frequency impedance increased with the increased discharge as expected as the
anode is consumed. Also, the low-frequency part is affected, maybe partially as a consequence of
the formation of zinc oxide as suggested by Schröder et al. [13]. It can be noted that the 25.6 Ah total
discharged capacity is lower than the rated capacity (48 Ah with a 1 A discharge current); however,
the cell had underwent abusive tests including higher discharge currents than 1 A, prior to the final
discharge procedure with a 1 A discharge current.
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Figure 9. Impedance measurements for cell 1 showing real vs. imagined part three times: the 
beginning of life (0 Ah), intermediate measurement (3.9 Ah), and at the end of the testing (25.6 Ah), 
with a magnification around the origin in the inset. 
4. Conclusions 
Zn–air batteries are regarded as having a very high safety level since the possibilities for 
unwanted reactions are low and spontaneous reactions, e.g., as a consequence of an internal error, 
are unlikely. Furthermore, even if this battery technology is regarded to be very safe, interrupting 
the flow of air by suffocation could be a useful additional safety device, e.g., in case of internal or 
external short circuits or in case there is a risk of excessive temperatures, especially for larger battery 
systems. In this study it has been shown that suffocation may be an efficient method to bring the 
battery cell potential to zero and thus stop battery reactions within a short time. Using suffocation as 
a method to halt battery reactions may be a general possibility for batteries with an air cathode to be 
used in case of, e.g., internal short circuit events or external violence such as nail penetration or 
deformation in order to shut down a battery system. This method may also reduce the electrical 
hazard in a larger battery system since, by stopping the air supply, the voltage can be brought to 
zero while maintaining the energy capacity of the battery. As a consequence, this method may be 
considered also for emerging battery techniques such as the Li–air battery. 
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4. Conclusions
Zn–air batteries are regarded as having a very high safety level since the possibilities for unwanted
reactions are low and spontaneous reactions, e.g., as a consequence of an internal error, are unlikely.
Furthermore, even if this battery technology is regarded to be very safe, interrupting the flow of air
by suffocation could be a useful additional safety device, e.g., in case of internal or external short
circuits or in case there is a risk of excessive temperatures, especially for larger battery systems. In this
study it has been shown that suffocation may be an efficient method to bring the battery cell potential
to zero and thus stop battery reactions within a short time. Using suffocation as a method to halt
battery reactions may be a general possibility for batteries with an air cathode to be used in case of,
e.g., internal short circuit events or external violence such as nail penetration or deformation in order
to shut down a battery system. This method may also reduce the electrical hazard in a larger battery
system since, by stopping the air supply, the voltage can be brought to zero while maintaining the
energy capacity of the battery. As a consequence, this method may be considered also for emerging
battery techniques such as the Li–air battery.
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